


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WOMEN IN COMBAT



FINAL REPORT

JUNE 1986

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policy. The purpose of the study was to determine if changes are required to current Army policy governing utilization of women in combat.

Findings are based on research of literature pertinent to the roles of women in combat, workshops conducted by the WCTF with TRADOC Proponency Offices, visits to FORSCOM and TRADOC posts and units, briefings to field commanders and questionnaires and interviews with selected groups of Army personnel.

Conclusions and recommendations offer a comprehensive and consistent assignment policy for women based on a study group determination that the intent of Congress is to exclude women soldiers from primary offensive killing roles in combat. The recommendations address, with equal concern, the need for mandatory physical strength standards by MOS and development of a "gender free" physical demands strength test as a predictor of a recruit's ability to qualify for the physical strength requirements of an MOS prior to award of an MOS.

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6. TRADOC BULLETIN 5	1
7. TRADOC BULLETIN 6	1
8. TRADOC BULLETIN 7	1
9. TRADOC BULLETIN 8	1
10. TRADOC BULLETIN 9	1
11. TRADOC BULLETIN 10	1
12. TRADOC BULLETIN 11	1
13. TRADOC BULLETIN 12	1
14. TRADOC BULLETIN 13	1
15. TRADOC BULLETIN 14	1
16. TRADOC BULLETIN 15	1
17. TRADOC TRAINING TEXT 17-50-3	1
18. TRADOC TRAINING TEXT 100-44-1	1
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SUBJECT: Women in Combat Task Force Report, Letter of Transmittal

Cdr, TRADOC (ATCD-S), Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000 29 Jun 86

TO: HQDA(DAPE-ZA) WASH D.C. 20310-0300

The enclosed Training and Doctrine Command final report on Women in Combat is approved. We stand ready to assist you in implementation.

Encl
nc


WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
General, United States Army
Commanding

CF:

HQDA (DAPE-MP-DR)

CDR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATZL-CAI

26 JUN 1986

SUBJECT: Women in Combat Task Force Report, Letter of Transmittal

Commander
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATCH-D
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651

1. References.
 - a. AR 5-5, Army Studies and Analysis, 15 Oct 81.
 - b. TRADOC Pam 11-8, Army Programs, Studies and Analysis Handbook, 19 Jul 85.
 - c. FONECON, Cdr, TRADOC, to DCdr, CACDA, 22 Jul 85 directing initiation of study group to relook how women should be employed on the battlefield.
2. The Women in Combat Task Force Coordinating Draft Report is submitted.
3. The recommended distribution is listed in Appendix I.
4. The complete report is unclassified. There are no releasing restrictions for security reasons. Coordination draft releaseable only within HQ, TRADOC.
5. This report provides recommended changes to the Army's existing assignment policy on women, Direct Combat Probability Coding.
6. The recommendations contained in this report are the result of research and analysis by the Women in Combat Task Force, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Task Force examined current assignment policies, researched available data, and formulated recommended changes to Direct Combat Probability Coding Policy.
7. The findings and recommendations of this study group have been coordinated with branch and functional area proponents and with HQ, TRADOC.

ATZL-CAI

26 JUN 1986

SUBJECT: Women in Combat Task Force Report, Letter of Transmittal

8. Request approval of subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


CARL J. UNDERHILL
Major, GS
Secretary General Staff

Enc1

1. Women in Combat Task Force
Coordinating Draft Study Report

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21 MAY 1986

ACN 83701

WOMEN IN COMBAT TASK FORCE STUDY REPORT

Coordinating Draft Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study was initiated by Headquarters TRADOC, and performed by the Combined Arms Integration Directorate, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This report has been approved by Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, and accepted by the Commanding General, TRADOC.

The conclusions and recommendations of this study are those of the Commander, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity. They are based on data gathered and analyzed by the Women in Combat Task Force study group, working under the Director, Combined Arms Integration Directorate, COL Johnny R. Hubbard, as CACDA Study Director. The study group included LTC Fredrick J. Cart, Study Team Chief, and the following team members: LTC Raphael Luente, CPT Anthony Bruno, CPT Allen Fleming, CPT Susan Griesemer, and SSG Roy Wise.

LTC Sam McKenty and MAJ Steve Accinelli served as special consultants during the study.

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
TITLE PAGE	1
NOTICES	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	vi
MAIN REPORT	
CHAPTER I	Introduction
CHAPTER II	Combat Exclusion
CHAPTER III	Physical Standards
CHAPTER IV	Combat Effectiveness
CHAPTER V	Conclusions and Recommendations
APPENDICES	
APPENDIX A	Study Directive
APPENDIX B	Glossary
APPENDIX C	Commander's Assessments
APPENDIX D	WCTF Survey
APPENDIX E	Combat Exclusion Layout
APPENDIX F	Alternatives to Physical Strength Standards
APPENDIX G	Recommendations of Previous Studies
APPENDIX H	References
APPENDIX I	Distribution
APPENDIX J	DD Form 1473 Report Documentation Page
FIGURES	
Figure 2-1	DCPC - The Problem
Figure 2-2	Female Soldier Assignment Policy
Figure 2-3	Cluster Security
Figure 2-4	MOS/Unit Closure Criteria
Figure 2-5	Combat Exclusion Position Coding
Figure 2-6	DCPC As Designed To Be
Figure 2-7	WCTF Proposal
Figure 3-1	Army Modified DOL Physical Demand Classification System
Figure 3-2	Factor Analysis of Physical Task Elements Contributing to Military Job Performance
Figure 3-3	Lifting Capacity of Men and Women
Figure 3-4	Physical Strength Qualifications for Chosen MOS
Figure 3-5	Distribution of Female Soldiers by Strength Capability Category
Figure 4-1	Components of Combat Effectiveness
Figure 4-2	First Term Soldier Attrition
TABLES	
Table 2-1	WCTF Unit Coding Summary
Table 3-1	Contrasted Strength Data From Military Samples

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ABSTRACT

The TRADOC Women in Combat Study was conducted by the Women in Combat Task Force (WCTF) Study Group organized under the Combined Arms Integration Directorate, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This document is the final report of that effort.

The TRADOC Women in Combat study was undertaken as a short-term effort to evaluate the current Army policy governing assignment and utilization of women soldiers in the combat zone, focusing on the Direct Combat Probability Coding policy. The purpose of the study was to determine if changes are required to current Army policy governing utilization of women in combat.

Findings are based on research of literature pertinent to the roles of women in combat, workshops conducted by the WCTF with TRADOC Proponency Offices, visits to FORSCOM and TRADOC posts and units, briefings to field commanders and questionnaires and interviews with selected groups of Army personnel.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE. The Women in Combat Task Force (WCTF) study group was initiated at the direction of Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Its mission was to examine how the Army should assign and utilize female soldiers to enhance Army combat effectiveness in the AirLand Battle environment. This examination was to be made without regard to the influence of past or present Women in the Army studies.

2. BACKGROUND.

a. Study Group Formation. The WCTF study group was formed as an adjunct to the Combined Arms Integration Directorate, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The study group consisted of six full-time and two part-time personnel from the Combined Arms Center (CAC). Additionally, the CAC branch proponency offices, the Soldier Support Center, and the Logistics Center assisted as required. The study group was initially chartered for 90 days. This period was subsequently extended, and the entire effort required 10 months to complete.

b. Basis of the Study. In November 1983, the Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system was implemented by the Secretary of the Army as Army policy specifying where women may be assigned on the battlefield. Both DCPC and the MOS physical demands analysis, a methodology for addressing longstanding field commanders' concerns regarding the lesser physical strength of female soldiers, resulted from the Women in the Army Policy Review Group (WITAPRG) study completed in 1982. The WITAPRG recommendations addressing physical strength--the MOS Physical Demands Analysis--have not been fully

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implemented by Department of the Army. Since the implementation of DCPC, a number of concerns have arisen. These concerns center, first, around the operational commander's difficulty in making DCPC fit with the evolving AirLand Battle Doctrine and revised threat assessments and, secondly, the administrative inequities that are being experienced. This latter area includes inconsistent probability coding of duty positions, unequal career progression opportunities for both males and females in various career fields, and a confusing array of probability codes to deal with. Other concerns have also been raised by field commanders and branch proponents regarding the capability of women soldiers to perform in a combat environment, and the adverse impact on combat service support and combat support unit mission accomplishment that has resulted from the use of "battlefield location" as one of the criteria for determining female assignments under DCPC policy. At the invitation of ODCSPER, HQDA in early 1985, several of the proponents developed approaches to solving these problems. During presentations at a Specialty Proponent General Officer Steering Committee in May 1985, it became apparent that there was wide variation among the proponents in their approaches to the method of analysis, interpretation, and application of DCPC guidelines. Because of the need for a review of the impact of DCPC policy and other concerns not directly addressed by DCPC policy, as well as a desire on the part of the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command that a solution to these problems be comprehensive and consistent in approach and application, the WCTF was formed to address the issue of how women should be employed on the battlefield.

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3. METHODOLOGY. As initially conceived, the WCTF study was to be a short-term action necessarily limited in scope, design, and depth of research. Subsequent extension of the study time frame allowed for a more thorough evaluation of the key issues.

a. Information Gathering. The WCTF approach involved research of both published and unpublished studies and reports, field visits, a questionnaire survey of selected groups, and workshops with branch/functional area proponents. The field visits included both specific data-gathering ventures at other TRADOC activities, and obtaining assessments of five division commanders and two major Army command commanders, as well as their staffs, regarding initial study findings and the general performance of women soldiers in those commands. A study-group developed survey questionnaire was administered to 1,102 personnel, principally resident students of the Command and General Staff college, Combined Arms Service Staff School, and the Sergeants Major Academy. Finally, two workshops held at CAC involved the branch and functional area proponents within TRADOC.

b. Study Parameters. The criteria for measuring the validity of study findings were that any recommendations must:

- (1) Support combat effectiveness, e.g., the Army's capability to carry out its mission on the battlefield.
- (2) Be consistent in approach and application to designating positions throughout the Army force structure where women may or may not serve.
- (3) Be consistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine and with current estimates of Threat doctrine and capabilities.

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c. Additional Study Questions. In addition to the preceding study group mission statement, four specific questions were initially posed for answering during the study. These questions were:

- (1) If we were just beginning to access women into the Army and had no policy, where would we draw the assignment line?
- ✓ (2) While women may be able to do the job in a peacetime environment, is it realistic to assume they can physically and psychologically do the job during war?
- ✓ (3) Practically and culturally, is it sound to assign women to positions forward of corps?
- ✓ (4) What do other countries of our cultural background, such as England and France, have for a policy?

d. Issue Development. In order to focus the scope of the study within resources available while providing a consistent approach to assignment policy, the issues bearing directly on policy were separated from issues that could and should be addressed through routine personnel management procedures. An effective Army policy must be the foundation from which personnel management issues can be addressed. Therefore, issues relating to professional development, career progression and personnel turbulence were excluded from the direct focus of this study. While these are important in the context of personnel management, basic policy development should drive these matters rather than the reverse. Research efforts eventually focused on three areas: refinement of DCPC, support for job related physical strength standards, and analysis of a broad range of topics termed combat effectiveness concerns. As the study progressed, the combat effectiveness concerns were narrowed to a focus on pregnancy, soldier bonding and the impact on mission performance of sole parents and married service couples. ✓ A

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4. SUMMARY. The findings in this report are based on studies conducted by various Army research activities, data maintained by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center and ODCS PER, HQDA, and published materials from the Congressional Record, Army doctrinal publications, and other sources. Inputs from major field commands were also given significant weight since these organizations are staffed and commanded by those who are ultimately responsible, on a daily basis, for the combat readiness of the nation's ground combat forces. The findings and recommendations of the study are outlined below.

a. Combat Exclusion. The intent of Congress and of the American public is that female members of the Armed Forces should be excluded from combat. The meaning of the term "combat" in public usage is not precise, especially as it might apply to ground forces in the modern AirLand Battle environment. However, a clear operational concept of combat for this purpose can be determined by considering the missions and functions of the various force elements in the Army. The central function of ground combatants is to kill or destroy the enemy by offensive action using direct and indirect fire weapons. While all military forces support this function, only certain identifiable elements are assigned this mission and perform it within recognized doctrinal tenets. Those military occupational specialties (MOSS) and units that have a mission or function of seeking to engage and destroy enemy forces in offensive combat must be closed to women soldiers in order for the Army to comply with national policy. Except for this combat exclusion policy, there are no sound reasons--practical or cultural--to categorically deny women assignments anywhere on the AirLand Battlefield as long as they are qualified to perform

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the required duties. The concept of protecting females from the violence of combat and the risks of being killed, wounded or captured on the modern battlefield is inconsistent with the practice of having them in the Army. Women cannot be protected from the enemy on the AirLand Battlefield and, in fact, must participate equally with men in killing or destroying enemy forces as necessary to defend themselves and their unit. The concept of the current Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) policy as a methodology for implementing combat exclusion is sound. Implementation of the concept requires modification to improve understanding by all concerned, to achieve consistency in application throughout the Army, and to support the unit commander's flexibility in utilizing assigned personnel. The following recommendations will provide for a combat exclusion policy that better supports the combat effectiveness of Army forces:

(1) Base the definition of areas and positions from which females are excluded on the following female soldier assignment policy rather than the current definition of direct combat:

Women may serve in all units and MOSs which do not have a TOE or doctrinal mission to destroy the enemy by direct application of offensive force, whether by fire, maneuver, or shock effect. The level of unit closed to women will be determined by the doctrinal employment of the unit and/or its organic subordinate elements in performing offensive combat missions. Women may serve in all MOSs except those whose specified duties involve the application of offensive force to destroy the enemy.

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(2) Revise the criteria for coding MOSS/units/positions as open or closed to women to discontinue use of battlefield location as a criterion.

Coding criteria would be as follows:

✓(a) MOS/Special Skill Identifiers having wartime duties or tasks involving the primary offensive mission of killing or destroying the enemy will be closed to women.

(b) Units which have a mission involving the primary offensive function of killing or destroying the enemy will be closed to women.

(c) Normal doctrinal employment of a unit in executing the mission will determine the size of the unit (platoon, company, battalion) closed to women.

(3) Use only two codes to designate all duty positions in Army authorization documents as open or closed to women. Since these codes would not designate "probability of combat," a code set other than "P"-codes should be used; e.g., "X" to designate closed positions and "O" to designate open positions.

(4) Make combat exclusion coding decisions only at the following level of detail:

(a) MOS/Special Skill Identifier and Officer Areas of Concentration/Additional Skill Identifier, and

(b) Type and size of unit.

(c) Authorized positions within units will be mechanically coded based on (a) and (b), above.

b. Physical Strength. Matching the physical strength capability of a soldier to the physical strength requirements of a job is one of the most

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basic determinants of combat effectiveness. Technological advances that either have been realized or are being developed will not alleviate the requirement for a great deal of strenuous physical activity on the part of lower grade enlisted soldiers, especially in a combat environment. The lack of adequate physical strength to meet the requirements of the physically demanding MOSs is a problem with some soldiers of both sexes. The subject is addressed in this study because it is of considerably greater concern with female soldiers since they possess, on average, significantly less physical strength than do males. Female soldiers can physically do any military job both in peacetime and wartime if they are selected and trained based on individual capability to perform the requirements of the MOS and related tasks. The proportion of females who can do the physically demanding jobs is, however, much smaller than the proportion of males due to physiological differences between the sexes. Since enlistees, both male and female, are presently being permitted to select an MOS without regard to the physical capacity necessary to perform required duties, the mission capability of some units is being noticeably degraded. Such information is generally not being reported by field commanders, however, because of a widespread belief that to do so would jeopardize one's career regardless of the merit of the case. This study group, like those before it, is convinced that physical strength capacity of an individual should be made a mandatory criterion for MOS qualification by all soldiers on a gender-free basis. The concern for difficulty in recruiting sufficient qualified females to fill the large numbers of positions in the physically demanding MOS should be subordinated to the paramount concern of recruiting a combat-effective Army. Prior to implementing a mandatory physical strength criterion for MOS, there are certain administrative actions

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that must be completed to ensure a fair and objective set of standards that blocks the potential for MOS entry discrimination against either sex. Although a great deal of productive effort has been devoted in recent years to describing the required duties and functions of each MOS and to rating the physical demands required of the incumbent, inaccuracies remain. Further, there appears to be a lack of effective central control and authority to initiate a priority effort toward completing these actions and implementing a mandatory physical strength qualification system. The following recommendations, if implemented, would effectively eliminate the most significant personnel-related factor degrading unit combat effectiveness:

- (1) Institute physical strength to meet MOS job related standards as a mandatory criterion for MOS entry and qualification of all soldiers, regardless of gender.
- (2) Base the physical strength standards for each MOS on duty performance in a field (combat) environment.
- (3) Validate the physical demands analysis (PDA) and physical performance tasks (PPTs) in AR 611-201 for every MOS, with emphasis on the following:
 - (a) PDAs and PPTs accurately describe how the task is to be accomplished in the field environment, to include inherent and common soldier tasks.
 - (b) PDAs and PPTs accurately and consistently reflect the actual amount of force or effort required on the part of an individual to perform a task.

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(4) Revise current Military Enlistment Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) to use the incremental lift device at the end of the basic combat training (BCT) cycle rather than using alleged job related tasks at the end of the advanced individual training (AIT) cycle.

(5) Include the average percentage gain in physical strength for each sex, resulting from the physical conditioning achieved during BCT, in initial physical qualification assessment at MEPS.

(6) Appoint TRADOC as the Department of the Army executive agent for implementing of DA policy regarding physical strength standards and qualification. As executive agent, TRADOC would establish strong, effective administrative control over the physical demands analysis and physical strength test validation processes to achieve early implementation of mandatory qualification standards.

(7) Designate the Soldier Support Center National Capital Region as the responsible TRADOC integrating center for carrying out TRADOC responsibilities as DA executive agent.

c. Combat Effectiveness. From an extensive literature review, the WCTF study group developed a list of 19 components or factors that address the combat effectiveness of soldiers. The components that deal directly with where females should serve on the battlefield, and with required physical strength and stamina, are treated separately as major study topics. Of the remaining 15 items on the original list, only the issues of deployability and attrition, which boiled down essentially to the impact of pregnant soldiers and married service couples on unit combat readiness, evolved into substantive study topics. The adverse impact of pregnant soldiers on combat effectiveness in terms of unit operational readiness, capability for rapid overseas

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deployment, and mission accomplishment is second only to the physical strength issue among commanders. The most significant reasons for this impact are the extensive absence from authorized positions, especially in low density MOSs and/or duty positions believed hazardous to the fetus due to physical or environmental conditions, and the long-term nondeployable status related to pregnancy. Some of the lost duty time of pregnant soldiers is probably due to a widespread lack of understanding by male commanders and supervisors of the condition of pregnancy, and their reluctance to enforce reasonable duty requirements and standards of conduct. Regardless of the measures conceived thus far to eliminate this problem by terminating the active duty status of pregnant soldiers, legal precedents insist that pregnancy-related personnel actions be conducted on an individual soldier basis. The potential impact of sole parent and married service couples on unit combat readiness generates nearly as much concern among troop unit commanders as the closely related pregnancy issue. Sole parents (a majority of whom are male) and the female member of married service couples may elect to terminate active duty status rather than deploy into combat. Additionally, local commanders frequently permit duty limitations for these soldiers based on child care considerations, although existing regulations clearly give first priority to mission accomplishment and duty performance of both commanders and soldiers--parents or otherwise--in this regard. Few commanders could cite actions they had taken to address this problem. A final issue reviewed by the study group was the impact in mixed sex units of female soldiers on the male bonding process. Although fairly extensive literature exists on bonding among members of unisex organizations, no studies have been completed on bonding in mixed sex units.

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Two studies currently underway may produce substantive findings on this topic. The following recommendations apply to those issues for which substantive evidence of a problem could be ascertained:

- (1) Commanders/supervisors address the pregnancy issue on an individual basis, require duty performance of pregnant soldiers IAW individual medical assessment of the soldier, and separate non-performers UP AR 600-20 and AR 635-200/AR 635-100 as necessary.
- (2) Commanders enforce the provisions of AR 600-20 and AR 635-200/ AR 635-100 regarding duty performance of sole parents and married service couples. Personnel who cannot or will not meet their responsibilities should be separated from the service for inability to perform prescribed duties due to parenthood as regulations currently permit it.
- (3) Further consideration of female soldier impact on male bonding and unit cohesion in mixed sex units should await the results of ongoing studies of the subject.

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policy. The purpose of the study was to determine if changes are required to current Army policy governing utilization of women in combat.

Findings are based on research of literature pertinent to the roles of women in combat, workshops conducted by the WCTF with TRADOC Proponency Offices, visits to FORSCOM and TRADOC posts and units, briefings to field commanders and questionnaires and interviews with selected groups of Army personnel.

Conclusions and recommendations offer a comprehensive and consistent assignment policy for women based on a study group determination that the intent of Congress is to exclude women soldiers from primary offensive killing roles in combat. The recommendations address, with equal concern, the need for mandatory physical strength standards by MOS and development of a "gender free" physical demands strength test as a predictor of a recruit's ability to qualify for the physical strength requirements of an MOS prior to award of an MOS.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose. This report provides the results of the Women in Combat Task Force's (WCTF) review of existing women in the Army policy, current TRADOC branch proponent change recommendations and the WCTF proposal for an alternative, consistent approach to utilization and assignment of women that supports combat readiness of the Army.

1-2. Why Another Study on Women in the Army? No federal statute specifies where or under what conditions women soldiers may serve in Army units. While the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force must define policy regarding assignment and utilization of female service members within the confines of statutory limitations, Army combat exclusion policy is regulatory in nature and is promulgated by the Secretary of the Army, pursuant to authority of Title 10 United States Code 3012. In order to best determine the basis for effective, sound Army policy, several studies concerning utilization of women in the Army have been produced during the past 10 years. Recommendations of these studies have formed the Army's policies on women since transitioning from the Women's Army Corps. The most recent of these studies, the Women in the Army Policy Review Group (WITAPRG), was tasked in May 1981 to assess how Army policies concerning women impacted on the Army's mission and readiness for combat, to include mobility and deployment. It concluded that the existing combat exclusion policy did not realistically deal with the modern battlefield as an

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extremely fluid environment. The majority of the study, however, was devoted to establishing a process for determining physical strength requirements for each MOS, classifying these widely differing requirements into a manageable set of standards and identifying a testing methodology to match recruits physical strength qualifications to MOS requirements. This was in response to a continuing concern by field commanders over the impact on unit mission capability in units with a significant density of female soldiers.

a. The WITAPRG developed and recommended adoption of two methodologies. They were the Direct Combat Probability Coding System and the MOS Physical Demands Analysis. The Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) system was approved by the Secretary of the Army in November 1983, replacing the 1977 Combat Exclusion Policy. The MOS physical demands approach to matching soldiers to jobs has been only partially implemented and therefore has not achieved intended objectives.

b. During the period of implementation of DCPC, following its approval as the Army's policy for assignment of women soldiers, a number of concerns arose. These concerns centered around the operational commanders difficulty of making DCPC fit with the evolving AirLand Battle Doctrine and revised threat assessments, and, secondly, the administrative inequities that were being experienced. This latter area included inconsistent probability coding of duty positions, unequal career progression opportunities for both males and females in various career fields and a confusing array of probability codes (seven) to deal with. Other, sometimes conflicting, concerns were also being heard from field commanders and branch proponents regarding the capability of women soldiers to perform in a combat environment.

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c. Since the branch and functional area proponents have the responsibility to identify issues of this type and propose recommendations to HQDA, several of the proponents developed approaches to address these problems. During presentations at a Specialty Proponent General Officer Steering Committee in May 1985, it became apparent that there was wide variation among the proponents in their approaches to the method of analysis, interpretation and application of DCPC guidelines. While numerous well considered, rational concepts were embodied in these proposals, significant inconsistencies were present which would have exposed the Army to strong criticisms if simply adopted as they were. More importantly, the piecemeal imposition of several inconsistent approaches to resolve an Army force structure problem due in large part to inconsistent application of existing policy could not be expected to be successful.

d. Because of the clear need for a review of the impact of DCPC policy, the continued voicing of other concerns not directly addressed by DCPC policy and a desire on the part of the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command that a solution to these problems be comprehensive and consistent in approach and application, the Women in Combat Task Force was formed at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on 31 July 1985 to address the issue of how women soldiers should be employed on the battlefield.

1-3. Issue Identification. The TRADOC Women In Combat Task Force study group was formed to examine how the Army should assign and utilize women, disregarding present and past policies and proceeding as though the Army currently had no policy. A study directive, as drafted by the study group, and outlining the objectives and scope of the study, is at Appendix A.

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parameters. Key parameters of the study were that any
guidances must:

- (1) Support combat effectiveness, e.g., the Army's capability to carry out its mission on the battlefield.
- (2) Be consistent in approach and application to designating positions throughout the Army force structure where women may or may not serve.
- (3) Be consistent with the tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine and with current estimates of Threat doctrine and capabilities.

b. Additional study questions. Four specific questions were initially posed to the study group for answering during the study. The questions were:

- (1) If we were just beginning to access women into the Army and had no policy, where would we draw the assignment line?
- (2) While women may be able to do the job in a peacetime environment, is it realistic to assume they can physically and psychologically do the job during war?
- (3) Practically and culturally, is it sound to assign women to positions forward of corps?
- (4) What do other countries of our cultural background, such as England and France, have for a policy?

c. Additional guidance. Following a 7 October 1985 in-process review, Commander, TRADOC provided the following guidance:

- (1) Lay out the Army force structure by unit and by MOS to show the impact and demonstrate consistency of the WCTF proposed combat exclusion policy. Involve TRADOC branch proponents in this action.

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(2) Develop the study group tentative recommendation on combat effectiveness to provide a basis for determining whether units open to women should be capped in terms of male/female strength ratios. Obtain field commander's assessments and other source data to assist in completing this action.

d. Proponent Issues.

(1) During the 20-21 May 1985 Specialty Proponent GOSC; the U.S. Army Logistics Center and the branch proponents from Military Police, Signal, Engineer, Military Intelligence and Field Artillery Centers identified specific issues and proposed solutions. The issues included:

- (a) Unequal professional development opportunities for males and females.
- (b) Career progression limitations.
- (c) Replacement/reconstitution of technical service MOS positions in male only units from predominantly female rear area units, e.g., medical aidmen.
- (d) DCPC approach not aligned with new AirLand Battle Doctrine.
- (e) DCPC and Direct Combat definition open to interpretation in coding units/MOSs, e.g., lack of consistency in application.
- (f) Location as a criteria for exclusion prevents effective utilization of women and hinders unit mission accomplishment.
- (g) Too many gradations of DCPC coding causes confusion and inconsistency in TOE/MTOE position coding.
- (h) DCPC fluctuations (changes in TOE position coding) cause turbulence in female inventory management.

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(2) The underlying causes for these issues were seen as:

(a) Changes in doctrine as the Army moved from Active Defense doctrine to AirLand Battle Doctrine.

(b) Revision of threat capabilities and strategy..

(c) Uncertainties throughout the Army regarding the intent of Army female assignment policies.

(3) Recommended improvements included discarding battlefield location as a DCPC criteria for position coding and otherwise aligning DCPC policy with current AirLand Battle doctrine, improved recruiting and retention of women, and consistent application, throughout the Army, of assignment policies for women.

e. Refinement of Study Group Issues. The initial task of the WCTF was to focus the scope of the study within resources available while meeting the TRADOC guidance to take a "fresh look" at how women should be utilized and to provide a consistent approach to assignment policy. Resources consisted of six personnel assigned to the study group and a 90-day period in which to complete the study (the time period was subsequently extended to accommodate the additional taskings).

(1) The first step in narrowing the study focus was to isolate policy issues from issues that could and should be addressed through routine personnel management procedures. An effective Army policy is the foundation from which personnel management issues can be addressed. Therefore, issues relating to professional development, career progression and personnel turbulence were excluded from direct focus of this study. While these are important in the context of personnel management by MILPERCEN and proponents,

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basic policy development should drive these matters rather than the reverse. Thus the study group was left to concentrate on the following key issues in formulating recommendations.

(a) Policy must improve combat effectiveness of the Army. To do so, recommended changes must recognize the fluidity of the AirLand Battle environment, capabilities and perceived intentions of Threat forces, congressional boundaries on the utilization of women soldiers and capabilities/ limitations of women soldiers as a group, if different than male soldiers.

(b) Policy must be relatively easy for commanders and personnel managers alike to understand and to implement.

(c) Policy must permit consistent application throughout the force, both active and reserve component.

(2) Initial research efforts were targeted to gain insights into the concerns expressed by proponents, commanders and others. The results were to focus on three areas: refinement of DCPC, support for job related physical strength standards and analysis of a broad range of topics termed combat effectiveness concerns. As the study progressed, the combat effectiveness concerns were narrowed to a focus on pregnancy, soldier bonding and the impact on mission performance of sole parents and married service couples.

1-4. Related Studies.

a. Several studies have been completed during the past ten years that were either wholly devoted to policies governing utilization and assignment of women or that addressed some aspect of the subject in the course of studying a more general subject. The most important of these were:

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(1) Enlisted Personnel Management System Review, June 1985, U.S. Army Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison.

(2) Women in the Army Policy Review, 12 November 1982, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA.

(3) Evaluation of Women in the Army, 28 February 1978, United States Army Administration Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison.

(4) Women in the Army Study, 1 December 1976, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA.

(5) Additionally, the U.S. Army Logistics Center completed, in April 1985, a study concerning utilization of women in divisional Forward Support Battalions.

b. The three WITA specific studies, above, were comprehensive reviews of the contemporary issues surrounding Women in the Army. In general, the conclusions for related issues in each study were similar. A summary of the conclusions and recommendations of each study is provided at Appendix G.

1-5. Assumptions Applicable to this Study.

a. Initial Assumptions. The following assumptions were initially developed to support this study.

(1) The definition of "direct combat" as a part of DCPC methodology is valid.

(2) Women will continue to be accessed into the Army at the present level.

(3) Public opinion, as expressed through the intent of Congress, will not support assignment of women to positions requiring engagement in direct combat as a primary mission, regardless of the type of warfare.

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(4) Soliders, regardless of sex, will be killed, wounded and captured throughout the theater of operations.

b. Modification of Assumptions. The preceding set of assumptions were subsequently modified as follows for the reasons indicated.

(1) The assumption that the direct combat definition is valid was dropped. Research and analysis showed that the definition contained terminology that is ambiguous and open to interpretation when attempting to apply it to actual TOE/MTOE position functions. The definition has in fact been the basis for coding inconsistencies.

(2) Assumption 1-5a(2), above, was modified to read "Women will continue to be accessed into the Army at rates equal to or greater than the present level." This assumption is derived from the fact that for the Army to maintain the quality of soldier required while faced with a shrinking availability of males in the recruiting pool, women have been and will continue to be accessed into the force. Assuming the same or greater proportion of women in the force was done to prevent attempts to assume away the problem by simply recommending the Army sharply reduce female accessions. Further, the study group has no assurance that female accessions can be reduced while continuing to meet manpower quality and quantity requirements.

(3) Assumptions 1-5a(3) and (4) were not changed.

(4) The following assumption was added: "Women will deploy into combat with the units to which normally assigned." This addition was in response to the concerns of numerous brigade-level commanders that the leadership at DOD or Congress level will, in the event of deployment for combat, suddenly insist that all women be left in CONUS and units will be

forced to deploy at reduced strength or with untrained male soldier backfill if available. This is an indication that both current women in the Army policy and pronouncements by senior administration officials lack credibility with combat commanders.

1-6. Methodology. The approach used by WCTF involved research of previous studies and reports, field visits, questionnaire survey of selected groups and workshops with branch/functional area proponents.

a. Research of studies and reports included both military sponsored studies on women in the Army and related subjects, and numerous reports and books published by academic and commercial sources, reflecting the spectrum of viewpoints on this subject.

b. Field visits included trips to the Army Logistics Center, Soldier Support Center, Health Services Command and the Air Defense Artillery Center, primarily to gather data and insights relevant to physical strength issues. Once emerging results had been developed, visits were made to five Division commanders within CONUS; the Commandant of Health Services Command; Commanders of III Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps in CONUS and V Corps and VII Corps in Europe; Commander, 21st Support Command; Commander, Forces Command and Commander U.S. Army Europe. Purpose of these visits was to brief these commanders and their staffs and obtain their assessments of both the study direction and of the performance of women soldiers in their commands. A summary of their responses is contained at Appendix C.

c. A survey questionnaire developed by the study group was administered to resident classes of Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Service Staff School and the Sergeants Major Academy. A copy of the

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questionnaire is at Appendix D. Usefulness of the survey results proved to be limited in the ultimate context of the study. This reflected the subject matter inexperience of the study group early on and the urgency with which the survey was prepared, given the limited time initially available to complete the study effort. Analysis and results of the pertinent data is contained in subsequent chapters.

d. Two workshops were hosted by the study group, the first to obtain assessment of the study group's initial findings for the entire study and the second related solely to the initial study group combat exclusion proposal. The workshops were of little value in advancing toward the goal of an Army-wide consistent approach to determining where women should or should not be utilized. The workshops did illustrate the widely differing approaches of the various proponents and the lack of reasoned argument on the part of some.

1-7. Findings. Findings in this report are derived from the information collected and developed by WCTF, the United States Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, the Army Research Institute, U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, the Army Audit Agency, the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center, U.S. Army Health Services Command, extracts of the Congressional Record, U.S. Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) and doctrinal publications of the various branches and elements employed in Division and Corps level operations. Inputs of major field commands also weigh significantly in the findings. WCTF recommendations for new or revised policies dealing with assignment and utilization of women to produce a more combat ready and cost effective force are presented in Chapter 5.

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CHAPTER II COMBAT EXCLUSION

2-1. Introduction. One of the major study tasks was to provide recommended solutions to the problems being experienced with implementation of Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC). An essential element of a recommendation would be that it provide a consistent and clearly understood means of classifying where women soldiers may be assigned throughout the Army. Each of several branch and functional area proponents had previously identified problems, both policy related and personnel management related, and had proposed solutions to fix the problems. While many of these approaches were commendable, they were narrow in scope, addressing only an individual proponent view rather than an Army-wide perspective. Further, they exhibited a wide disparity in approach. The study group determined that, to succeed in its tasking, it must focus on the policy issues, leaving personnel management concerns to be sorted out by personnel managers once a clearly defined policy was developed.

Section I - BACKGROUND

2-2. Women's Armed Services Integration Act. The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 (Public Law 80-625) established the Women's Army Corps with a female content ceiling of two percent of the total military force. The specific objectives of P.L. 80-625 were:

- a. To assist in filling current personnel requirements and lessen the need for a peacetime draft.

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- b. To provide a trained nucleus, a basic reservoir for future expansion, in time of national emergency.
- c. To find out how and where women could best be used before an emergency arises - to catalog skills, to develop abilities, and to find what types of training were needed for women.
- d. To provide for greater economy in the use of all personnel by using women in the jobs for which they were better suited than men.

✓ 2-3. The 1960s and 1970s. Women's policies changed little until 1967 when the two percent ceiling was repealed by Congress. The Army began accepting women into ROTC on a test basis in 1972. In 1975 the Army required all women to participate in individual weapons training. Women were admitted to the service academies in 1976. The Women's Army Corps was legally disestablished on 20 October 1978. Also in 1978 Public Law 95-485 amended the Navy's combat exclusion law by allowing women to be assigned to noncombat ships other than hospital ships and transports and, on a temporary basis, to combat ships when not engaged in combat missions. In 1979 and 1980 the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on a proposal to repeal the Air Force and Navy laws prohibiting the use of women in combat missions. The hearings turned into a heated debate over women in combat with emphasis on ground combat, and ended with no decision on the repeal. (Holm, 1982)

2-4. Women Excluded From the Draft. The 1980 law requiring reinstitution of the draft specifically excluded women from the draft. The Senate report to accompany Senate Bill 109 provides insights as to the prevailing Congressional majority view toward military roles for women. Essentially, the report noted that:

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a. Purpose of a draft would be to provide large numbers of personnel for combat forces.

b. Women are now excluded, by law and policy, from combat and this should continue. ✓

c. Processing and training elements of the selective service systems during a rapid mobilization would be needlessly burdened by women recruits who could not be used in combat. If additional people could be processed, they should also be directed to combat positions where the need will be.

d. Registering women for assignment to combat or assigning women to combat positions in peacetime would leave the actual performance of sexually mixed units as an experiment to be conducted in war with risks the Senate Armed Services Committee found unwarranted and dangerous. (Senate Report No. 96-226, June 19, 1979)

2-5. Legal Challenge to Draft Exclusions. Congress' decision not to pass registration of women for the draft was legally challenged on the grounds of sexual equality. In 1981 the Supreme Court ruled the government may exclude women from the military draft and registration for the draft. The justices note, "...perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference, not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power in this area broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked." (CQ Fall 1981. Rosteker v. Goldberg).

2-6. Congressional Statutes. Since 1948 the increases in technology, abolition of the Women's Army Corps (WAC), changes in perceptions of the intent of Congress, and society's views on the roles of women have made it difficult to decide what is and is not a combat mission in the context of the 1948 act. Does Congress view an infantry rifleman and missile crewman as

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performing the same combat mission? All Secretaries of the Army from 1948 to the present have relied on an interpretation of the "intent of Congress" to exclude women from "combat missions." The intent of Congress has been derived both from language in authorization or appropriations bills and from the existing statutes.

a. U.S. Air Force Statute (1956). Title 10 U.S. Code 8549 states: "Female members of the Air Force, except those designated under section 8067 of this title, or appointed with a view to designation under that section (e.g., Medical, Dental, Chaplain or other professionals), may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions."

b. U.S. Navy Statute (as amended 1980). Title 10 U.S. Code 6015 states: "The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women officers, women warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the Regular Navy and the Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and qualified for military duty. The Secretary may prescribe the kind of military duty to which such women members may be assigned and the military authority which they may exercise. However, women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions."

c. U.S. Army Statute (as amended 1966). Title 10 U.S. Code 3012 states, in part:

"(b) The Secretary (of the Army) is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including:

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(1) Functions necessary or appropriate for the training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness and effectiveness of the Army...

(e) The Secretary, as he considers appropriate, may assign, detail and prescribe the duties of members of the Army and civilian personnel of the Department of the Army."

2-7. Army Policies. In 1977 the Secretary of the Army formulated the following Combat Exclusion Policy as a regulatory exclusion of women from selected units and occupational specialties: "Women are authorized to serve in any officer or enlisted specialty except those specified at any organizational level, and in any unit of the Army except Infantry, Armor, Cannon Field Artillery, Combat Engineer and Low Altitude Air Defense Artillery units of battalion/squadron size or smaller. Women may not serve on Scout or Attack helicopters." (DEPSECOEF ltr to Speaker of House of Representatives, 14 February 1978)

By 1980 senior field commanders were expressing concern that the 1977 combat exclusion policy would permit women to be on the battlefield where the most frequent and violent combat would take place. Although women did not possess a combat specific specialty, commanders felt a female's direct combat involvement would be the same as that of male combatants because of battlefield location. In 1982 the Army developed a system to identify the associated risk of participation in direct combat for every position in the Army. The Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) Policy replaced the 1977 Combat Exclusion Policy in 1983. DCPC provided a formal definition for the term "direct combat" and a methodology to exclude women from serving in positions that are routinely engaged in direct combat. Of the four criteria

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(MOS duties, unit mission and employment, battlefield location and tactical doctrine) that were to be met in determining whether a position would be open or closed, the primary operative criteria in practice became "battlefield location." The DCPC approach was logical and probably would have been workable if a single "integrating center" had been appointed to code every position in the Army. However, the complexity of the DCPC system, the ambiguity in terminology used in defining direct combat, ambiguities in branch doctrine and unit mission statements, and the decentralization of DCPC position coding for TOEs and modified TOEs soon led to a number of problems and inconsistencies in application of DCPC rules. Figure 2-1 provides an assessment of the problems encountered with implementation of DCPC. The result has been that field commanders have in many cases either ignored the policy or have virtually been forced to violate it. The most obvious example is the assignment of women to units that habitually operate forward of the brigade rear boundary such as divisional Forward Support Battalions and maneuver brigade headquarters. The commander's reasons for doing so are pragmatic, e.g., the female soldier is the best qualified available for a critical job even though it is coded P-1 or there is a qualified female but no qualified male soldier available at all at the time the P-1 vacancy exists.

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Figure 2-1.

DCPC - THE PROBLEM

- DOES NOT REFLECT AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE AND THREAT
 - DIVISION REAR/CORPS AREA NO LONGER "SAFE AREAS"
- CAUSES OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR DIVISIONAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS
 - LIMITS COMMANDER FLEXIBILITY IN PERSONNEL UTILIZATION
 - PROBLEMS OF REPLACEMENT/RECONSTITUTION OF FORWARD ELEMENTS
- PROCESS IS DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT
 - DIRECT COMBAT DEFINITION IS BROAD IN SCOPE/VAGUE IN TERMS
 - TOO MANY PROBABILITY CODES
 - INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF POSITION CODES
- HAS GIVEN RISE TO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
- LACKS CREDIBILITY WITH COMMANDERS

Section 2 - THE WCTF APPROACH

2-8. General. The integration of women into the various branches of the Army is still a relatively new phenomenon. The debate continues over what women soldiers should be allowed to do and what they are capable of doing in the widely varying environments that constitute everyday unit operations. Most important is whether or not current policies support the structuring of a combat force capable of winning in war. The issue is fuzzy for several reasons. First, there are general differences in certain male and female capabilities. These are addressed further in subsequent chapters, but it is useful to note here

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that the differences in physical strength, for example, can have significant impact in many of the routine functions of TOE units and should be a factor when addressing where women should be assigned in the force. Information from field commanders and others surveyed consistently stress that, while some women are fully capable of performing the most physically demanding tasks of any MOS, many of the women soldiers being recruited today lack the capability to satisfactorily function in the heavy and very heavy category jobs. The recommendations herein concerning utilization of women in combat are predicated on the fact that mandatory physical strength standards will be established concurrent with expanding the assignment locations for women. Secondly, there are some long held precepts about the roles of women in the Army. Perhaps the most enduring is that women are to be protected from the violence and danger of combat. This has led to the restrictions on women being employed forward of the brigade rear boundary and to exclusion from the kinds of units having a mission involving it directly in combat. While feasible on the linear battlefield in which risk of engagement with the enemy increased sharply as one went forward of the brigade rear boundary, the current AirLand Battlefield is an extremely fluid environment in which a much higher degree of risk is present in rear areas previously considered relatively safe. Threat forces capability to disrupt or destroy friendly high value targets has increased considerably. The risks of soldiers being killed, wounded or captured, while still highest in vicinity of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), are much higher

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throughout the theater of operations (TOPNS) than formerly envisioned. These risks are an occupational hazard of being a soldier and women soldiers serving in the theater of operations are subject to these risks. Degree of risk is a deeper concern. Is there some level of risk at which Congress and American society do not want women soldiers exposed to? And can that level of risk be related to geographical or tactical boundaries on a battlefield? The answer to the first question is probably "yes," but there is no indication of what the risk level is. The answer to the second question, in the context of current doctrine and threat assessment is "no." Key command and control centers, logistics sites and other high value targets behind our division rear boundaries are expected to be struck early and intensely in a conflict. The risk may well be higher at these locations than on the FEBA. To eliminate or even minimize risk of harm from the enemy to any group of soldiers will require that group be kept out of the theater of operations. It is not feasible to keep a ten percent segment of our active component out of the TOPNS during peacetime or wartime. A third factor that clouds the issue of utilization of women is the rapidly changing societal view of women's roles. The matter of women working in nontraditional, e.g., other than clerical, administrative and nursing fields has changed greatly in recent years and is now much more accepted. Opinion surveys by Gallup, Roper and others, between 1980 and 1984, show public support for utilization of women in the military (as volunteers) and wide awareness that women soldiers will be casualties in the next war. Our own surveys at the

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operational level within the Army support assignment of qualified women throughout the battlefield in non-combat positions, recognizing that they will share the risk of harm equally with male soldiers in those positions.

2-9. A Basis for Combat Exclusion. To establish a policy basis for defining where women should or should not be assigned, WCTF considered particularly the parameters prescribed within U.S. law and also the approaches taken by some allied nations with similar cultural background. Current policies of England, France, Germany, Canada and Israel were reviewed to identify possible useful parallels. Analysis of U.S. law and practice was restricted to the language of statutes applicable to service use of women members and to the language contained in measures reported out of committee that expressed the intent and purpose of the legislation. Comparisons of allied nations use of women revealed that U.S. military forces are already far in the lead on integration of women, reflecting significantly different societal attitudes towards women than those of our allies and rendering attempts to draw parallels virtually useless. Analysis of U.S. law shows that the U.S. Congress clearly intends that women be excluded from combat. However, the meaning of the term "combat" is neither consistently defined nor understood in Congressional usage.

a. The study group then analyzed the definition of "direct combat" as developed by WITAPRG. Results were that some of the terms used, e.g., "high probability" and "substantial risk," while precisely defined in that study, were extremely difficult to use in an operational context; as in consistently determining probability codes

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for specific unit positions. Additionally, the words "while repelling his assault by fire" have been construed in some cases to apply to any unit under attack, including combat service support elements in the corps area. The effort then turned to developing an alternative definitional concept of the functions women should be excluded from. The term "close combat" was found insufficient for the same reasons previous study groups have addressed. Efforts to develop a new definition that was both clear and unambiguous in terminology and consistent in its applicability to every branch/element of the Army were also unsuccessful. Attempts to proceed from a definitional base were abandoned in favor of developing a policy statement that directly reflects the perceived intent of Congress.

b. The intent of Congress is to exclude women from combat. The precise meaning of this statement is unclear, particularly the term "combat" and its applicability in the modern battlefield environment. The combat exclusion laws pertaining to the Navy and Air Force, the statement of purpose accompanying the 1980 law reinstating registration for the draft and other current statements of legislative intent were considered in context of how Army combat forces function. The central function of ground combatants is to kill or destroy the enemy by offensive action with both direct and indirect fire weapons. All military forces support this function but only certain elements of the force are assigned this mission and perform it within recognized doctrinal tenets. Those Army elements, whether identified by Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or by unit designation (Standard Requirements Code), that are assigned the function of seeking to engage

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the enemy for purposes of destroying his forces would be closed to women. All other forces, whether directly or indirectly supporting the function of destroying enemy forces by offensive action would be opened to women regardless of location on the battlefield or of perceived risk of harm. These supporting forces can be expected to be exposed to enemy forces wherever they are located on the battlefield. They are responsible for defending themselves individually and as a unit and, in the context of defensive action, will be required to destroy enemy forces. This concept leads to the following statement of a female soldier assignment policy:


Figure 2-2.

FEMALE SOLDIER ASSIGNMENT POLICY

- WOMEN MAY SERVE IN ALL UNITS AND MOS WHICH DO NOT HAVE A TOE OR DOCTRINAL MISSION TO DESTROY THE ENEMY BY DIRECT APPLICATION OF OFFENSIVE FORCE, WHETHER BY FIRE, MANEUVER OR SHOCK EFFECT. THE LEVEL OF UNIT CLOSED TO WOMEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE DOCTRINAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE UNIT AND/OR ITS ORGANIC SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS IN PERFORMING OFFENSIVE COMBAT MISSIONS. WOMEN MAY SERVE IN ALL MOS EXCEPT THOSE WHOSE SPECIFIED DUTIES INVOLVE THE APPLICATION OF OFFENSIVE FORCE TO DESTROY THE ENEMY.
- WOMEN ARE REQUIRED TO KILL OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AND THEIR UNIT.

2-10. Policy Statement. This policy statement does not rest on a definition of combat. The determinants for assignment of women soldiers are MOS duties and unit mission in the context of combat doctrine. Location on the battlefield is not a factor. It does borrow from the definition of direct combat, but focuses on exclusion of women from units and specialties having a mission to destroy the enemy by offensive force. It further recognizes explicitly the fact that female as well as male soldiers will be required to engage enemy forces in order to defend themselves and to provide area security for their unit. This concept is simplified schematically in Figure 2-3. All personnel assigned to units designated open to women are equally required to participate in defense of themselves individually and of the unit collectively. This includes duty as perimeter guards inside unit area

Figure 2-3.



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(area 2), as active patrols in the area surrounding the perimeter (area 1), and as a designated quick reaction force which both supports perimeter guards in area 2 and reinforces patrols in area 1 as required. Examples of the kinds of units involved in cluster security are divisional forward support battalions operating in the brigade trains area, divisional main support battalions operating in division rear area and corps signal units operating in the corps rear area. Some field commanders have indicated a perception that while all women soldiers are issued personal weapons, many first termers are not adequately trained in weapons use or in defensive tactics such as patrolling, ambush, etc. Since all soldiers have for several years been given identical basic combat training in these subjects, this perception most probably applies equally to male soldiers in the combat support and combat service support branches. The real issue here is that all soldiers in combat support and combat service support units must receive more extensive and continuous training, at unit level, in unit defensive measures.

2-11. Replacement/Reconstitution Issues. The potential impact of women on replacement and/or reconstitution in combat units was raised during the study. Replacement, in the context used here, refers to the transfer of a soldier with a particular skill, e.g., 76Y or 91B, from one unit to another to fill a vacancy such as that created by a casualty in wartime. The gaining unit is generally considered a higher priority unit than the losing unit and the transfer is effected to fill vacancies on an immediate basis, before the normal echelons above division personnel replacement system can respond. Reconstitution refers to the transfer of soldiers, regardless of skill, within a combat battalion to reform the fighting elements in order to continue an

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immediate mission. An example is the reconstitution of an Infantry company with mechanics and supply personnel in order to continue a mission while in contact with the enemy.

a. Personnel replacement concerns were considered as a potential element of combat exclusion criteria but were dropped from the final package. It is virtually impossible to ensure that male soldiers would always be available to replace casualty vacancies in closed units unless, as a minimum, divisions and, ideally, corps would be closed to women. The study group thus recognizes that there is potential for having to replace male casualties of support MOS in Infantry battalions with female soldiers during combat as long as the Army continues to have closed units. While undesirable, this situation will have to be accepted, at least for temporary periods, on the basis of operational necessity. The disadvantages of closing divisions/corps to women for reason of replacement issues is more than offset by the advantages of utilizing them in combat support and combat service support units in the division area.

b. Personnel reconstitution was a potential issue in determining the level of unit which should be closed to women. It was rendered moot as a result of the criteria adopted for unit exclusion of women and the application of those criteria to the force.

2-12. MOS and Unit Exclusion Criteria. The criteria by which each military career field and unit in the Army are to be evaluated for assignment of women is shown in figure 2-4. These criteria concentrate on mission and employment doctrine only. Both specialties and units must be classified open or closed to women. Specialties are classified in accordance with duty descriptions contained in AR 611-101, AR 611-112 and AR 611-201. Units are classified in accordance with TOE mission and doctrinal basis of employment for each Standard Requirements Code (SRC) unit designation.

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- a. The basic process for classifying an MOS or unit closed to women is to answer the following questions. For MOS: "Do the duties of this MOS involve
- Figure 2-4.

MOS/UNIT CLOSURE CRITERIA

- MOS
 - NORMAL WARTIME DUTY INVOLVES PRIMARY OFFENSIVE MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY
 - DOES NOT INCLUDE
 - DEFENDING SELF
 - PROVIDING POINT OR AREA SECURITY FOR UNIT, I.E., QUICK REACTION FORCE
- UNIT
 - MISSION INVOLVES PRIMARY OFFENSIVE MISSION OF KILLING OR DESTROYING ENEMY
 - NORMAL EMPLOYMENT IN EXECUTING MISSION DETERMINES UNIT LEVEL AT WHICH CLOSED (PLT, CO, BN)

✓ the incumbent directly in killing or destroying enemy forces, other than in defense of self or unit?" For unit "Does the mission of this unit directly involve killing or destroying enemy forces other than in a defensive mode?". A "yes" answer to these questions is a determination that the MOS or unit, respectively, would be closed to women. A "no" answer would classify the MOS/unit open to women. The rationale for WCTF coding is laid out for each MOS and SRC in appendix E. Subsequent to initial classification of MOS and units, those MOS that have a large proportion of positions in closed units must be reviewed to determine if adequate career progression can be maintained. If not, additional MOS would be closed for this reason.

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
b. The WCTF, with proponent assistance, reviewed and classified all personnel career fields and all units in the Active Component to ensure that consistency was maintained in applying the combat exclusion criteria throughout the force. Source data for reviewing career fields was the 30 Jan 86 Update of AR 611-101 and AR 611-112 and the 25 Oct 85 Update of AR 611-212. Selection of units for review was based on active component unit SRCs listed in the FY86 column of TAA92 Force Program Review. WCTF classification results showing career fields and unit SRCs closed to women are at Appendix E.

2-13. Applying the Combat Exclusion Criteria. The WCTF sought to achieve a more simplified administrative process than Direct Combat Probability Coding for applying coding criteria to individual positions in authorization documents. Administrative simplicity facilitates consistency in coding, particularly since mission and combat employment doctrine cannot be quantified to produce a numerical yardstick for consistently evaluating the functions of all positions in the Army. As a first step, the seven DCPC probability codes representing the relative combat risks of each position in TOE authorization documents are reduced to two codes, an "X" indicating women are excluded and an "O" indicating the position is open to all soldiers, male and female. This reflects the way DCPC coding is in fact being applied in the field. Secondly, exclusion coding decisions are limited to MOS and unit level of detail. A career field classified as open to both women and men would have those positions authorized in closed units available to men only, but all positions in that career field authorized in open units would be open to soldiers of both sexes. A unit classified as closed to women, based on mission and employment doctrine, would be closed at the unit level, e.g., platoon, company, battalion, consistent with how it is employed as an offensive combat

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entity. For example, Infantry units are normally assigned missions at battalion level, as are Armor and cannon Field Artillery units while SHORAD units are assigned missions at battery level and Military Police at section or, occasionally, squad level. While exceptions can be cited in every case, exceptions cannot be permitted to make the rule in this area, else women may effectively be excluded from units beyond the bounds of common sense. Once each career field and each type unit by SRC have been classified, positions with each unit are designated as open or closed by a simple mechanical process, using a computer if desired. Figure 2-5 shows an example of the combat exclusion coding process.

Figure 2-5.



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2-14. Impact of WCTF Approach to Combat Exclusion. Study group assessment of the impact of this approach is that women will serve throughout the battlefield in positions that do not have a mission of seeking to destroy the enemy. Figures 2-6 and 2-7 compare, respectively, the positions where a woman soldier may serve in accordance with current policy as originally designed and with the WCTF approach.

a. In terms of enlisted MOS, the net impact will be to open at least eight additional MOS after determining both those that would remain closed due to lack of career progression and those closed due to MOS duty requirements. The MOS currently closed that would clearly be opened by WCTF include 00B (Diver), 13R (Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator), 51K (Plumber), 51R (Interior Electrician), 52G (Transmission and Distribution Specialist), 54C (Smoke Operations Specialist), 82C (Field Artillery Surveyor) and 96R (Broad Surveillance Systems Operations). Although additional MOS would likely be opened, final determination of career fields to be closed on the basis of undesirable career progression opportunities (e.g., most or all duty positions are in closed units) will be made by branch proponents through respective integrating centers and in conjunction with the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, HQDA. WCTF classification of officer areas of concentration (AOC) would open AOC 15B and 21J except for AOC 21J positions in closed units and those 15B positions identified with ASI 1A, 1D, 1J, 1L and 1M on the basis of combat exclusion criteria. Caution must be exercised in the application of AOC 15B recommendations. A review of current TOE indicates inaccurate coding. Only 15B OH58 positions that require aeroscout qualifications should be coded with ASI 1D; all others should be coded 1P, which is open to women. Again, career opportunities must be evaluated to determine if these AOC/MOS

Figure 2-6

LOCATION OF WORKERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD





Figure 2-7

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should in fact be opened. There were no changes required to WO MOS except as a result of the restructure of aviation WO MOS codes. (Officer areas of concentration identify the specific requirements of a position and requisite qualifications for commissioned officers to fill them. AOC codes consist of three characters, two numeric and one alpha, used to identify a specific AOC.)

b. The WCTF classification of units considered only unit mission and combat employment doctrine in the process. WCTF recognized that valid reasons, such as changes to doctrine or mission not available at the time of classification or information inadvertently overlooked, may require exclusion of women from units that were initially coded open to women. The review process subsequent to initial WCTF classification has resulted in a few changes, both toward opening and toward closing of units. A summary of selected type units classified by WCTF, together with current (DCPC) status and the results of the TRADOC review, is shown at Table 2-1. All type units not addressed in table 2-1 are classified as open to women. It should be noted that opening of divisional forward support battalions to women, as recommended by a separate U.S. Army Logistics Center study, is entirely consistent with the WCTF classification rationale. Using the best available data, we estimate that about 350-400 additional company-sized units will be opened to women. All MOS and active component units, at SRC level of detail, classified by WCTF as closed to women are at Appendix E.

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Table 2-1.
WCTF UNIT CODING SUMMARY

X - Closed
O - Open

	<u>DCPC</u>	<u>WCTF</u>	<u>TRADOC REVIEW</u>
INFANTRY BN	X	X	X
RANGER BN	X	X	X
L/R RECON CO	X	O	X
RECON PLT	X	X	X
ARMOR BN	X	X	X
FA BN (CANNON)	X	X	X
MLRS BTRY (DIV)	X	X	X
MLRS BN (N-DIV)	X	O	X
FIRE BTRY	X	X	X
LANCE BN	O	O	O
FIRE BTRY	X	O	X
PERSHING BN	O	O	O
TAB BTRY, DIVARTY	X	O	O
CBT ENGINEER BN	X	X	X
CBT (HVY) ENGR BN	X	O	O
EN RBN BRG CO	X	X	X
EN LT EQ CO, ABN/AA	X	O	X
EN LT EQ CO, LID	N/A	O	O
SHORAD BN (DIV/N-DIV)	O	O	O
HHB	O	O	O
FIRE BTRY	X	X	X
RECON SQDN (LID)	X	O	O
HHT	X	O	O
AIR TROOP	X	X (PILOTS)	X (FLT CREW)*
GRD TROOP	X	X	X
LRS DET	X	X	X
AIR CAV SQDN (HTMD)	X	O	O
HHT	X	O	O
AIR TRP	X	X (PILOTS)	X (FLT CREW)*
GRD TRP	X	X	X
DIV CAV (SQDN HVY)	X	O	O
HHT	X	X	O
AIR TRP	X	X (PILOTS)	X (FLT CREW)*
GRD TRP	X	X	X

WCTF UNIT CODING SUMMARY

X - Closed
O - Open

	<u>DCPC</u>	<u>WCTF</u>	<u>TRADOC REVIEW</u>
ARMD CAV REGT	0	0	0
CBT AVN SQDN	0	0	0
AIR CAV TRP	X	X (PILOTS)	X (FLT CREW)*
ATK HEL CO	X	X (PILOTS)	X
GRD CAV SQDN	X	X	X
HHT	X	0	0
ATK HEL BN	0	0	0
HHC	0	0	0
ATK CO	X	X (PILOTS)	X
AIR CAV SQDN (AASLT)			
HHT	X	0	0
AIR TROOP	X	X (PILOTS)	X (FLT CREW)*
ASSAULT HEL BN	0	0	0
CBT AVN CO	0	0	X (FLT CREW)*
CHEM CO (ACR)	X	0	0
CHEM RECON PLT	X	X	X
CHEM CO (DIV)	0	0	0
MI BN	0	0	0
C&J CO	X	0	0
GSR PLT	X	0	0
MIL POLICE CO (DIV)	0	0	0
DS/GS PLTS	X	0	X
MP CO (CSC)	0	0	0
MP CO (HVY SEC)	0	0	0
SOF BN	X	X	X
SOF MI CO	X	X	0
SOF SIG CO	X	0	0
SOF SVC CO	0	0	0
HHC SF GROUP	0	0	0
HHC BDE (IN/AR) (SEP BDE, ACR)	X	0	0

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WCTF UNIT CODING SUMMARY

X - Closed
O - Open

	<u>DCPC</u>	<u>WCTF</u>	<u>TRADOC REVIEW</u>
HHC, RANGER REGT	X	O	O
HHC, DIV	O	O	O
FSB	X	O	O
MSB	O	O	O

NOTES:

1/ A code of "X (...)" indicates only the positions identified in the parenthesis are closed in that unit; the unit itself (remainder of positions) is open, e.g., "X(FLT CREW)" indicates an open unit except for flight crew positions.

* Crew chief positions that do not accompany the aircraft into battle are open to women

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CHAPTER III PHYSICAL STRENGTH

3-1. Introduction. The Army, in conjunction with the other military services, is frequently on the cutting edge of technology in developing machines that do more, do faster, and do more accurately than humans can. Machines have facilitated great improvements in the soldier's ability to kill, communicate, transport, supply, fix and do all the other functions required to perform daily missions in peacetime or war. Technological advances will not, however, eliminate the requirement for a great deal of strenuous human activity in order to perform many of the tasks associated with ground combat forces. Enlisted soldiers in particular must have the physical strength necessary to perform all functions of their Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in a combat environment. Matching the physical strength capability of a soldier to the established physical strength requirements of an MOS is one of the most basic determinants of combat effectiveness. It is also a long recognized institutional need within the Army. The WCTF study group was not resourced to develop empirical evidence in support of a case for or against MOS physical strength standards within the Army. The evidence from existing studies and the assessments of commanders garnered by WCTF is sufficient to convince this group of the requirement for institutionalizing mandatory physical strength standards. WCTF, in fact, considers its recommendations on this subject to be inextricably linked to the recommendations that provide for women serving in units in forward combat areas (e.g., forward of Brigade rear

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boundary). This chapter provides a brief overview of pertinent literature and of the WCTF findings as substantiation for the study conclusions and recommendations on physical strength.

3-2. Why Physical Strength is a Problem. The U.S. Army continues to be an organization in which the majority of jobs require significant physical strength. The physical strength requirement is increased when non-MOS specific tasks such as establishing and moving field positions are included. Since these non-MOS tasks are an essential part of a soldier's function in a combat environment and since the mission of the Army requires functioning in a combat environment, they must be included in an overall assessment of soldier capability. The lack of physical strength to meet the demands of the MOS for which trained and paid is a problem with soldiers of both sexes, but is proportionally of greater concern with female soldiers since they possess significantly less strength, on average, than do males. Within all male units a few individuals will be found who lack the physical strength to do a fair share of work. This lack of capability is normally compensated for by the "helping hand" from some of the great majority of males who meet or exceed the physical strength requirements for any MOS job. The problem of physical strength shortfall is exacerbated with increasing density of female soldiers in units because, as will be shown, females on average possess about two-thirds the physical strength of males even after a period of rigorous physical conditioning, e.g., Basic Combat Training (BCT). When the ratio of soldiers who do lack the physical capacity required to perform the mission is allowed to increase to a certain level vis-a-vis the number of soldiers who have the capacity, the compensation factor (helping hand) becomes insufficient and unit mission capability is degraded. This situation is occurring now

because personnel are being allowed to select MOS without regard to the physical capacity required to perform duties. The problems arising from a lack of physical strength, either as the case of a individual soldier having less strength than the duties of the MOS require or on a collective unit basis to perform its missions in a timely fashion, are not generally being officially reported. Official reporting of this information would normally occur via the Unit Status Report (USR). The most frequent response we received when asking commanders why they were not reporting physical strength problems in the USR was "they (major command or HQDA) would kill the messenger" or "it would jeopardize one's career to report problems relating to the capabilities of female soldiers." Simply put, there is widespread belief in the field that reporting of problems of this nature is being suppressed by the leadership of the Army for political expediency. If true, the problem of physical strength capability is going to continue without resolution.

3-3. Findings of Previous Studies. The following subparagraphs highlight the findings and recommendations of previous Women in the Army (WITA) studies concerning physical strength of soldiers. The findings are consistent and the recommendations reflect an evolutionary approach to the actions required. The fact that the findings of studies during the past 10 years continue to show that some women cannot meet the requirements of their MOS, coupled with the lack of any concrete action to resolve the problem, is a strong indication of suppression of the problem by the Army leadership.

a. Women in the Army (1976) - Found that female soldiers, in some instances, were unable to perform the full range of tasks relating to their jobs due to limited physical strength. Concluded that a clear physiological differential exists between males and females with males being significantly

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stronger. A survey of major commanders showed need for identifying a minimum set of physical standards for all personnel in each MOS. Recommended researching performance capabilities and limitations of female soldiers and that a minimum physical capability be a criterion for closure of an MOS.

b. Evaluation of Women in the Army (1978) - Found that female soldiers in certain MOS could not perform all physically demanding tasks required and that the (then) current lack of established performance standards, unvalidated critical tasks and lack of a system for measuring potential against standards precluded reliable determination of the physical capabilities soldiers must have to do the job. Concluded that the Army could not be certain of accomplishing its ground combat mission if women were randomly accessed into positions having physically demanding tasks exceeding their capabilities. Recommended 14 MOS be closed to women because of physical strength required, that a gender free system for measuring strength potential be developed and implemented, and that a coordinated effort be initiated to establish and validate performance standards for all MOS/specialties.

c. Women in the Army Policy Review Group (1982) - Found some women soldiers were having difficulties in performing the full range of tasks required in some MOS, and that some units had a disproportionately high female content. Established a modified Department of Labor Physical Demands Classification methodology to link the data on physical capacity of soldiers with the duties of MOS by identifying the physical demands required of each MOS. The Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) was developed as a gender free test to screen recruits and predict their physical capacity to perform successfully in an MOS. Recommended that the physical demands analysis of Army jobs be adopted and institutionalized, that the

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MEPSCAT, developed by USARIEM, be validated expeditiously, and that all soldiers be matched to their jobs through demonstrated physical capability at least equal to that required by the job.

d. Army Audit Agency (1982) - Found that female soldiers were being accepted into MOS in which they experienced more difficulty than males in performing physically demanding tasks. Results of physical capability tests conducted at 24 units in Europe and CONUS showed that nearly twice as many males as females possessed the strength and stamina to perform the physically demanding tasks of their MOS to specified standards. Recommended continuing (then) ongoing efforts to develop job-related physical standards required of soldiers to successfully perform in their MOS, a gender-free comparison at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) for comparing physical capabilities of potential enlistees against job- related physical standards, and institution of MEPS screening of potential enlistees with the gender-free system thus developed.

3-4. Commander's Assessments. A series of briefings regarding WCTF emerging results on this study were provided to numerous commanders from platoon to major Army command level, with the largest representation being at the battalion, brigade and division levels. A major element of the briefing/discussion was to obtain an assessment of the significant problems and advantages of women soldiers in these organizations.

a. The commanders were nearly unanimous in stating that the physical capacity of the average enlisted female soldier being recruited today does not meet the requirements of the heavier duty MOS. Commanders of support units are the most affected and, while proud of the female soldier's intelligence, motivation and willingness to do the job, were strongly critical of the lack

of physical strength standards and the Army's apparent reluctance to set standards. Their concern stems from the impact on mission capability. In units with a relatively low density of enlisted women soldiers in the heavy and very heavy strength MOS (up to about 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively) and in a garrison environment, male soldiers tend to do the heavier tasks and female soldiers tend to do the lighter tasks. Such an arrangement is generally satisfactory to all concerned and poses no degradation of mission or of soldier morale. But in units with an enlisted female density exceeding about 30 percent (some company-size support units currently exceed 40 and even 50 percent density), the heavier tasks get done only with much greater effort and require greater time to complete. The light
divisions are particularly concerned about this impact because they lack the mechanical equipment and the total number of soldiers over whom the workload can be apportioned. This is especially so in the combat support/combat service support units which are where the majority of force structure decrements were made to achieve "lightness" and also where the majority of enlisted females are assigned in such divisions. This is not to argue that female soldiers should be barred from light divisions since that would very probably only result in greater populations being assigned to the heavy divisions where the same concern over physical strength exists. Rather, as the commanders repeatedly remarked--standards (physical as well as mental) for all our soldiers are essential to the combat effectiveness and well being of the Army. Female officers (with one exception) consistently supported the concept of a single physical strength standard and mandatory qualification for award of MOS to any soldier, but generally for a different reason than male officers. Female officers tend to view the present system of no physical

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standards for MOS and of differentiated standards in other areas such as the Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) as promoting a dual standard system. As a result, commander's expectations of female soldiers are lower and, consequently, females as a group are perceived as inferior to male soldiers.

b. Results of the WCTF survey of students in the Sergeants Major Academy, Combined Arms Services Staff School and Command and General Staff College were not entirely consistent with the assessments of troop unit commanders on this subject. While the WCTF survey showed 81 percent of respondents believe physical strength and stamina should be an assigned criteria for women and that it ranks second only to unit mission (combat exclusion) as an assignment criterion, the students also indicated a belief that female soldiers are presently capable of adequate physical performance during wartime. The difference in response is attributed to different perspectives. Commanders' assessments were based upon field observations, whereas student responses were based upon personal experiences and individual assessments. ✓

3-5. Current Recruit Screening Process. The U.S. Army trains enlisted soldiers for more than 350 different MOS. Training for these specializations is often expensive and time consuming. A reliable method is necessary for helping soldiers select an MOS suitable to their unique mental and physical abilities. At present, the Army screening procedures include the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a medical examination, a written questionnaire regarding moral qualifications, and a physical strength screening tool called the Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT).

a. Data generated from the screening process is then used in a job counseling session. The ASVAB is based on cognitive measures and provides information concerning specific areas in which the applicant should excel. If

the applicants do not meet the requisite standards for the selected MOS they must select another MOS for which they qualify.

b. The MEPSCAT results are used to identify the physical strength capabilities of the applicant and match his/her capability to the strength requirement of one of the five MOS clusters (figure 3-1). Unlike the use of ASVAB data, MOS classification on the basis of physical strength is a voluntary rather than mandatory process; applicants not possessing the requisite strength for a chosen MOS may obtain a waiver, after counseling, and be awarded the MOS anyhow. The present administration of MEPSCAT uses a minimum weight lift of 40 pounds which effectively ignores the "LIGHT" classification, and therefore fails to provide a measure for one of the standard categories. Again, since physical strength classification is voluntary, the inability to lift 40 pounds will not exclude anyone from entering the Army.

3-6. Toward a System for Physical Strength and Qualification. Individual soldier levels of physical strength and aerobic capacity are important to the military because these capacities have consequences for the performance of most military jobs.

a. With the expansion of the female force to about 46,000 in 1977, problems began to surface with respect to strength and stamina of female soldiers. Several studies which dealt primarily with physical capabilities of females were sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel during the 1977-78 time frame. The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences made two of the studies: Women Content in the Units Force Development Test, October 1977, and Women Content in the Army, May 1978. Both studies essentially concluded that the assignment of women to units had no

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
adverse effect on unit missions except where physical strength was a factor. Both studies acknowledged that some tasks exceeded the strength of many women in enlisted specialties such as motor transport operators, petroleum supply specialists, and medical specialists. The studies concluded that unit missions must be analyzed to determine the extent of physical strength required to fulfill physically demanding jobs. Conclusions reached in the 1978 Evaluation of Women in the Army study made by the U.S. Army Administration Center stated that there was clear evidence that males have certain physical capabilities, such as upper-body strength, that are greater than those of females and corroborated other findings that females in certain specialties cannot perform some physically demanding tasks. Based on data from these studies and the perception of commanders that readiness was being impaired, ODCSPER recommended that DA establish specific strength standards by specialty and that tests be developed and administered at the examining and entrance stations to compare the strength potential of enlistees against the standards (Wright, et al 1985).

b. The U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM) in 1977 conducted research on a system for establishing gender free, occupationally related physical fitness standards that could be used to select enlistees for enlisted occupational specialties. This effort was a joint venture of USARIEM, the U.S. Army Infantry School, Training and Doctrine Command, and the proponent schools of the military occupational specialties. The proponent schools, in conjunction with the Infantry School, compiled a list of strenuous, occupationally related tasks. The USARIEM then grouped the specialties having similar physical demands and measured the actual physiological costs (force required and energy expended). These costs were

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converted into physiological capacities, expressed in terms of muscle strength and stamina, that could be assessed at the time of entrance into the service and during periodic on-the-job evaluations. Projections made by the USARIEM showed that a physical-demand-based system of entrance fitness standards would have excluded a high percentage of women from occupational specialties they were then and are now entering. The research report was released in March 1980. The Army decided not to implement the gender-free system in Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) until more research could be done on all critical tasks requiring physically demanding activity. (AAA 28 May 1982)

Figure 3-1.



c. In July 1982, USARIEM was tasked to develop and validate a gender-free military entrance physical strength capacity test (MEPSCAT) as a result of the WITAPRG emerging findings. The WITAPRG selected a modified Department of

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Labor (DOL) classification system to categorize Army MOS (figure 3-1). The modified DOL system is based solely on lifting requirements, with no consideration given to non-lifting tasks such as whole body mobility tasks which are limited by aerobic demands.


3-7. The Case for Physical Strength Qualification. A number of studies have been completed by both military physiologists and civilian sports physiologists which consistently demonstrate that there are significant physical strength differences between the average female and the average male, especially in upper body strength. Further, it has been shown repeatedly that physical fitness has a bearing on the level of task performance where strength is a factor, and that the level of physical fitness can be substantially improved through training, especially when the individual begins at a low level of fitness. (For extensive reviews of literature, see Clarke, 1979; Drinkwater, 1973; Laubach, 1976; Nunneley, 1978; Printy, 1979; Willmore, 1979.) In physical training programs women usually start training at lower levels of their physical potential, resulting in a greater degree of improvement than men (15% and 8%, respectively). However, strength data available from military samples (Table 3-1), indicates that females average 60 to 70 percent of the strength of males. This relationship exists both before and after a period of rigorous physical conditioning such as basic combat training.

a. The WCTF focused its evaluation of the need for physical strength standards on what is frequently referred to as "dynamic strength." Dynamic strength is a measure of an individual's upper body strength and involves the capacity to lift, lower, push, pull, and carry. WITAPRG supported basing their physical demands classification on upper body strength on a 1980 studying finding by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command

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that the major physical component in more than 90 percent of Army jobs was for upper body strength. Subsequently, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command branch schools demonstrated that 85 percent of the major physical tasks in 261 entry-level MOS (as of February 1986) require dynamic strength. Figure 3-2 displays the task analysis breakdown of the major physical tasks as determined by TRADOC.

Figure 3-2.



- b. The differences in physical strength between male and female soldiers, as measured in four different studies, is shown in Table 3-1. While there are rather wide differences in the ratio of strength depending on the part of the

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anatomy being compared, the results are consistent in showing that females possess roughly two-thirds of the males' upper body strength that is essential to most Army jobs. There are, in fact, physical strength differences between the sexes that are of a magnitude sufficient to influence work performance in the heavy and very heavy category MOS.

Table 3-1.


Contrasted Strength Data From Military Samples

Canadian Military Women (Entry)	Range of strength Average female strength Dynamic strength (lifting, lowering, pushing, pulling, carrying)	35 to 86% of male 63.5% of a male 68.6% of a male
USARIEM (After BCT)	Upper extremity strength Lower extremity strength Trunk strength	60% of a male 67% of a male 72% of a male
Aerospace Medical Research (Entry)	Upper extremity Lower extremity Dynamic strength Average female strength	59.5% of a male 71.9% of a male 68.6% of a male 63.5% of a male
U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (After BCT)	Range of strength Average female strength Leg strength Upper extremity Trunk flexor Aerobic capability Lean body mass	58 to 78% of male 68.8% of a male 65% of a male 58% of a male 68% of a male 78% of a male 75% of a male

c. Several studies have addressed both the physical strength capacity of females and males to function adequately in the various modified DOL physical strength categories of Army jobs and the number of personnel by sex assigned to MOS in these categories. Figure 3-3 was developed by the WITAPRG to demonstrate the fact that large numbers of female soldiers are employed in the heavy end jobs although very few women in the population have the physical strength required to perform all tasks associated with these jobs. The work

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Figure 3-3.




capacity lines are based on post-basic training physical conditioning. Every soldier was tested for a maximum effort at lifting weight on the Incremental Lifting Device, and the results arrayed by their lifting capacity without regard to the physical strength category for which they enlisted.

d. Figure 3-4 uses data from a 1984 USARIEM study of 1984 soldiers, nearly evenly divided by sex, to compare physical strength before and after basic combat training, thereby providing an indication of the gain in strength resulting from this period of vigorous physical conditioning. Only the top

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Figure 3-4.




three physical strength categories are shown since there is no meaningful difference in data for the two lighter strength categories. Although the data in figure 3-4 shows a considerably higher degree of qualification of women in the moderately heavy category than does that in figure 3-3, there is a strong correlation between the two samples in the percent of females qualifying for the heavy and very heavy strength categories.

e. Figure 3-5 shows the distribution of Army enlisted jobs by physical strength category, the number of female soldiers in those jobs and the number who are qualified on the basis of physical strength as shown in figure 3-4, using the post-BCT data. The data showing distribution of both jobs and of

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female soldiers is from a 1986 HQDA ODCSPER manpower report. Although several years have passed since the WITAPRG study, there has been effectively no change in the fact that large numbers of soldiers, particularly female soldiers, are being assigned to MOS for which they are ill-suited on the basis of physical requirements. The Army leadership's failure to acknowledge the problem as documented by WITAPRG and to act decisively on the WITAPRG recommendations, has not caused the problem to go away. The current USARIEM data and the assessments of our troop commanders support each other on this subject and are substantive reasons to implement the WITAPRG recommendations in support of physical strength standards by MOS within the Army.

Figure 3-5.



3-8. The Stamina Component. The WCTF initially considered the issues of physical strength and stamina to be closely linked but have since concentrated on the need for MOS standards that would incorporate only physical strength requirements. All previous WITA studies have included the sex-based difference in stamina as being a potential limiting factor in the performance of physically rigorous duties over time. WITAPRG, based on original work by USARIEM, had recommended use of a stamina test as well as a strength test in qualifying recruits for MOS. No effort was made to implement it, however, due to the time and effort required for test administration and a belief at USARIEM that stamina, although a main component of organizational tasks, was not a limiting performance factor in the majority of Army duties (KOWAL, 1983).

a. Stamina or endurance is measured in terms of maximal oxygen uptake which is the ability of the body to replenish the muscle cells with oxygen via the blood supply, at a rate necessary to continue a level of physical exertion for a specified period of time. It is considered important to the maintenance of physical activity where the large muscle groups are used for periods of one minute or longer (Printy, 1979). During physical exertion, the heart rate must increase in order to pump more oxygenated blood throughout the body. Females have a smaller heart (and lungs) than males, even when adjusted for comparable body size, therefore the amount of blood that can be circulated is more limited in the female (Stransky, 1974).

b. Although there is some conflict in the studies, Vogel (1985) has reported that some increase in maximal oxygen uptake will occur during physical training, and that, while female recruits show greater improvement than males, their aerobic capacity (stamina) remains about 30 percent less than that of males. Although the WCTF has recognized the differences in

stamina and the potential impact on job performance in combat, physical strength is emphasized over stamina as the remedy to the major part of the physical capacity concerns regarding performance of female soldiers in the physically demanding MOS.

3-9. Perceived Deficiencies in Current Status of Physical Strength

Screening. Although early adoption of mandatory physical strength standards specific to the required duties of each MOS is considered essential to successful integration of women into a combat effective Army, there are deficiencies which need to be corrected first. These problems can be categorized as flaws in the existing standards, lack of centralized control and direction, and a lack of priority of effort to complete testing and implementation of the system.

a. The tasks required of each MOS are identified in AR 611-201. Included in each MOS description in AR 611-201 is a statement of the physical demands rating, if any, applicable to the MOS. Although many of the MOS physical demands ratings have been accurately and justifiably determined and expressed, a lot of work remains to achieve accurate physical demands ratings for all MOS. As examples:

(1) The statement of task in AR 611-201 may not reflect actual job requirements. One of the tasks for MOS 16E, Hawk Missile Fire Control Crewmembers, as stated in AR 611-201 is "Frequently runs 375 feet while carrying 98 pounds." In observed performance of this task, two soldiers lifted a 96-pound cable reel from the bed of a 2 1/2 ton truck, placed the reel on a cable stand and pulled the cable off the reel to a distance of 375 feet while running. The statement of task overrates the actual physical demands of the job in this case.

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(2) The heaviest tasks for MOS 91A, Medical Specialist, stated in AR 611-201, are "occasionally push and lift 180 pounds and carry long distances as part of a 4-soldier team (prorated 45 lbs.)" and "occasionally lift 60 pounds and carry short distances." These tasks define a physical demands rating of moderately heavy which is the current rating for the MOS. In fact, 91A personnel may work for extended periods in field environments where the tasks of setting up and maintaining tentage and equipment and of performing perimeter security place greater physical demands on soldiers than litter carrying. The physical demands analysis probably is underrated for this MOS. Medical battalion commanders have frequently reported difficulties in effecting timely and adequate mission accomplishment in field training with companies that have a high (35-60 percent) density of women soldiers.

(3) The task statements for a number of MOS appear to be either overstated or written such that the physical demands appear to be greater than they actually are. The weight to be pushed/pulled is, in several cases, stated as the total dead weight of the object to be moved; e.g., MOS 76X: "Frequently pushes and pulls 1500 lbs 100 feet." The force that must be actually applied to move an object would be a more descriptive measure of the task.

b. The administrative processes of implementing a system of MOS related physical strength standards is out of control. The potential impact of such a program is extensive in terms of the large number of soldiers affected, the dependence of combat effective forces on the Army's ability to man them with physically capable soldiers and the political sensitivity of a program that is perceived by some as a covert form of sex bias. Yet, there is practically no

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overwatch or system of checks to ensure accurate, valid establishment of physical strength requirements nor for validating the MEPSCAT test. A summary of some specific problem areas follows:

(1) The physical demands analysis of an MOS is done by the MOS proponent--the subject matter expert who works under a set of guidelines which may or may not be clearly understood and/or followed. There is generally no on-location validation of task performance by an overwatch agency to ensure consistency in the analysis and documentation of what the tasks are and how they must be performed. With the large number of MOS proponents and the decentralization of the critical MOS task requirements development phase, inconsistencies, inaccuracies and bias are invited and do occur, whether or not intended.

(2) The Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) is undergoing a three year validation to determine if it is a valid predictor of the ability to perform in an MOS. Analysis of data gathered thus far by the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency provides inconclusive results. The problem areas include uncertainty over the physical demands ratings of some MOS in AR 611-201, MEPSCAT validation test administration and reporting of results and failure to account for some environmental factors. The validation test--called the Physical Strength Test (PST) is given near the end of Advanced Individual Training (AIT), at a point where an extensive investment in skill training has been made. Further, the test administrators are closely associated as a part of the training center itself. The failure rate on the PST is practically nil for even the very heavy category MOS although there are numerous soldiers who do not qualify at the required strength level during the MEPSCAT test and, subsequently, during troop unit assignments have trouble meeting the physical demands of the job.

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c. The source of the concerns noted above appears to be inadequate command interest and inadequate priority of effort toward development of physical strength standards and testing processes. WCTF has been unable to ascertain the precise causes or pinpoint responsibility. However, interviews with personnel administering the PST at proponent schools, with personnel involved in establishing MOS physical demands ratings and with commanders consistently lead to the perception of a less than full-scale effort to develop and institute an effective and legally sufficient form of physical strength qualification for each MOS.

3-10. Some Alternatives to Mandatory Physical Strength Standards. The WCTF strongly believes that, in view of the consistent findings of physiological research and of studies concerning utilization of women in the Army, the Army needs to move quickly to adopt mandatory physical strength standards for award of MOS to all enlisted soldiers. Based on the record, however, we are concerned that such a recommendation may again be ignored or put off for reasons not related to preserving the operational capability of our combat forces. Therefore, in view of the critical need to maintain that operational capability while continuing to recruit soldiers unqualified for the physical demands of many MOS, we offer some alternative approaches to retaining a necessary level of collective physical strength in units. The focus is on the divisions which are the primary combat forces of the Army and are the forces in which inability to accomplish the mission carries the greatest risk of unfavorable outcomes of the war. The alternatives apply only to those MOS in physical strength categories of "heavy" and "very heavy" since those MOS are where the lesser strength capability of women soldiers impacts significantly on unit operations. All these alternatives effectively establish a min/max

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ratio on the number of males/females, respectively, that should be assigned to units having a preponderance of physically demanding duty positions. Appendix F provides detailed descriptions of each alternative.

a. Heavy physical strength MOS. Two mathematical approaches, both relying on a similar set of facts and assumptions, show that between 70 and 88 percent of the personnel in any heavy or very heavy category MOS within the division must be males. A third approach was to obtain the assessments of commanders at various levels within several divisions. Commanders consistently reported observing that combat effectiveness drops significantly when the ratio of males declines to 70 percent or less in units of any size.

b. Very Heavy physical strength MOS. The lesser physical strength of the average female impacts greatest in this category. The majority of positions available to both women and men are in this category yet very few women have the physical strength to qualify for these positions. Efforts to develop a mathematical approach were fruitless because they effectively closed more than 130 MOS to women. Rather, we concluded these MOS should remain open to women but with a limitation of 10 percent female content in each MOS and in the distribution to divisional units. A unit would thus be assured of retaining the collective physical strength to perform its mission in a combat environment.

c. Female assignment density in divisions. Another approach to determine the ratio of males to females in a division is to analyze the number of positions by MOS, using the modified DOL standards for each MOS and relying on the above determinations that minimum male fill should be about 70 percent for heavy MOS and 90 percent for very heavy MOS. Appendix F details the process and summarizes the results of laying out a heavy division by unit and

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MOS duty positions, accounting for both the impact of physical strength differences and of pregnancy (discussed in the following chapter). The net result is that, in a perfect environment, the density of male soldiers in a heavy division should not be less than 90 percent. Since the perfect environment in terms of MOS and grade matches in personnel assignments is not achievable in practice, the density of male soldiers should approximate 92 or 93 percent of total heavy division strength. The mix for light divisions would be similar. The results of this approach are consistent with the assessment of commanders in USAREUR who stated uniformly that they cannot absorb a greater density of women soldiers in divisional units than they currently have. Current density is seven to eight percent of total strength according to USAREUR strength data as of January 1986.

CHAPTER IV
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

4-1. Introduction. The term "combat effectiveness" was used by WCTF as an umbrella term encompassing a number of topic areas such as survival skills, motivation, leadership ability, etc., that are frequently used as the basis for arguments on the impact of women in the Army. During the initial research phase of the study, numerous research reports, academic papers and books addressing concerns over the impact of women on the combat effectiveness of military units were reviewed. The arguments raised sufficient concerns among study group members that the subject of "other combat effectiveness concerns" was taken up as a study issue in addition to the combat exclusion and physical strength issues.

4-2. Developing the Issues. Based largely on literature review, a list of the components of combat effectiveness was assembled as a point of departure (figure 4-1). Each of the items on this list has been argued in published literature as a point about which the author believed women soldiers may have a detrimental impact on the combat effectiveness of TOE Army units. The apparent substantiveness of an author's argument was not a factor in developing the initial list of components. Further, for nearly every point on which women are described as having a deleterious impact on combat effectiveness, another argument can be found describing that point as an area in which women either excel in building combat effectiveness or have a neutral impact. The objective in developing this issue was to ensure that no factors of potential importance were overlooked in arriving at a policy recommendation governing assignment of women in TOE (combat) units.

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Figure 4-1.

Components of Combat Effectiveness

- JOB SKILLS (technical qualification)
- SURVIVAL SKILLS (ability to function in an austere environment)
- TACTICAL SKILLS (defense of unit and self in combat)
- LEADERSHIP (will male subordinates support female leader?)
- STRENGTH (physical strength to function in combat)
- STAMINA (ability to endure physically demanding tasks over time)
- BONDING (with males and females in combat environment)
- ESPRIT, MORALE (effect on males in unit)
- AGGRESSION (females less aggressive than males)
- MOTIVATION (the desire to perform to best of ability)
- INTELLIGENCE (mental capacity)
- DEPLOYABILITY (readiness to deploy into combat)
- ATTRITION (opting to leave the Army before retirement)
- MALE BIAS (against female soldiers)
- MALE PERCEPTIONS (of female soldiers)
- PROTECTIONISM (male urge to shield females from danger)
- MALUTILIZATION (not using female soldiers in assigned MOS)
- STRESS SUPPORT SYSTEMS (a threshold level of females in unit required to provide mutual psychological, sociological, and physical support)
- MACHISMO IMAGE (male perception of himself as superior to female)

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a. Initial study group efforts to develop definitive, unbiased conclusions regarding the validity of each of the factors in figure 4-1, as a measure of female soldiers' impact on combat readiness, proved ineffective. There are no comprehensive and unbiased studies available that serve to prove significant differences between male and female capabilities, or notably superior/inferior female qualities, on most of these factors. Furthermore, it is doubtful that human behavior studies on many of these factors, no matter how well done, would serve a useful purpose. To the extent there are differences between the sexes, the value of research data will be surpassed by factors such as manpower availability in the recruiting pool and the political predispositions of decision makers.

b. Perhaps the best way to determine the impact of women soldiers on combat effectiveness is to query a cross section of field commanders. The WCTF obtained the assessments of commanders and command staff in all grades from lieutenant to general. Both male and female officer personnel were represented although male officers, particularly in the senior grades were a large majority of the group. Additionally, the views of several senior noncommissioned officers, principally Command Sergeants Major and Staff Sergeants Major, were sought. No claims of scientific precision are made as this was not conducted as a formal opinion survey. We believe the process of seeking commander's assessments is a common sense approach and provides valid insights to the real concerns associated with women soldiers in today's Army. Commanders are, foremost, a pragmatic group--survival in the job requires identifying and dealing with actual problems and in using capable personnel to

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best accomplish the mission. Academic theories not manifested in the work environment as factors that degrade mission accomplishment are generally ignored.

4-3. Narrowing the Issues. The results of obtaining the assessments of TOE unit commanders regarding capabilities of women soldiers in a wide range of skills over time, together with study group assessment of the formal research reports and other published materials, substantially reduced the scope of factors to be regarded as impacting unit combat effectiveness.

a. The issue of the lesser physical strength and stamina of the average female soldier and its impact on the operational capability of units with a substantial density of female soldiers was the single greatest concern of commanders, both male and female. This issue is addressed in detail in Chapter 3.

b. The issues of deployability problems and of attrition of female soldiers resolve essentially to the impact of pregnant soldiers and of married service couple soldiers on unit combat readiness. Pregnancy and married service couple issues are addressed in this chapter.

c. Combat commanders reflected widespread concern over the potential effect on male soldiers of female soldiers getting killed, wounded or captured by enemy forces, particularly in forward areas. This is a sensitive subject with combat arms commanders who can anticipate, by the WCTF proposal, the fact of female soldiers assigned to support units that are physically located adjacent to infantry positions during combat. The concerns are that female casualties will disrupt the male infantry soldier's concentration on doing battle with the enemy and will divert his attention to protecting the female

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soldier instead of carrying the fight to the enemy. Both events would lead to increased friendly casualties and reduced combat effectiveness. the study group accepts this concern as legitimate. the solution to this problem is not to preclude assignment of female soldiers to support units whose mission requires working in vicinity of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, but to condition all soldiers during peacetime training maneuvers to the event of female soldier casualties on the AirLand Battlefield.

d. The remainder of the factors in figure 4-1 identified as potentially impacting unit combat effectiveness were generally dismissed by commanders for various reasons. Some of the points frequently made were:

(1) Female soldiers have demonstrated MOS skills, leadership ability, motivation and intelligence that, on average, equals or exceeds that of male soldiers, regardless of assignment. ✓

(2) The ability of female soldiers to function for extended periods in austere/field environments--basically the female hygiene issue--is not considered a problem if hygiene training is conducted and sanitation standards are enforced. Management of the problem is perceived as being much the same as for cold weather survival training or tropical environmental training for all soldiers. ✓

(3) The tactical skills of females will generally equal those of male soldiers, given the necessary training. Perhaps because of the more sheltered environment in which female children are raised, the amount of combat training required may exceed that required for males raised in urban environments. The difference is not considered significant. ✓

(4) Concerns over the potential adverse impact of female soldiers on male soldiers in units, e.g., lowered unit morale, male perceptions of female

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soldiers as being favored by superiors, etc., are considered over-emphasized by most commanders. Effective command discipline, impartiality in treatment of soldiers and establishment of clear standards of performance on the part of unit leaders generally resolves these problems. Additionally, it appears that, as males become accustomed to working with females in an environment of impartial performance standards, the initial frictions that occur tend to disappear.

✓ 4-4. Impact of Pregnant Soldiers on Unit Combat Effectiveness. The adverse impact of pregnant soldiers on combat effectiveness in terms of unit operational readiness, capability for rapid overseas deployment and mission accomplishment is second only to physical strength as the most widespread concern among commanders. Current Army policy is perceived as supporting the female soldier's opportunity to combine raising of a family with a service career at the expense of unit combat readiness. The basis of readiness problems arising from female soldier pregnancies are duty restrictions, lost duty time, inability to replace a soldier absent for a long period of time and the inability to deploy pregnant soldiers. Additional concerns relate to attrition and to morale problems.

a. Duty restrictions stem both from medical determination that a pregnant female should not be exposed to certain environmental hazards (noxious fumes in a motor pool) or strenuous physical exertion (heavy lifting as a cook), and from inexperienced male commanders who are loathe to require any but the lightest work from them. As a result, many pregnant junior enlisted women are temporarily reassigned during pregnancy from essential jobs perceived to be hazardous to fetal development into make-work functions such as company level "shadow-clerks."


call 1 hour
no overtime req'd

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- b. Lost duty time, for purposes of periodic prenatal checkups, sick call/quarters rest and pre/post partum leave was reported in a 1977 OSD study to average 105 days per year. Although that data is nine years old, we have been unable to find any more current statistic either more or less favorable.
- c. A commander's most immediate concern resulting from these personnel losses is the inability to fill vacated duty positions, since the pregnant individual remains assigned to the unit and a replacement cannot be requisitioned through the personnel replacement system. Consequently, other soldiers are required to do the tasks of the vacant position as well as their own. Additional workload, in conjunction with a general perception that pregnant females receive preferential treatment, contribute in many cases to a lowering of morale within the unit.
- d. A longer term concern of commanders is the fact that pregnant soldiers are nondeployable from the time they are determined to be pregnant until about four weeks after delivery--a period of approximately 8 1/2 months.
- e. Pregnancy is also one of the primary reasons that enlisted female soldiers are discharged from the Army during the first 36 months of military service (generally, their initial service obligation). Figure 4-2 illustrates the problem of pregnancy related attrition of first term enlistees. The data are from a HQDA DDCS PER manpower attrition report as of February 1986 and include attrition both during the period of pregnancy and subsequent to delivery but for reasons related to caring for the baby. About 30 percent of female first term attrition is related to pregnancy. When the pregnancy factor is set aside, female attrition in the first 36 months is less than that for males.

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Figure 4-2.



4-5. HCTF Approach for a Pregnancy Policy. Although not an item on the original study directive agenda, the study group determined to address pregnancy as a result of input from field commanders. The objective was to develop Army policy recommendations that would improve combat effectiveness of company/battalion-sized units by enabling commanders to replace pregnant female soldiers who, for medical reasons, could not perform assigned duties during the period of pregnancy. A secondary objective was to remove the benefits available to pregnant soldiers under existing Army policy that are perceived as incentives to become pregnant, e.g., additional financial allowances, separate housing, and in some cases better working conditions or easier duties. The following summarizes the results of that effort.

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a. Reassignment of pregnant soldiers to the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) was considered on the basis of an outside recommendation. It was found to be not appropriate because the study objectives could not be supported and because the criteria for inclusion on the TDRL made it questionable for application to pregnancy cases.

b. The WCTF developed a two-part approach to deal with pregnancy, one aspect aimed at soldiers in their initial three-year duty period and another aspect that recognized career soldiers as such and made provisions for combining career and the raising of a family. The initial three year period of duty rather than "first enlistment" was used to distinguish between "first termers" and "career" enlisted soldiers because the first enlistment period varies widely based on MOS and contract specifications. An easily understood and equitable time period was desired. The study proposal is outlined as follows:

(1) First term (first three years of service) active duty soldiers who become pregnant would be terminated from active service and transferred on an involuntary basis, without delay, to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Medical privileges would be provided for prenatal care and delivery of the child at U.S. Government facilities such as VA or military hospitals. CHAMPUS coverage could also be authorized for similar care in civilian hospitals if desired. The soldier would be permitted to return to active duty within 12 months after birth of the child and at the rank held upon transfer to the IRR, if desired. These criteria would be specified in the initial obligation contract to ensure up-front knowledge by the recruit of her obligations.

(2) Career soldiers (those with more than three years active service) would be encouraged to participate in a "planned parenthood program." The

purpose of such a program would be to schedule pregnancies with compatible assignments as much as possible, e.g., assignments to TDA positions, in order to minimize the impact on mission accomplishment and readiness for deployment in TOE units. The service member would work with military personnel assignment officers to jointly plan family development with appropriate assignments.

(3) Key elements of the rationale used in arriving at the above proposal are:

(a) The transfer to the IRR of first term soldiers was originally conceived to apply to all soldiers, regardless of MOS, duties or assignment because of the desirability for a clearly understood, easily promulgated, equitable policy that supports the Army's mission to fight and win wars. Applicability could be restricted to the TOE portion of the Army, if manageable, without impairing the basic objective of readiness for combat. Incorporating further exceptions is considered inadvisable since the Army personnel management system is not responsive at the individual duty position level of detail in providing replacement personnel in the short term (four months or less).

(b) The 12 month period for a service member placed on the rolls of the IRR to return to active duty after childbirth was chosen as a balance point between adjusting to parenthood and loss of military skills. She should be given adequate time to determine what caring for a baby really entails, to determine if she is capable and/or desirous of balancing child rearing and a service career, and if so to make the necessary child care arrangements required of sole parents.

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(c) A concern which was perhaps not satisfactorily addressed by the study group was that of determining concrete incentives for the career soldier to participate in a family/career development program. Several alternatives were evaluated and discarded while awaiting a legal evaluation of the proposal, which then rendered the entire proposal infeasible.

4-6. Legal Evaluation of the WCTF Pregnancy Proposal. Following is a summary of the legal opinion rendered on the above proposal by the Fort Leavenworth Judge Advocate's office in conjunction with the HQ, TRADOC Judge Advocate.

a. Previous regulatory attempts to deal with the problem of the pregnant female soldier have raised numerous Constitutional problems. Past challenges against military regulations have proven successful. Any future such proposals must, therefore, consider the law as it has developed in a series of Federal court decisions. This opinion referred to several court decisions, including:

- (1) Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (U.S. Supreme Court).
- (2) Turner v. Dept. of Employment Sec., Etc., 96 S. Ct 249 (1975) (U.S. Supreme Court).
- (3) Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 97 S. Ct 1932 (1977) (U.S. Supreme Court).
- (4) Skinner v. Oklahoma, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
- (5) Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F. 2d 629 (1973) (2d Circuit Court).
- (6) Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F. 2d 848 (1980) (4th Circuit Court).
- (7) U.S. v. City of Philadelphia, 573 F. 2d 802 (1978) (3d Circuit Court).

- (8) Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board, 649 F. 2d 1084 (1981) (5th Circuit Court).
- (9) Robinson v. Rand, 340 F. Supp. 37 (1972) (Colorado).
- (10) Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F. 2d 1114 (1976) (2d Circuit Court).
- b. The cases of Robinson v. Rand and Crawford v. Cushman dealt with Air Force and Marine Corps regulations, respectively, on pregnancy. They are summarized here as background for the specific evaluation of the WCTF proposal.
- (1) In Robinson v. Rand, 340 F.Supp. 37 (D. Colo. 1972), an Air Force regulation required the immediate discharge of pregnant women. The court held that the right to bear children was one "of utmost importance." Any Government restrictions on that right would, therefore, be subjected to a "strict scrutiny test," and "viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." In view of the magnitude of the Constitutional right involved, issues of administrative convenience and cost were simply insufficient to persuade the court; on the contrary, the court found that the military interests could be satisfied by far less drastic means; i.e., transferring the soldier out of a particular job environment.
- (2) In Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d circ. 1976), the court considered a Marine Corps regulation which required separation for the convenience of the Government when a soldier was found to be pregnant. The individual soldier who filed the suit contended that she could have continued working as late as the 7th month of pregnancy, and could have returned to work 6 weeks after the birth of her child. This particular soldier was an office worker, and her medical evidence was not rebutted by the Government. The Government offered no medical evidence to show that women couldn't continue to work during the early stages of pregnancy. The Government did argue (and the

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Court agreed) that in the military, "all persons are expected to respond on short notice and without restriction to orders that might direct expeditious movement from one location to another." This, however, did not save the regulation. The court stated that each case "needs individual treatment." A conclusive presumption of unfitness to work was found to be arbitrary and irrational. It was specifically found to be Constitutionally defective for two basic reasons.

First, the regulation was a violation of the Equal Protection requirement of the U.S. Constitution. Ironically, the challenged regulation was found to be both UNDERinclusive and OVERinclusive at the same time. It was "irrational" to treat pregnancy different than any other disability. Pregnancy was viewed by the court as a temporary disability. It was the only one, however, that led to mandatory discharge. All others were treated on an individual basis, viewing each person's capacity to serve. The Government's interest in mobility was certainly valid, but the regulation only dealt with pregnancy. The court found that there were less drastic alternatives available. Depending on the severity of a person's condition, a soldier could be excused from some duties, put on light duty, temporarily hospitalized, or put on convalescent leave. With the exception of pregnancy, other temporary disabilities were dealt with in much less restrictive ways, with the soldiers being returned to their regular command as soon as was possible. The court also looked to the availability of day care facilities.

The regulation was also OVERinclusive, because it discharged people regardless of their individual fitness, and simply presumed unfitness regardless of the particular type of work involved. It was based on "unsubstantiated generalizations." An individual's ability to work past any fixed time "is very much an individual matter."

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The regulation was also a Due Process violation. It, in effect, penalized the decision to have children "by one whose mobility and readiness aren't impaired prior to or after birth." The court concluded that the Marine Corps could discharge for disability "where mobility and readiness or ability to perform work is likely to be impaired for any substantial period." The Government must, however, individually determine one's fitness to work, based on a person's ability to do the job.

c. The WCTF proposal itself is considered open to legal challenge on several grounds. Distinguishing between soldiers in their first three years of enlistment and "career" soldiers may generate a challenge under the equal protection doctrine. Since the right to bear children is a fundamental Constitutional right, a statement in an enlistment contract may be deemed invalid as contrary to public policy. Termination of active duty for all first term females who become pregnant, regardless of their ability to do their job, would subject the entire proposal to a constitutional attack on the basis of overbreadth. Transferring the soldiers to the IRR would probably be unconstitutional because it assumes unfitness to work.

d. A policy to minimize the impact of pregnancy on unit combat readiness may have a good possibility of surviving court challenges on Constitutional grounds if the following criteria are met. Presuming the incidence of pregnancy and its effect on deployability, attrition and lost duty time are as significant as the available statistical data and commander's assessments indicate, it would be useful to pursue the documentation and legal effort required to draft such a policy. As a minimum, a policy must:

- (1) Be based on a specific and well documented problem, e.g., impact of pregnant soldiers on deployability of a TOE unit.

(2) Document, with medical evidence, the nonavailability of pregnant soldiers and the immediate and potential impacts on combat effectiveness in terms of reduced mission effectiveness and effect on mobilization/deployment capability.

(3) Show why pregnant soldiers could not be left behind in event of mobilization or what the effect of doing so would be.

(4) Show why pregnant soldiers should be treated differently than other soldiers with temporary disabilities. Is pregnancy substantially different than other disabilities in terms of frequency of occurrence, duration, limitations on soldier, etc?

4-7. Sole Parent and Married Service Parents Issue. Closely related to the pregnancy issue, both physiologically and as a readiness concern of commanders are the duty limitations frequently experienced of sole parents and married service couples with dependent children. Troop unit commanders assess this issue and its impact on lost duty time in garrison and during field training, and potential impact on deployability as evidenced by untimely reporting during practice alerts or reporting with children in hand, as nearly of equal concern as pregnant soldiers. Surveys indicate that parent obligations may outweigh contractual obligations in the event of mobilization. This issue is not female specific, but involves a sizable number of both sexes in the active component with 3.2 percent of male soldiers and 9.2 percent of female soldiers on record as single parents and 19,000 married service couples with dependent children currently on active duty. While all sole parents have the option, by regulation, of voluntarily leaving military service at any time, only the female member of a married service couple with dependent children is afforded this option. As a percentage of the female force eligible to leave the

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service, especially during a contingency, the married service women add substantially to the numbers of female sole parents, a majority of whom have indicated a likelihood of opting for discharge rather than to deploy into combat.

a. Army policy is clear on the responsibilities of sole parents and married service couple parents. In accordance with Change No. I03, AR 600-20, Section V, commanders will identify members of their command who are enlisted, in-service couples with family members or sole parents, or officers with less than 3 years service who are in-service couples with family members or sole parents, and will advise them regarding "their rights and responsibilities." Soldiers must arrange for the care of their family members so as to: (1) be available for duty when and where the needs of the service dictate; (2) be able to perform assigned military duties without interference; and (3) remain eligible for worldwide assignment. Soldiers "will not receive special consideration in duty assignments or duty stations based on their responsibility for dependents." If parenthood interferes with their military responsibilities, soldiers may be separated UP AR 635-200, chapter 5, (Sec XV, AR 635-100 for officers). Paragraph 5-8, AR 635-200, allows such a separation for "inability to perform prescribed duties due to parenthood" and cites the criteria set forth in AR 600-20 (noted above). Commanders are directed to stress these obligations.

b. Most commanders with whom this was discussed were aware of the regulations. However, the majority indicated they did not believe that provisions made for child care in the event of mobilization would in fact work as intended. Additionally, very few instances of disciplinary action can be cited in cases where child care problems result in service members' absence

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from duty or failure to report for practice alerts during normal peacetime operations. If commanders are not enforcing the regulatory requirements of family care arrangements and mission priorities during peacetime, the stage is set for major problems during a mobilization.

4-8. Cohesion and Bonding. Study focus toward the impact of women on male bonding and unit cohesiveness in military combat units stemmed from concerns on the subject originating at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth. The study effort was confined to review of published research studies to determine if evidence exists upon which to base recommendations that may impact assignment assignment policy for women in TOE units. This paragraph summarizes the findings of the WCTF effort.

a. Extensive empirical research has been done concerning the cohesion and bonding process among males in all-male military groups. There is general agreement that cohesiveness among the members of a TOE military unit, particularly of company or smaller size, is essential to the everyday operational effectiveness of the unit. To date, however, there is little, if any, research data available regarding male-female bonding processes or the impact of mixed sex groups on unit cohesiveness and consequently on the combat effectiveness of these units. This gap in the knowledge base may be rectified by the results of two studies currently underway. The Army Research Institute began a study on cohesion and values in January 1986. Walter Reed Army Research Institute, at the direction of HQDA DCSPER, initiated in March 1986 a study on the subject of male/female soldier bonding and cohesion and levels of unit effectiveness in combat support and combat service support units. These will be the first formal efforts we are aware of to address the question of

whether males and females can cohere within a unit and form bonding relationships as effective as those experienced in all-male units.

b. The following summarizes what this study group has determined from available reports.

(1) Interpersonal dynamics affect the degree to which a group functions effectively to achieve its goals. The performance of a group engaged in coordinated activities is more than the sum of the task performance of the individual members. Cohesion among the personnel of a unit affects the ability of the unit to function effectively in combat and the ability of its members to survive the psychological stress of combat (Marlow, 1980).

(2) The actual will to engage in combat, to kill and to risk being captured depends to a large extent upon devotion to the group. The presence of women is seen by some as interfering with the devotion of men to the group, because women are outsiders and are not privy to the male subculture. Commitment to the group is seen as depending, among other motivations, on male bonding (Cropsey, 1980, Gabriel, 1980). Another research effort also claims that there is a unique male-bonding process. That is, only men are able to develop the strong bonds that motivate them to perform in threatening or stressful situations. Introducing women into such groups is perceived as disruptive to male bonding and group dynamics (Lionel Tiger, 1970). Tiger's auxillary argument is that because women are perceived as the 'weaker' sex, men will spend undue time protecting them.

(3) Bernard (1981) gives evidence to show that females as well as males bond. He cites Finnish and American social groups where women have more female friends than men have male friends. Bernard shows that in American culture, men are socialized toward one-upmanship, which often precludes

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intimate and open relationships with other people. He also says that women have the ability to bond to others but are often prevented from having the opportunity to do so because of structurally induced social isolation (e.g., a housewife who is isolated from the workplace's potential social network). The available data suggests females are as capable of bonding together as males are and that they can be as competitive as males.

(4) The question of whether men and women in American society are capable of forming cohesive groups together serves as a prelude to determining the possibilities of successful unit cohesion in mixed sex military units. Virtually all research on the increased utilization of females in the military shows that males continue to have negative attitudes concerning females on active duty and those attending service academies. The WCTF survey questionnaire is consistent with other research in the area of continued negative attitudes with a small majority of survey respondents believing that women should not be allowed in any positions in the military service even if they are mentally and physically qualified (figure 4-2). Such attitudes are primarily held by males who purport traditional roles for women or who have a machismo orientation (Durning, 1978; Adams, 1980). The outgrowth of these beliefs would be a lessened acceptance of females as equal coworkers and a possible negative influence on women's physical and mental well being.

(5) Kanter (1977) indicates that when women enter the previously all male arena, especially if their numbers are few, they face serious problems of acceptance by the men. The men's attitudes and behavior toward the women create stress for the women. In such settings, women often experience intense performance pressures, discrimination in task assignment and promotion, social isolation, and sexual harrassment. There are two typical ways in which the

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women tend to respond in this environment. The first involves over achievement. Aware of the performance pressures, many will put forth extra effort and promote themselves and their work to let everyone know how well they are doing. This type of response evokes threats of retaliation from the male majority. The second response is the more common. It involves attempts to limit visibility or to become socially invisible. The females keep deliberately low profiles, avoid conflict, risks, and controversial situations. They blend into the background, but they also limit recognition of their competence. The consequences of female soldiers in a "token status" in units also indicate that they may undergo a great deal of personal stress and may need to expend extra energy to maintain satisfactory relationships in the work environment. This is reflected in their statements that they must work twice as hard as the males. Such a situation has been found to be a source of mental stress for people with inconsistent statuses (Kanter, 1982). Military data appears to substantiate Kanter's findings, given that mental disorders of females account for the highest number of days hospitalized, with pregnancy second (Hoiberg, 1979; Hoiberg and Thomas, 1982). Stress related illness may be manifested by psychological and physical symptoms, including psychological depression, despair, headaches, nausea, insomnia and hypertension (Backhouse and Cohen, 1981).

c. After an extensive literature review, this study group finds insufficient evidence at present upon which to base a recommendation that would link cohesion and bonding in male-female units to improved unit combat effectiveness. Although there is evidence that a majority of male soldiers harbor negative attitudes concerning female soldiers, and that this and other forms of pressure may be related to elevated rates of stress-related illness

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among female soldiers, the resolution of these factors may well be with leadership efforts to improve working relationships and mutual respect within units. The findings and recommendations of the ARI and WRARI studies should be evaluated before any decisions are made in this area.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5-1. General. The Women in Combat Task Force mission to relook how the Army should assign and utilize women on the AirLand battlefield resulted in analysis of combat exclusion policies and of ways in which women soldiers realistically may have a favorable or unfavorable impact upon the combat effectiveness of the total Army and especially on the forces that participate directly in combat engagements during wartime - the TOE Army. The study group finds generally that there are two areas in which a clear policy direction is strongly needed, that there is a long way to go in training male troop leaders to lead women soldiers and that the presence of qualified women soldiers on the battlefield is not the prescription for disaster that some would claim. Subsequent paragraphs provide specific conclusions and recommendations that follow from the preceding chapters.

5-2. Combat Exclusion.

a. Conclusions.

- ✓ (1) The practice of excluding female soldiers from units and MOS that have a mission or function of engaging enemy forces in offensive combat must be retained for the Army to comply with national policy.
- ✓ (2) With exception of the combat exclusion policy, there are no sound reasons, either practically or culturally, to categorically deny women assignments anywhere on the battlefield as long as they are qualified to perform the required duties.

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✓ (3) The policies of countries with similar cultural background to the United States are based on unique internal social, cultural and economic reasoning and bear little, if any, relationship to our cultural environment.

* ✓ (4) The problems of potentially having to use female soldiers to replace combat unit casualties from rear echelon units, e.g. units that operate in the division main support area or Corps area, in the short term, will continue as long as there are units from which women are excluded. No policy short of excluding women from the entire combat zone would alleviate this problem.

(5) The concept of the current DCPC approach to combat exclusion is sound, but requires modification to enhance understanding, to achieve consistency in application throughout the Army and to support the commander's flexibility in utilizing assigned personnel.

* (a) The policy basis for defining the areas and positions in which female soldiers may not serve should be revised to alleviate the confusion and misinterpretation of intent that has been ascribed to the definition of Direct Combat.

* (b) The use of battlefield location as a criteria for determining where females may or may not serve should be discontinued. Geographical-based lines are not feasible as assignment boundaries in the fluid AirLand battle environment.

* (c) Women cannot be protected from the enemy on the AirLand battlefield and in fact must participate equally with men in killing or destroying enemy forces as necessary to defend themselves and their unit.

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(d) The seven DCPC codes are not required to effectively implement female combat exclusion and in fact unnecessarily complicate the process of coding duty positions.

(e) Simplifying the combat exclusion coding of authorization documents (TOE's and TDA's) would significantly promote consistency in applying combat exclusion criteria. Coding decisions should be limited to MOS and unit level of detail in lieu of the current process of evaluating every position in an authorization document on an individual basis.

b. Recommendations.

(1) That the definition of areas and positions from which females are excluded be based on the following female soldier assignment policy rather than the current definition of direct combat:

✓ Women may serve in all units and MOS which do not have a TOE or doctrinal mission to destroy the enemy by direct application of offensive force, whether by fire, maneuver or shock effect. The level of unit closed to women will be determined by the doctrinal employment of the unit and/or its organic subordinate elements in performing offensive combat missions. Women may serve in all MOS except those whose specified duties involve the application of offensive force to destroy the enemy.

(2) That the criteria for coding MOS/units/positions as open or closed to women be revised to discontinue use of battlefield location as a criterion. Coding criteria are as follows:

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(d) The seven DCPC codes are not required to effectively implement female combat exclusion and in fact unnecessarily complicate the process of coding duty positions.

(e) Simplifying the combat exclusion coding of authorization documents (TOE's and TDA's) would significantly promote consistency in applying combat exclusion criteria. Coding decisions should be limited to MOS and unit level of detail in lieu of the current process of evaluating every position in an authorization document on an individual basis.

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(2) That the criteria for coding MOS/units/positions as open or closed to women be revised to discontinue use of battlefield location as a criterion. Coding criteria are as follows:

proportion of females who can do the physically demanding jobs is significantly smaller than the proportion of males due to physiological differences between the sexes.

(2) The work of the Women in the Army Policy Review Group in exploiting the results of previous physiological research and in developing the physical demands analysis and MOS clustering process to match soldiers to the physical requirements of MOS is valid.

(3) Physical strength standards are essential to the maintenance of a combat capable Army. *VS Lorraine ch
you*

(4) Physical strength capacity should be made a mandatory criteria for MOS entry and qualification of all soldiers in order to ensure the collective unit physical capability of all forces to perform their missions in a combat environment.

(5) There are inaccuracies in the MOS physical demands analysis and MOS physical demands ratings as reflected in AR611-201. These inaccuracies result in improper classification of MOS by physical strength category and undermine efforts to implement the process of fairly and objectively matching soldiers to jobs.

(6) Implementation of objective, realistic MOS physical strength standards and of a valid entry-level testing process suffers from lack of strong central organization to ensure consistent, accurate and timely results.

(7) The concern that implementation of MOS physical strength standards would create difficulties in recruiting sufficient qualified females to fill the large number of positions in the heavy and very heavy strength categories is misplaced. The overriding concern should be that personnel qualified for the requirements of their assigned MOS, regardless of gender, must be recruited in order to support a combat effective Army.

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tions.

physical strength to meet MOS job related standards be mandatory criteria for MOS entry and qualification of all s of gender.

- ✓ (2) That the physical strength standards for each MOS be based on duty performance in a field (combat) environment.
- (3) That physical demands analysis (PDA) and physical performance tasks (PPT's) in AR611-201 be validated for every MOS with emphasis on the following:

(a) PDA's and PPT's accurately describe how the task is to be accomplished in the field environment, to include inherent and common soldier tasks.

(b) PDA's and PPT's accurately and consistently reflect the actual amount of force or effort required on the part of an individual to perform a task.

(4) That current physical strength test validation procedures (MEPSCAT) be revised to use the incremental lift device at the end of the basic combat training (BCT) cycle rather than using alleged job related tasks at the end of the advanced individual training (AIT) cycle.

(5) That the average percentage gain in physical strength for each sex, resulting from the physical conditioning achieved during BCT, be included in initial physical qualification assessment at MEPS.

(6) That TRADOC be appointed the Department of Army executive agent for execution of DA policy regarding implementation of physical strength standards and qualification. As executive agent, TRADOC establish strong, effective administrative control over the physical demands analysis and

physical strength test validation processes to achieve early implementation of mandatory qualification standards.

(7) That Soldier Support Center National Capital Region be designated the responsible TRADOC integrating center for carrying out TRADOC responsibilities as DA executive agent.

5-4. Other Measures of Combat Effectiveness.

a. Conclusions.

(1) Other than physical strength capability, the only issues of serious impact on Army combat effectiveness relate to pregnant soldiers and service sole parents/married service couples. Other issues raised as a basis for restriction of females in military service roles are not supported by substantive evidence.

✓ (2) Pregnant soldiers cause significant impact on TOE unit operations, due to extensive absence from assigned duties and long term nondeployable status. This is especially so in low density MOS and in duty positions estimated to be hazardous to the unborn child due to physical or environmental factors.

✓ (3) Current Army personnel policies are perceived as encouraging pregnancy on the part of lower grade enlisted soldiers as a means of achieving increased pay, housing, more desirable jobs and early release from undesirable assignments.

✓ (4) Male commanders/supervisors generally lack understanding of the condition of pregnancy and of measures to enforce basic standards of conduct and duty responsibility on an individual basis with pregnant soldiers.

(5) Constitutional and other legal precedents effectively prohibit any measures to promulgate blanket personnel actions based on pregnancy.

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(6) Commanders are concerned about the impact on deployability and duty assignment limitation of sole parents of both sexes and of the female member of married service couples who may opt to leave the service rather than deploy to combat. However, few actions are being taken to enforce current regulations which are considered sufficient to address the problems.

(7) There is no conclusive evidence at this point concerning the impact of female soldiers on male bonding in mixed sex units.

b. Recommendations.

(1) Commanders/supervisors address the pregnancy issue on an individual basis, require duty performance of pregnant soldiers IAW individual medical assessment of the soldier and separate non-performers UP AR 600-20 and AR 635-200/AR 635-100 as necessary.

(2) Commanders enforce provisions of AR 600-20 and AR 635-200/AR 635-100 regarding duty performance of sole parents and married service couples. Personnel who cannot or will not meet their responsibilities should be separated from the service for inability to perform prescribed duties due to parenthood.

(3) Further consideration of female soldier impact on male bonding and on unit cohesion in mixed sex units should await the results of the ongoing studies on the subject.

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APPENDIX A

SUBJECT: Women in Combat Study Directive

Commander

Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity

ATTN: ATZL-CAI

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

1. PURPOSE. To determine if changes are required to the Army Policy governing assignment of women in combat. This study will be used to respond to CG, TRADOC concerns regarding present women in combat policy and implementation.
2. REFERENCES.
 - a. TRADOC Regulation 11-8, Army Program Studies Under AR 5-5, 29 March 1985.
 - b. TRADOC Pamphlet No. 11-8, Army Programs, Studies and Analysis Handbook, 19 July 1985.
 - c. FC 100-1, The Army of Excellence, 1 September 1984.
 - d. Women in the Army Policy Review, 12 November 1984.
 - e. DF, ATZL-CG, CAC & FT LVN, 24 July 1985, subject: Women in Combat Task Force.
 - f. DF, ATZL-CAI-I, CAC & FT LVN, 18 July 1985, subject: Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) Action Officer Workshop - Information DF.

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3. STUDY SPONSOR. HQ, TRADOC.

4. STUDY AGENCY. Combined Arms Center, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Combined Arms Integration Directorate.

5. STUDY MONITOR. Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, HQ, TRADOC.

6. TERMS OF REFERENCE.

a. Problem: How can changes be made to Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) policy and/or its implementation to better prepare the Army for war, promote consistent assignment of women throughout the Army, support combat capability, enhance professional development, recognize changes in the threat and comply with Airland Battle Doctrine?

b. Objectives.

(1) Analyze existing DCPC policy for assignment of women to:

(a) Determine if it is consistently applied.

(b) Determine if it supports combat capability through individual and unit replacement and unit reconstitution.

(c) Determine if it promotes professional development.

(2) Evaluate the implementation of DCPC as a policy tool.

(3) Recommend an Army assignment policy for women and a consistent method for its implementation.

c. Scope.

(1) This study will address combat capability as it relates to the assignment of women in combat. Optimization of this element of combat capability is achieved by the proper utilization of people assets. This involves placing properly trained, equipped and physically able soldiers in

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the right duty position at the right place on the battlefield, to include individual/unit replacement and unit reconstitution necessitated by combat casualties.

(2) The perceived problems in DCPC policy and/or its implementation and the effects on professional development of the total force as set forth by the proponent schools/centers, will be considered in formulating recommended changes to the assignment policy for women in combat. Changes to the policy must be designed to make it clear, consistent, and manageable throughout the total force while allowing the combat commander the flexibility to utilize his soldier assets in the most effective manner.

(3) Although the study group will confine their solutions to the high intensity scenario, the result must apply to all levels of warfare in all geographic locations. The current Threat assessment within the high-intensity scenario, coupled with AirLand Battle Doctrine, will guide the study parameters.

(4) No preconceived notions regarding women in combat will be used. The group should formulate their recommendations as though there were no policy and women were just beginning to be accessed into the Army.

(5) The study should not be confined to researching United States experiences alone; it should explore the policy development of other countries with a similar cultural background.

(6) Solutions to the assignment problem should not rest solely with refinements to DCPC. Physical capability criteria, as well as less objective data such as practicality, cultural acceptance, and psychological capability should be considered in arriving at a recommended position.

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(7) Recommended changes must consider the perceived problems with implementing DCPC policy reported from the field; e.g., hindering of professional development, adverse effect on training, and fluctuation in female strength ceilings by MOS.

d. Time Frame. The study will address assignment of women in the present and foreseeable time frame, e.g., 1986-1987.

e. Constraints. The study will not address in detail each TOE position within the Army, rather it will provide guidance for implementation. Time constraints will not permit extensive analysis or modeling; therefore, existing studies, analyses, and reports will be used to the maximum extent possible.

f. Assumptions.

(1) The definition developed for "direct combat" as part of DCPC methodology is valid.

(2) Women will continue to be accessed into the Army at the present level.

(3) Predominant public opinion, as expressed through the intent of Congress, does not and will not support routine assignment of women to positions requiring engagements in direct combat as a primary mission, regardless of the type of warfare.

(4) Soldiers, regardless of sex, will be killed, captured or wounded throughout the theater of operations.

g. Essential Elements of Analysis.

(1) What is current DA policy on the assignment of women, and how was it promulgated?

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(2) How is TRADOC implementing DA policy on the assignment and training of women?

(3) How do various MACOMs and TRADOC schools and centers interpret current policy?

(4) What tools and procedures are used in implementing existing policy?

(5) How does the implementation of policy and procedures impact on combat capability and professional development/training?

(6) How can current policy and procedures be improved?

(7) Where and how should women be assigned in a theater of operations?

(8) Is it realistic to assume women can physically and psychologically do the job during war?

(9) What do other countries of our cultural background have for a policy?

h. Methodology.

PHASE I

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Consolidate, review and evaluate existing policy statements and implementation. | Literature Review, Travel to DA DCSPER, MILPERCEN, TRADOC DCSPAL |
| 2. Review past studies and lessons learned from other services and other nations on utilization of women soldiers. | Literature Review, Travel to CAA, War College, SSC, DA DCSPER, MILPERCEN |

3. Conduct detailed review of DCPC to: Critical Assessment, Travel to
a. Determine validity of Selected Schools, Interviews
methodology.

b. Assess accuracy and validation
of data.

c. Evaluate ease and difficulty
of application.

d. Determine utility as a policy
tool.

4. Gather Field Data Messages, Surveys, Interviews,

a. Input from schools on: Phone Contact

(1) Doctrinal and Tactical
Implications.

(2) Training and Professional
Development.

(3) TOE Development and
Position Coding.

(4) Replacement and
Reconstitution Issue.

(5) Impact on Regimental
System.

b. Field Commands:

(1) Utilization Policies
(2) Success/Problems

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- (3) Morale
- (4) Combat Effectiveness
- (5) School Issues Above (as appropriate)

PHASE II

- 5. Use Results of Phase I to: Task Force Workshop
 - a. Identify specific problems with current policies and the source of problems.
 - b. Develop and evaluate alternative policy statements and implementing directives.
 - c. Develop recommended TRADOC position. Council of Colonels, Army Officer Workshops
- 6. Report results.
- 7. Support and Resource Requirements.
 - a. HQ TRADOC. Receive study recommendations upon completion.
 - b. CACDA.
 - (1) Conduct the study.
 - (2) Identify and obtain technical data.
 - (3) Coordinate emerging results with branch and functional area proponents.
 - (4) Prepare and submit reports required by AR 5-5 and TRADOC Pam 71-3 to HQ TRADOC.

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- (5) Ensure that the study is completed within 90 days.
- c. TRADOC Centers, Schools and Agencies. Provide input and support to the study group as required.

8. Administration:

a. Milestone Schedule

- Form Team	29 Jul
- Initial Draft Study Directive	1 Aug
- Brief CG, CAC	2 Aug
- Start Phase I of Study (Research)	5 Aug
- Final Draft Study Directive	5 Aug
- Initial Draft Study Plan	6 Aug
- Brief CG, TRADOC	7 Aug
- Study Directive/Plan Forwarded to TRADOC for Approval	9 Aug
- Complete Phase I of Study (Research)	30 Aug
- Start Phase II of Study (Analysis)	3 Sep
- Workshop with TRADOC Proponents	11 Sep
- End Phase II of Study	20 Sep
- Brief CG, CAC	25 Sep
- Brief CG, TRADOC	30 Sep
- Brief Selected MACOM Cdrs	7-16 Oct
- Draft Report	10 Oct
- Army Commanders Conference	21-22 Oct
- Final Report	30 Oct

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b. Control Procedures. Commander, TRADOC will review study proposal approximately 60 days after initiation of study.

c. Action Control Number (ACN) Category is 083701. The Army Study System (TASS) Category Number is 1. The study program priority is G 01A.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

HAROLD T. FIELDS, JR.

Brigadier General, GS

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

for Combat Development



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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

Close Combat - Fighting at close quarters with the enemy utilizing small arms, bayonets, and other hand weapons. (AR 310-25)

Combat - 1. Armed fighting; battle 2. Any struggle or conflict; strife. (Webster's New World Dictionary)

Combat Element - Troops that actually take part in fighting, as distinguished from troops engaged in supply or administration. (AR 310-25)

Combat Forces - Those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat. (JCS Pub 1)

Combat Unit - Unit trained and equipped for fighting as an independent tactical element. (AR 310-25)

Direct Action Mission - In special operations, a specified act involving operation of an overt, covert, clandestine or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power's special operations forces in hostile or denied areas. (JCS Pub 1)

Direct Combat - Engaging an enemy with individual or crew served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with enemy personnel, and a risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, and shock effect to destroy or capture him or while repelling his assault by fire, close combat, or counterattack. (WITAPRG 1982)

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Direct Fire - Gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or the director. Fire directed at a target that is visible to the aimer. (JCS Pub 1)

Maneuvering Force - Element of a combat unit that seeks to seize an attack objective through movement to a more advantageous position with respect to the enemy. (AR 310-25)

Offensive Operations - Characterized by aggressive initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, by rapid shifts in the main effort to take advantage of opportunities, by momentum, and by the deepest, most rapid destruction of enemy defenses possible. The ideal attack should resemble Liddell Hart's concept of the expanding torrent. It should move fast, follow reconnaissance units or successful probes through gaps in enemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly to widen penetrations and to reinforce its successes, thereby carrying the battle deep into the enemy rear. It should destroy or bring under control the forces or areas critical to the enemy's overall defensive organization before the enemy can react. (FM 100-5, p. 9-1)

Primary Mission - Principal purpose which an organization is designed to accomplish. (AR 310-25)

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APPENDIX C

COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENTS

1. During the study, as the study group's findings were taking shape, a briefing on "WCTF Emerging Results" was provided to several Division and higher level commanders and their staffs. Following is a summary of their assessments of the study results and of their views on the impact of women soldiers in their commands.

USAREUR COMMANDER

- Consistent application of combat exclusion policy
- Standards are essential
- Should open all MOS's/Units to those who meet the standards--battle roster women soldiers for transfer from TOE combat units to TDA in wartime.

FORSCOM COMMANDER

- Entire issue must be addressed from combat effectiveness view
- The rear battle will be less vigorous than that in forward areas
- Why don't we adjust the number of women coming into the Army? Challenge the assumption that 10% or more of force will be women
- There is no way to get a consistent policy regarding combat effectiveness
- Need to insure that we put women where they can improve combat effectiveness on the battlefield
- Some women don't think we are serious about them having to kill...In one sister service survey, 60% said they would not go into combat
- Before we get rid of direct combat definition, we should know why Army wanted to exclude women from direct physical contact with the enemy, exposure to direct enemy fire, risk of capture

APPENDIX C: ASSESSMENTS BY MAJOR COMMANDERS OF WOMEN IN COMBAT UNITS

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USAREUR STAFF

- We do not want more than our fair share of women soldiers
- Light Divisions are not special
 - If you decrease women in LID's, we will have to take them
- We want no policy that allows a pregnant soldier to exit the Army and return after pregnancy --
Would encourage getting pregnant to get out of European assignment
- Be consistent

DIVISION COMMANDERS

- Support using women soldiers - with combat exclusion
 - Want maximum flexibility in utilizing females
 - Concern with women in Battalion Task Force
 - Concern with male soldiers reaction to female soldiers killed in combat
- Combat Arms Colonels have limited confidence that women will deploy with units during initial stages of conflict in Mid East
- Vast majority support mandatory physical strength criteria
- Vast majority support removing from unit rolls pregnant soldiers who cannot perform duties due to physical or environmental limitations
- Other "Combat Effectiveness" measures not of major concern
 - Specific MOS job skills: Equal to men except for physical strength, basic combat tasks and unit collective tasks
 - Lost Time: Little difference (when pregnancy excluded)
 - Survival in Field: Women can be trained
 - Utilization: Males tend to do heavier jobs/females lighter jobs - not a problem as long as there are an adequate number of males

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2. Overall, the Division Commanders were neutral or positive about women soldiers. Their bottomline is: give us the maximum flexibility in utilizing women within our units; do not tie our hands with quotas, ratios, limits on utilization and more reports. All the Commanders asserted the need for a consistent policy regarding assignment/utilization of women and the need for established standards of physical strength for all soldiers to which the Army adheres in recruiting and MOS qualification.



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APPENDIX D

WCTF SURVEY

D-1. Introduction. The initial effort to develop a study group knowledge base concerning women in combat included development and administration of an opinion survey. The survey contained 34 questions generally directed toward policy regarding the nature of duties and battlefield location criteria that impact assignment of female soldiers. Additionally, several questions addressed the capability of females to perform required duties in a combat environment. A total of 1102 survey questionnaires were administered and returned. Although none of the questions received a 100 percent response, nonresponse was less than two percent for all except two questions where nonresponses were three percent and four percent.

D-2. Objective. To obtain the professional assessment of officers and senior noncommissioned officers with recent field experience concerning personnel assignment policies for women in the Army as one of several input sources to the TRADOC Women in Combat study.

D-3. Discussion. The following subparagraphs present the survey questions and responses. The original 34 questions are reduced to 30 questions by consolidating the five questions concerning branch of service (originally broken out to facilitate machine scoring) as figure D-3. The study did not rely heavily on the results of this survey for several reasons. Due to the original time constraints, the survey questionnaire was rather hastily prepared early in the research phase of the study and without benefit of indepth experience in questionnaire preparation. Therefore, some of the questions were not well designed and, more importantly, some of the subject

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areas subsequently dealt with by the study were not addressed in this survey. The items in the original questionnaire have been arranged in three groupings classed as demographic background, combat exclusion (assignment criteria) and the expected capability of women to function in a combat environment.

a. Demographics. A total of 1,102 survey questionnaires were utilized as input into the SPSS-X program. The survey questionnaires were administered to students at the Command and General Staff Officers Course (591), Combined Arms Service and Staff School (229), Sergeants Major Academy (246) and O-6s (36) stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Demographic data of respondents is contained in the following figures.

Figure D-1.

Sex of Respondents

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Male	1035	93.9
Female	48	4.4
No answer	19	1.7
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-2.

Grade of Respondents

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
E-7 thru E-9	246	22.3
O2/O3	231	21.0
O4	573	52.0
O5	8	.7
O6	37	3.4
No answer	7	.6
TOTAL	1102	100.0

ARMED FORCES ONLY

Figure D-3.

Branch of Respondents

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Infantry	201	18.2
Field Artillery	109	9.9
Armor	90	8.2
Aviation	88	8.0
Engineer	73	6.6
Adjutant General	70	6.4
Signal Corps	65	5.9
Quartermaster	65	5.9
Military Intelligence	50	4.5
Ordnance	50	4.5
Air Defense	41	3.7
Military Police	38	3.4
Transportation	28	2.5
Medical Corps	19	1.7
Chemical	17	1.5
Finance	17	1.5
Medical Service	15	1.4
Judge Advocate	12	1.1
Chaplain	12	1.1
Army Nurse	6	.5
No answer	36	3.3
TOTAL	1102	99.8

Figure D-4.

Have you ever been assigned to a unit with female soldiers?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	942	85.5
No	152	13.8
No answer	8	.7
TOTAL	1102	100.0

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Figure D-5.

How many female soldiers have you supervised?
(expressed as a percentage of your unit)

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0-4%	412	37.4
5-19%	377	34.2
20-100%	187	17.0
Out of Range*	126	11.4
TOTAL	1102	100.0

*Respondents were instructed to skip this question if they had never been assigned to a unit with female soldiers. Variance in out-of-range data indicates some respondents did not comply with instructions.

Figure D-6.

Were females assigned to your last unit?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	775	70.3
No	196	17.8
Out of Range*	131	11.9
TOTAL	1102	100.0

*Respondents were instructed to skip this question if they had never been assigned to a unit with female soldiers. Variance in out-of-range data indicates some respondents did not comply with instructions.

Figure D-7.

Which of the following units have you commanded with females assigned?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Detachment	99	9.0
Company	454	41.2
Battalion	22	2.0
Brigade	12	1.1
Have not commanded a unit with females	386	35.0
Out of range*	129	11.7
TOTAL	1102	100.0

*Respondents were instructed to skip this question if they had never been assigned to a unit with female soldiers. Variance in out-of-range data indicates some respondents did not comply with instructions.

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b. Combat Exclusion. The following data depicts respondent's opinions and observations concerning the importance of selected factors as potential assignment criteria, where respondents have observed female soldiers working, where female soldiers should be assigned on the battlefield, whether female soldiers should be allowed to participate in offensive combat, and what types of MOS they believe should be available to females. Respondents were also asked their opinion concerning two alternative definitions of direct combat and were asked to provide their own if neither alternative seemed satisfactory.

Figure D-8.

Should unit location be an assignment criteria for women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	556	50.5
No	538	48.8
No answer	8	.7
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-9.

Should unit mission be an assignment criteria for women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	769	69.8
No	323	29.3
No answer	10	.9
TOTAL	1102	100.0

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Figure D-10.

Should type of unit be an assignment criteria for women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	760	69.0
No	332	30.1
No answer	10	.9
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-11.

Should the mores of society be an assignment criteria for women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	473	42.9
No	615	55.8
No answer	14	1.3
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-12.

What is the most important criterion for the assignment of women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Unit Mission	435	39.5
Physical Strength and Stamina	322	29.2
Type Unit	154	14.0
Mores	106	9.6
Unit Location	64	5.8
No answer	21	1.9
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-13.

Women should be assigned duties without regard to the risk of capture.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agree	486	44.1
Disagree	589	53.4
No answer	27	2.5
TOTAL	1102	100.0

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A majority of respondents in MC, ANC, AG, CM, MI and QM branches believe risk of capture should be a determining factor for female assignments; a majority of respondents in all other branches disagreed with the statement. There appears to be an inconsistency on the part of MC and ANC since they indicated in Figure D-19 that females should be assigned to maneuver battalions where risk of capture or of becoming a casualty will be highest.

Figure D-14.

Women should be assigned only in relatively safe areas.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agree	503	45.6
Disagree	586	53.2
No answer	13	1.2
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-15.

Given your recent experience, were women assigned to duties forward of the brigade rear?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	400	36.3
No	384	34.8
No Experience	311	28.2
No answer	7	.6
TOTAL	1102	99.9

Figure D-16.

Is an assignment policy for women based on battlefield location still valid, since the Army has adopted the AirLand Battle Doctrine?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	380	34.5
No	708	64.2
No answer	14	1.3
TOTAL	1102	100.0

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Stratification by grade of respondents shows that E-7s thru O-5s generally agree that battlefield location is not a valid assignment criteria. However, the O-6 respondents were slightly in favor of battlefield location as a criterion (51% to 49%).

Figure D-17.

Women should be assigned to CSS and CS positions in the division support area.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	330	29.9
Agree	344	31.2
Neutral	159	14.4
Disagree	158	14.3
Strongly disagree	107	9.7
No answer	4	.4
TOTAL	1102	99.9

Figure D-18.

Women should be assigned to CSS and CS position in the brigade support area.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	248	22.5
Agree	296	26.9
Neutral	120	10.9
Disagree	236	21.4
Strongly disagree	198	18.0
No answer	4	.4
TOTAL	1102	100.1

A majority of senior NCOs and field grade officers agree with assigning women to CS/CSS positions in the brigade support area. Company grade officers narrowly disagree (44% agree/47% disagree) and a majority of O-6s disagree with the statement.

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Figure D-19.

Women should be assigned to support positions
within the maneuver battalions.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	165	15.0
Agree	162	14.7
Neutral	98	8.9
Disagree	302	27.4
Strongly disagree	373	33.8
No answer	2	.2
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Only in the MC and ANC branches did a majority of personnel indicate that women should be assigned to support positions in maneuver battalions.

Figure D-20.

If location were the primary factor in the assignment of women, I believe women should be assigned:

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Everywhere	311	28.2
Up to the company rear boundary	34	3.1
Up to the maneuver battalion rear boundary	121	11.0
Up to the brigade rear boundary	229	20.8
Up to the division rear boundary	397	36.0
No answer	10	.9
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-21.

Women should be allowed to participate in offensive combat operations, i.e., with maneuver units.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Agree	341	30.9
Disagree	741	67.3
No answer	20	1.9
TOTAL	1102	100.1

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Figure D-22.

Based upon my military experience and judgment:

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
All MOS should be open to females	98	8.9
All MOS except those that engage in direct combat should be open to females	502	45.6
All MOS for which females can meet mental and MEPSCAT physical standards should be open	152	13.8
Only those MOS that are more in line with traditional female occupations should be open	222	20.1
All MOS for which females can meet the mental, MEPSCAT, and male physical training standards should be open	120	10.9
No answer	8	.7
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-23.

Assuming that the "Will of Congress" is that women will not engage in "direct combat," which of the following definitions, in your opinion best defines "direct combat" as it relates to the "Will of Congress"?

- a. Direct combat takes place in a unit which has a TOE mission to close with and destroy or capture the enemy by fire and maneuver and repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.
- b. Direct combat is engaging an enemy with individual or crew-served weapons while being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy's personnel, and a substantial risk of capture. Direct combat takes place while closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver, or shock effect in order to destroy or capture him, or while repelling his assault by fire, close combat or counterattack.
- c. Neither. If you have further elements for a clearer definition of direct combat, please comment.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Alternative a, above	374	33.9
Alternative b, above	605	54.9
Neither	108	9.8
No answer	15	1.4
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Note:

- (1) Subsequent to development of this survey, the study group adopted an approach to combat exclusion that does not rest on a definition of direct combat. The responses received to this question did not bear on that decision.
- (2) No write-in alternatives for a better definition were provided by respondents.

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c. Combat Capability. The following data provides respondent's opinions and observations concerning female soldier's physical ability to do the job in different type units and whether physical capability should be an assignment criteria. The following also provides respondent's opinions concerning the percent fill of female soldiers a company-sized unit should contain and what the greatest negative factor is to combat readiness in mixed gender company-sized units.

Figure D-24.

The women whom I have observed are capable of performing all duties associated within a combat environment.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	83	7.5
Agree	231	21.0
Neutral	171	15.5
Disagree	362	32.8
Strongly disagree	250	22.7
No answer	5	.5
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-25.

Women are capable of physically performing in combat service support units during wartime.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	281	25.5
Agree	455	41.3
Neutral	154	14.0
Disagree	127	11.5
Strongly disagree	79	7.2
No answer	6	.5
TOTAL	1102	100.0

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Figure D-26.

Women are capable of physically performing in combat support units during wartime.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	230	20.9
Agree	403	36.6
Neutral	155	14.1
Disagree	194	17.6
Strongly disagree	117	10.6
No answer	3	.3
TOTAL	1102	100.1

Figure D-27.

Women should be allowed in any position if they are physically and mentally capable of performing the duties.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Strongly agree	254	23.0
Agree	224	20.3
Neutral	69	6.3
Disagree	264	24.0
Strongly disagree	287	26.0
No answer	4	.4
TOTAL	1102	100.0

A majority of personnel in the combat arms branches (IN, AR, FA, AD, AV and EN) disagree with this statement. However, the majority of personnel in all other branches agree that females should be allowed to do any job if they are physically and mentally capable.

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Figure D-28.

Should physical strength and stamina be
an assignment criteria for women?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Yes	889	80.7
No	195	17.7
Neutral	18	1.6
TOTAL	1102	100.0

Figure D-29.

Most company-sized units should have no more than ___% of women.

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0-10%	351	31.9
11-20%	174	15.8
21-35%	52	4.7
36-50%	30	2.7
No limit is needed	480	43.6
No answer	15	1.4
TOTAL	1102	100.1

Figure D-30.

Which factor has the greatest negative impact on the combat readiness of a mixed gender, company-sized unit?

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Too many females assigned	204	18.5
Too many males assigned	13	1.2
Females unable to perform basic military tasks	499	45.3
Males unable to perform basic military tasks	87	7.9
Other: Please comment*	254	23.0
No answer	45	4.1
TOTAL	1102	100.0

*Less than half of the respondents who checked "other" actually provided comments as was requested. Of those who did write in comments, a majority indicated that too many soldiers of both sexes being unable to perform basic military tasks was the greatest negative factor.

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APPENDIX E

**WOMEN IN COMBAT
TASK FORCE**

COMBAT EXCLUSION LAYOUT

APPENDIX E: WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION LAYDOWN FOR MOS AND ACTIVE COMPONENT TOE
UNITS CLOSED TO WOMEN

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

CLOSED ENLISTED MOS's

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

MOS	RATIONALE
11B INFANTRYMAN	CLOSES WITH AND DESTROYS ENEMY PERSONNEL, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
11C INDIRECT FIRE INF	PREPARES AND FIRES MORTAR AND PERFORMS INDIVIDUAL COMBAT AND UNIT DEFENSE SUPPORT DUTIES.
11H HVY ANTI-AR INFANTRYMAN	ASSAULTS AND DESTROYS ENEMY TANKS AND ARMOR VEHICLES, EMPLACEMENTS, WEAPONS, AND PERSONNEL WITH HEAVY ANTI-ARMOR WEAPONS.
11M FIGHTING VEHICLE INFANTRYMAN	OPERATES BOTH MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED TO CLOSE WITH AND DESTROY THE ENEMY.
12B COMBAT ENGR	ASSAULTS OBJECTIVE, OPERATES LISTENING AND OBSERVATIONS POSTS, PARTICIPATES IN OPERATIONS, MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED, AND IN AMBUSH PATROLS.
12C BRIDGE CREWMAN	REORGANIZES TO FIGHT AS INFANTRY AS NEEDED.
12E ADM SPECIALIST	ASSEMBLES, ARMS, DISARMS, DISASSEMBLES, TESTS AND MONITORS ADM. REORGANIZES TO FIGHT AS INFANTRY AS NEEDED.
12F ENG TRACK YEH CREWMAN	FIGHTS AS INFANTRY WHEN REQUIRED.
12Z CBT ENGR SR SGT	FIGHTS AS INFANTRY WHEN REQUIRED.
13B CANNON CREWMEMBER	PARTICIPATES IN AND OR CONDUCTS ACTUAL EMPLACEMENT, LAYING, FIRING AND DISPLACEMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY CANNONS.
13M MLRS CREWMAN	PARTICIPATES IN AND/OR CONDUCTS ACTUAL FIRE MISSIONS.
16F LT ADA CREWMAN	ASSISTS IN PREPARATION FOR FIRING AND FIRES LIGHT AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.
16G ROLAND CREWMEMBER	SERVES AS GUNNER FOR THE ROLAND SYSTEM AND FIRES THE ROLAND MISSILE.

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

MOS	RATIONALE
16P CHAPARRAL CREWMEMBER	ASSISTS IN LOADING, PREPARES AND FIRES CHAPARRAL MISSILE.
16R ADA SHORT RNG GNRY CREWMEMBER	PREPARES AND FIRES THE VULCAN ANTIACRAFT GUN.
16S MANPADS CREWMEMBER	PREPARES AND FIRES MANPADS MISSILES.
18B SP OPS WEAPONS SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
18C SP OPS ENGR SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
18D SP OPS MED SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
18E SP OPS COMMO SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
18F SP OPS INTELL SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
18Z SP OPS SR SGT	LEADS, TRAINS AND PARTICIPATES IN SMALL LIGHT INFANTRY TACTICAL UNITS IN HIGHLY SPECIALIZED COMBAT OPERATIONS.
19D CAY SCOUT	PERFORMS AS PART OF SCOUT CREW, SQUAD, SECTION OR PLATOON IN RECONNAISSANCE, SECURITY AND OTHER COMBAT OPERATIONS.
19E ARMOR CREWMEMBER (M48/M60)	DRIVES TANK, LOADS AND FIRES MAIN GUN.
19K ARMOR CREWMEMBER (M1)	DRIVES TANK, LOADS AND FIRES MAIN GUN.
19Z ARMOR SR SGT	PARTICIPATES IN CAVALRY MISSIONS. ALL FEEDER MOS'S ARE P1

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

THE FOLLOWING MOS'S WHICH ARE CURRENTLY CLOSED TO WOMEN SHOULD REMAIN CLOSED BECAUSE THE GREAT MAJORITY OF AVAILABLE DUTY POSITIONS ARE LOCATED IN UNITS DESIGNATED AS CLOSED TO WOMEN UNDER THE WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION PROPOSAL. THERE IS A LACK OF SUFFICIENT AVAILABLE DUTY POSITIONS TO OFFER ADEQUATE CAREER PROGRESSION TO WOMEN SOLDIERS IN THESE MOS'S.

MOS	TITLE
13C	TACFIRE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
13E	CANNON FIRE DIRECTION SPECIALIST
13F	FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST
15J	MLRS/LANCE OPERATIONS FIRE DIRECTION SPECIALIST
16J	DEFENSE ACQUISITION RADAR OPERATOR
24M	VULCAN SYSTEM MECHANIC
24N	CHAPARRAL SYSTEM MECHANIC
24S	ROLAND SYSTEM MECHANIC (RC ONLY)
27C	ROLAND SYSTEM REPAIRER (RC ONLY)
27D	ROLAND SYSTEM FMTS REPAIRER (RC ONLY)
45D	SP FIELD ARTILLERY TURRET MECHANIC
45E	M1 ABRAMS TANK TURRET MECHANIC
45N	M48/M60 TANK TURRET MECHANIC
45T	BRADLEY FVS TURRET MECHANIC
63D	SP FA SYSTEM MECHANIC
63E	M1 ABRAMS TANK SYSTEM MECHANIC
63N	M48/M60 TANK SYSTEM MECHANIC
63T	BRADLEY FVS MECHANIC
93B	AERIAL OBSERVER

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

THE FOLLOWING ENLISTED MOS'S ARE RECOMMENDED TO BE OPENED TO WOMEN SOLDIERS AS A RESULT OF THE WCTF BASIS FOR COMBAT EXCLUSION.

MOS	TITLE
00B	DIVER
13R	FIELD ARTILLERY FIREFINDER RADAR OPERATOR
51K	PLUMBER
51R	INTERIOR ELECTRICIAN
52G	TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SPECIALIST
54C	SMOKE OPERATIONS SPECIALIST
82C	FIELD ARTILLERY SURVEYOR
96R	GROUND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS OPERATOR

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

CLOSED
WARRANT OFFICER
MOS's

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

MOS

RATIONALE

152B

OH-6A/C SCOUT PILOT

AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND WHO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

152C

OH-6 SCOUT PILOT

AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND WHO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

152D

OH-6D SCOUT PILOT

AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND WHO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

152F

AH-64 PILOT

ENGAGES ENEMY AERIAL OR GROUND FORCES BY DIRECT ACTION EITHER IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

152G

AH-1 PILOT

ENGAGES ENEMY AERIAL OR GROUND FORCES BY DIRECT ACTION EITHER IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

180A

SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
TECHNICIAN

OPERATES WITH FOREIGN REGULAR/IRREGULAR FORCES IN TRAINING AND, IF REQUIRED, OPERATIONS, MUST HAVE A BACKGROUND OF EXPERIENCE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

224B

CHAP/YULCAN
SYSTEM TECH

LACK OF VIABLE CAREER PATTERN BECAUSE MOST DUTY POSITIONS ARE IN CLOSED UNITS.

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FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIERS (ASI) ARE CLASSIFIED AS
CLOSED TO WOMEN:

ASI

RATIONALE

1A

OH-6D PILOT

AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND WHO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

1D

OH-58A/C PILOT
(SCOUT CONFIG)
(MOS 100B)

AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND WHO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

1J

AH-1G PILOT
(MOS 100E)

IDENTIFIES ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOT/GUNNER POSITIONS; THESE POSITIONS HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

1L

AH-64 PILOT
(MOS 100K)

IDENTIFIES ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOT/GUNNER POSITIONS; THESE POSITIONS HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

1M

AH-1Q/1S PILOT
(MOS 100E)

IDENTIFIES ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOT/GUNNER POSITIONS; THESE POSITIONS HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.

FOLLOWING SPECIAL QUALIFICATION IDENTIFIER (SQI) ARE CLASSIFIED AS
CLOSED TO WOMEN:

SQI

RATIONALE

H

AERIAL SCOUT

IDENTIFIES PERFORMANCE OF AERIAL SCOUT DUTIES IN AIR CAVALRY OR ATTACK HELICOPTER UNITS; THE DUTIES OF THESE POSITIONS INVOLVE KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES BY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS.

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

**CLOSED OFFICER
AREAS OF CONCENTRATION**

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

ROC

RATIONALE

11A INFANTRY GENERAL	COMMANDS OR ASSISTS IN COMMANDING INFANTRY UNITS. DUTIES REQUIRE GENERAL INFANTRY EXPERIENCE AND INVOLVE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY UNITS AND INFANTRY SOLDIERS.
11B LIGHT INFANTRY	COMMANDS OR ASSISTS IN COMMANDING LIGHT INFANTRY UNITS. DUTIES REQUIRE LIGHT INFANTRY TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE AND INVOLVE THE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY UNITS AND SOLDIERS.
11C MECHANIZED INFANTRY	COMMANDS OR ASSISTS IN COMMANDING MECHANIZED INFANTRY UNITS. DUTIES REQUIRE MECHANIZED INFANTRY TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE AND INVOLVE THE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY UNITS AND SOLDIERS.
12A ARMOR GENERAL	DUTIES REQUIRE GENERAL ARMOR FIELD SKILLS AND ARE CONCERNED WITH THE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS OR ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE UNITS TO KILL OR DESTROY ENEMY FORCES BY OFFENSIVE ACTION.
12B ARMOR UNIT	DUTIES INVOLVE LEADERSHIP OR STAFF POSITIONS IN TANK UNITS OR TANK SPECIFIC POSITIONS AT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND ARE CONCERNED WITH THE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS TO KILL/DESTROY ENEMY FORCES BY OFFENSIVE ACTION.
12C CAVALRY	DUTIES INVOLVE LEADERSHIP OR STAFF POSITIONS IN ARMOR RECONNAISSANCE UNITS OR CAVALRY SPECIFIC POSITIONS AT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND ARE CONCERNED WITH THE TRAINING AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS AND ARMORED RECON UNITS TO KILL ENEMY FORCES BY OFFENSIVE ACTION.
13E CANNON FIELD ARTILLERY	COMMANDS OR ASSISTS IN COMMANDING FIELD ARTILLERY CANNON UNITS. DUTIES REQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OR EXPERIENCE IN PROVIDING FIRE SUPPORT TO MANEUVER ELEMENTS BY TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CANNON FIRES TO KILL/DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.
14B SHORAD	COMMANDS OR ASSISTS THE COMMANDER OF SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY UNITS. PLANS, COORDINATES AND DIRECTS EMPLOYMENT OF GUN SYSTEMS AND/OR SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS AND ASSOCIATED COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. SERVES AS THE AIR DEFENSE STAFF OFFICER AT BATTALION, BRIGADE, DIVISION AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.
15B COMBAT AVIATION (W/ ASI 1A, 1D, 1J, 1L & 1M ONLY)	THESE ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIERS DESIGNATE PILOTS FOR OH-58D, OH-58A/C IN SCOUT CONFIGURATION, AH-1G, AH-64, AND AH-1Q/S HELICOPTERS RESPECTIVELY. AERIAL SCOUT PILOTS WHO WORK IN TANDEM WITH ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS AND THE ATTACK HELICOPTER PILOTS THEMSELVES BOTH HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF KILLING/DESTROYING ENEMY FORCES AS AN OFFENSIVE ACTION.
18A SPECIAL OPERATIONS	PLANS, CONTROLS, AND EXECUTES FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE, STRIKE OPERATIONS, STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND OTHER RELATED OPERATIONS.


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INFANTRY/ARMOR

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF BN, H SERIES
SRC: 07015H0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
40	2	736	778

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOST PSNS	TOT	P1 PSNS
07016H000 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	23	134	157	
07018H000 Rifle Co (3/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	153	8	161	
07028H020 CSC (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.	126	12	138	
BN TOTAL			608	170	778	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: LT INF BN
SRC: 07015 LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
34	1	512	547


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
07016L000 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	89	68	157
07017L000 Rifle Co (3/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	126	4	130
BN TOTAL			467	80	547

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF Bn (ABN) INF DIV
SRC: 07035LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>40</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>655</u>	<u>697</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	P1 MOS P2 MOST TOT P1 PSNS PSNS PSNS		
07036L000 HHC, Inf Ba (1/BM)	P1	Inf Ba is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	P1	88	105	193
07037L000 Rifle Co (3/BM)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	P1	128	4	132
07038L000 Antiaarmor C3 (1/BM)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Ba.	P1	104	4	108
BN TOTAL				576	121	697

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF BN, Aie Asslt Div
SRC: 07055JO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
40	2	709	751

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
07056J000 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	66	98	164
07057J000 Rifle Co (3/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	146	6	152
07108J000 Antiaarmor (AMBL) (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.	110	21	131
BN TOTAL			614	137	751

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF BN LT ATK, 9TH ID

DATE: _____

SRC: 07065T400



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	2	386	426


MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	P1 MOS P2 MOS TOT P1 PSNS PSNS PSNS		
07066T400 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	P1	31	125	156
07067T400 Rifle Co Lt Atk (3/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.		57	5	62
07028H020 CSC (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.		79	5	84
BN TOTAL				261	145	426

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Combined Arms Bn - Hug
SRC: 07095 T 410

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	2	476	516

MISSION:

To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counter-attack.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT: P1

PROPOSED: P1

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
07096T410 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	32	154	186
07097T400 Rifle Co Lt Mts (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	118	5	123
07098T400 Inf Co Aslt Gun (2/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	114	10	124
07099T400 CSC (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.	78	5	83
BN TOTAL			342	174	516

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: COMBINED ARMS BN - LT

DATE: _____

SRC: 07095T420



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>38</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>522</u>	<u>562</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
07096T420 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	28	143	171	
07097T400 Rifle Co Lt Mts (2/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	236	10	246	
07098T400 Inf Co Aelt Gun (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	57	5	62	
07099T400 CSC (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.	78	5	83	
BN TOTAL			399	163	562	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF BN (MECH), Hvy Div (BFVS)
SRC: 07245J410

DATE: _____



Eq w/BFYS

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
45	2	805	852

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counter-attack.			CURRENT: P1		PROPOSED: P1	
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
07246J410 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.	105	234	339	
07247J410 Rifle Co BFVS (4/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.	107	5	112	
07248J400 ANTIARMOR (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.	61	4	65	
BN TOTAL			594	258	852	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: INF BN (MECH), Hvy Div (M113)
SRC: 07245J420

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>45</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>771</u>	<u>818</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS				
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
07246J420 HHC, Inf Bn (1/BN)	P1	Inf Bn is doctrinally the basic maneuver unit of Inf Divisions and Separate Inf Bdes (FM 7-20). The primary battalion mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. Commander must fight the battalion as an integral force to accomplish the mission. HHC, Battalion is employed as an integral element of the battalion.			101	204	305
07447J410 Rifle Co (4/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action.			107	5	112
07448J400 ANTIARMOR (1/BN)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy the enemy as an offensive action. CSC accomplishes this mission as an integral element of the Inf Bn.			61	4	65
BN TOTAL					590	228	818

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: RANGER BN

DATE: _____

SRC: 07085H0



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
37	2	564	603

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS								
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	P1 MOS		P2 MOS	TOT	P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS
HHC 07086H4 (X1)	P1	Inf Bn's are by doctrine a basic combat maneuver element. To plan and conduct special military operations of U.S. policy and objectives. Participates in direct action missions.			18		63		81		
Ranger Co 07087H4 (X3)	P1	To plan and conduct special military operations of U.S. policy and objectives. Uses air, land, water, fast mobility and parachute delivery when required, to conduct raids, ambushes, and attacks against key targets in enemy territory. Participates in direct action missions.			163		11		174		
Bn Total					507		96		603		


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ABN INF, LONG RANGE SOEU Co. Corps

DATE: _____

SRC: 07157LO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	0	175	182


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS	P2 MOS	TOT P1
			PSNS	PSNS	PSNS
HQS SEC (1/CO)	P1	Although unit's primary mission is intelligence gathering, the units are organized, trained and equipped to enter enemy areas to collect HUMINT. Direct engagement with enemy forces as an offensive action, while not desirable, may be essential to mission accomplishment. All personnel may be required to employ Infantry skills to ensure individual and team survival. (FC 7-93)	4	5	9
MAINT SEC (1/CO)	P1		0	6	6
OPNS SEC (1/CO)	P1		6	5	13
COMMO PLT (1/CO)	P1		0	37	37
LRS PLT (3/CO)	P1		99	18	117
CO TOTAL			111	71	182

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ARMOR BN (ABN), ABN DIV

DATE: _____

SRC: 17215H.O.



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>32</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>447</u>	<u>481</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:	P1 MOS P2 MOS TOT P1 PSNS PSNS PSNS	
17216H300 HHC	P1	Primary battalion mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action. HHC, battalion is employed by the battalion commander as an integral element of the battalion in carrying out this mission.	96	96	124	220
17218H300 Armor Co (3/Bn)	P1	Primary mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action.	73	73	14	87
Bn Total			315	315	166	481

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: TANK BN(M60), HHC DIV
SRC: 17235J410

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
40	2	501	543


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
17236J410 HHC	P1	Primary battalion mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action. HHC, battalion is employed by the battalion commander as an integral element of the battalion in carrying out this mission.	P1	105	190	295
17237J410 Tank Co (4/Bn) Bn Total	P1	Primary mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action.	P1	59	3	62
				341	202	543

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: TANK BN (M1), Huy DIU
SRC: 17235J420

DATE: _____



EQUIPPED W/ M1

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>40</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>501</u>	<u>543</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS
17236J420 HHC (1/Bn)	P1	Primary battalion mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action. HHC, battalion is employed by the battalion commander as an integral element of the battalion in carrying out this mission.	105	190	295	
17237J420 Tank Co (4/Bn) BN Total	P1	Primary mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action.	59	3	62	
	P1		341	202	543	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: SEP TANK Co. (MIA)
SRC: 17237J430

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>62</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS				
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
17237J430 Tank Co	P1	Primary Company mission is to close with and destroy the enemy by offensive action. The company fights as an integral unit.	P1	P1	59	3	62

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: AR CAV Sqdn, ACR
SRC: 17055J310/320

DATE: _____



EQUIPPED W/ M60/M113

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
50	2	769	821

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
17056J310 HHT (1/Sqdn)	P1	Primary Squadron mission involves engaging enemy forces by offensive actions. Squadron executes light armor unit missions. HHT, squadron is employed by squadron commander as an integral element of the squadron in executing these missions.	45	186	231	
17057J30 ARM CAV TRP (3/Sqdn)	P1	Unit closes with and destroys enemy by offensive action while executing its primary mission.	109	20	129	
17027J310 Tank Co. (1/Sqdn)	P1	Unit closes with and destroys enemy by offensive action while executing its primary mission.	59	15	74	
06037H000 FA Btry (1/Sqdn)	P1	Primary mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire. Unit is employed as an integral element of the squadron.	90	39	129	
ACS Total			521	300	821	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: CAV Sqdn, Hvy Div
SRC: 17205J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>41</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>564</u>	<u>633</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
17206J410 HHT (1/Sqdn)	P2	Provides command, control, and administrative and logistics support to the squadron. Personnel, other than those with combat arms skills, do not engage in offensive combat. Risk of being killed or captured is not a criteria for unit closure.	46	210	256	46
17207J410 Cav Trp (2/Sqdn)	P1	Unit will engage enemy forces by offensive actions in order to successfully disengage from contact.	110	17	127	110
17208J410 Air Cav Trp (2/Sqdn)	P2	Unit is open EXCEPT for aircraft crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews are involved in combat operations or are potentially available as replacements. Attack helicopter pilots/gunners have a primary mission of killing/destroying enemy forces as an offensive action. Scout aircraft crews work with attack helicopters as an integral team to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.	17	18	35	24
07209J500 LRS Det (1/Sqdn)	P1	Detachment consists primarily of Long range surveillance teams that habitually operate forward of the FLOT and that are trained and prepared to fight limited offensive actions in order to insure mission accomplishment and successfully disengage from enemy forces	33	20	53	33
Sqdn Total			333	300	633	401

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: SEP AR CAV Trp, (Hvy Bde)
 SRC: 17207JS5

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
6	0	149	155

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
17207JS40 CAV TRP	P1	Primary troop mission involves engaging enemy forces by offensive actions.	110	20	130	
17207JS41 Sep CAV TRP (1/Trp)	P1	Augmentation element required to permit SPC 17207JS40 to function as a separate unit. This element is employed by troop commander as an integral element of the troop in executing assigned missions.	0	25	25	
TRP Total			110	45	155	

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COMBAT ENGINEERS

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN (MECH), Corps

DATE: _____

SRC: 05045H1



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WA	ENL	TOTAL
<u>36</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>794</u>	<u>836</u>

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05046H100 HHC (x1)	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Combat Engineer battalions, when employed as Infantry may function as an integral battalion or task organized with Infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies. The battalion commander requires maximum flexibility in utilization of personnel for the Infantry role as organization for combat may occur on very short notice.	32	108	140
05047H100 Co (x4)	P1		130	44	174
Bn Total			552	284	836


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN, Hwy Div
SRC: 05145J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>43</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>807</u>	<u>857</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
A. To increase the combat effectiveness of the Hwy Div by accomplishing mobility, countermobility, survivability missions and general engineer tasks. B. To perform Inf. Combat Missions when required.			CURRENT		PROPOSED	
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
05146J400 HIC (1/Bn)	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Combat Engineer battalions, when employed as Infantry may function as an integral battalion or task organized with Infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies. The battalion commander requires maximum flexibility in utilization of personnel for the Infantry role as organization for combat may occur on very short notice.	38	86	124	
05147J400 En Co (4/Bn)	P1		123	29	152	
05148J410 BRG Co, RBN (1/Bn)	P1		98	27	125	
BN TOTAL			628	229	857	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN, INF DIV/LT INF DIV

DATE: _____

SRC: 05155L000



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
25	1	288	314

MISSIONS:

A. To increase the Combat Effectiveness of the Infantry Division by accomplishing mobility, countermobility and survivability missions. B. To perform Infantry Combat missions when required.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P1

PROPOSED P1

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05156L000 HNC	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Combat Engineer battalions, when employed as Infantry may function as an integral battalion or task organized with Infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies. The battalion commander requires maximum flexibility in utilization of personnel for the Infantry role as organization for combat may occur on very short notice.	24	101	125
05157L000 EN CO (X3)	P1		59	4	63
Bn Total			201	113	314


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN (Cbt) (ABN)
 SRC: 05195H500

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>30</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>625</u>	<u>663</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	
			P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS
05196H500 HHC	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Combat Engineer battalions, when employed as Infantry may function as an integral battalion or task organized with Infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies. The battalion commander requires maximum flexibility in utilization of personnel for the Infantry role as organization for combat may occur on very short notice.	23	81	104
05197H500 EN EQ - MNT Co	P1		4	137	141
05198H500 CBT EN CO (X2)	P1		117	92	209
Bn Total			261	402	663

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN (Air Aslt Div) (A&W DIV)
SRC: 05215JO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>43</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>631</u>	<u>676</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS				
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05216J000 HHC	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Combat Engineer battalions, when employed as Infantry may function as an integral battalion or task organized with Infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies. The battalion commander requires maximum flexibility in utilization of personnel for the Infantry role as organization for combat may occur on very short notice.	38	126	164		
05217J000 En Co (X4)	P1		100	28	128		
Bn Total			438	238	676		

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (Sep IN Bde)
SRC: 05107H010

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>241</u>	<u>250</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05107H010	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Engineer companies, when employed as Infantry, can quickly reorganize and augment the Infantry's combat power, whether task organized with an Infantry battalion or as a separate company.	182	68	250

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co. (ACR)
SRC: 05108H600

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	1	186	194

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
05108H600 Engr Co.	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Engineer companies, when employed as Infantry, can quickly reorganize and augment the Infantry's combat power, whether organized with an Infantry battalion or as a separate company.	138	56	194	P1

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (Sep AR/MECH Inf Bde)
SRC: 05127J200

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	1	247	255


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT P/	PROPOSED P/	
05127J200 Engr Co. Bde, RIB	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Engineer companies, when employed as Infantry, can quickly reorganize and augment the Infantry's combat power, whether task organized with an Infantry battalion or as a separate company.	183	72	255

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (Sep LT INF Bde)
SRC: 05207H000

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	1	166	174

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS				
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05207H000 EN CO	P1	Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry and therefore have a recognized offensive killing mission. Engineer companies, when employed as Infantry, can quickly reorganize and augment the Infantry's combat power, whether task organized with an Infantry battalion or as a separate company.	P1	P1	112	62	174


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co. (Float Brg, Ribbon)

SRC: 05079J2

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	1	176	182

MISSION:

A. To provide: Personnel and Equipment to transport, assemble, disassemble and maintain the Engr assault Float Bridge, Ribbon. B. Engineer mission cargo hauling of palletized cargo in emergencies by immobilizing bridge loads.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P1


PROPOSED P1

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05079J200 Eng. Co.	P1	This unit is a Corps asset that supplements Heavy Division bridging capability in assault river crossings during enemy engagements. The projection of bridging equipment, when under enemy fire, is necessarily an offensive combat action requiring the killing/destroying of opposing enemy forces to secure a bridgehead on enemy held ground.	116	66	182

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co, LT ED(AB/AA/LT)
 SRC: 05054H3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>207</u>	<u>215</u>

MISSION: To support A&E ENGR combat operations with manned Engr construction equipment.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05054H300 (Abn/Aslt)	P1	Documented mission of this type unit does not include a mission or function of killing or destroying enemy forces by offensive action. However, units that operate in support of airborne and air assault division engineer battalions may be employed in airborne or air assault operations to secure enemy held airfields and assist in preparing to receive airlanded friendly forces. As potentially the first unit on the ground in a hostile environment, they will be required to kill enemy forces as an offensive action in order to secure the airfield.	19	196	215
05054H300 (Lt Inf Div)	P2	The units designated to support the light divisions do not have the unique early entry mission of the airborne/air assault unit version and thus will not be required to engage enemy forces as an offensive measure.	19	196	19

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, EN GRP
 SRC: 05052H6

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
19	15	84	118


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
05052H600 HHC	P2	Unit is a command and control headquarters having no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces. It therefore does not meet criteria for closure to women soldiers	16	102	118	16

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (ADM)
SRC: 05057H5

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
10	1	185	196


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide ADM support to a Corps, Task Force, and allied nations as required.			CURRENT P1 PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
05057H500 CO HQ	P2	HQ provides command and control. No offensive combat mission is defined.	3	33	3	
OPS SEC	P2	HQ provides command and control. No offensive combat mission is defined.	11	5	11	
ADM PLT's	P1	PLT's are P1 because the nature of a ADM mission is such that enemy personnel will be intentionally destroyed and delivery of the ADM device is similar to that of "direct action missions."	138	6	144	
Co. Total			152	44	152	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co. (CBT Spt. Equip.)
SRC: 05058H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	2	232	241

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P1			
			PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1 PSNS
05058H400 ENG. Co.	P2	This battalion has no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces and therefore does not meet criteria for closure to women soldiers.	7	234	7	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (Panel Bridge)
SRC: 05077J2

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
4	1	94	99

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05077J200 ENG. Co.	P2	This battalion has no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces and therefore does not meet criteria for closure to women soldiers.	63	36	63


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Bde (Theater Army)
SRC: 05101H620

DATE: _____



When orgn as HHC ENGR BDE, THTR ARMY

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>28</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>89</u>	<u>125</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05101H620 HHC, Engr Bde	P2	Unit is a command and control headquarters having no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces. It therefore does not meet criteria for closure to women soldiers.	23	102	23

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co. (Const. Spt.)

DATE: _____

SRC: 05114H200



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	1	169	175


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT		PROPOSED	
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
05114H200 Engr Co.	P2	No defined combat mission.	5	170	5	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN, Cbt Hwy
SRC: 05115H300

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>32</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>757</u>	<u>796</u>

MISSION: A. To increase the combat effectiveness of Division, Corps and Theater Army forces by accomplishing mobility, countermobility, survivability and general engineer tasks. B. To construct, repair, and maintain main supply routes, landing strips, building structures and utilities. C. To reinforce Div Engineer Units, when required. D. To perform Inf Combat missions, when required.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P2

PROPOSED P2

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05116H300 HHC	P2	HHC, does not perform combat missions. Provides Command and control and admin-log support.	11	105	11
05117H300 Engr Equip Co.	P2	FM 5-100 states, "Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry. Other engineer units do not have this mission, and will not be reorganized to fight as infantry. They will not be tasked with infantry missions except during unit or base defense situations."	2	138	2
05118H300 Eng Co (x3)	P2	FM 5-100 states, "Combat Engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as Infantry. Other engineer units do not have this mission, and will not be reorganized to fight as infantry. They will not be tasked with infantry missions except during unit or base defense situations."	5	175	5
Bn Total			28	768	28


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co. (Port Coast)
SRC: 05129H5

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
11	2	201	214

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
05129H500 Engr Port Co.	P2	No combat mission identified.	13	201	214	13


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Co (PIPELINE) (Const. Spt.)

DATE: _____

SRC: 05177H400



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	FNL	TOTAL
5	1	175	181

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			CURRENT P2		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05177H400 En Co	P2	Unit provides rear area construction support and maintenance of pipelines. Unit missions do not meet the criteria for closing the unit to women, i.e. unit does not have a primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces.	5	176	5

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN Det (Const, Utility, Elec. Power Trans)
SRC: 05530H600

DATE: _____



OSZSOMS HA (DIVING)
HB (PIPELINE DESIGN)
HC (REAL ESTATE)
HD (UTILITIES (2500))
HE (UTILITIES (4000))
HF (UTILITIES (10,000))
HQ (POWER PLANT OPN & MAINT)
HH (POWER LINE)
HJ (RADIOGRAPHIC YIELDING RESP)

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>56</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOST PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
05530H600 Utilities TM	P2	These detachments have no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces and therefore do not meet criteria for closure of women soldiers.	0	56	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: EN BN (TOPO)
SRC: 05335H600

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
33	22	818	873

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
To provide Topographic support to Theater Elements.			CURRENT P2		
			PROPOSED P2		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
05336H600 HHC	P2	This battalion has no primary offensive mission of killing/destroying enemy forces and therefore does not meet criteria for closure to women soldiers.	0	126	0
05337H600 CARTO Co. (x4)	P2		0	584	0
05338H600 Survey Co	P2		0	163	0
Bn Total			0	873	0

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
FIELD ARTILLERY

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Btry 155 SP, ACS
SRC: 06037H000

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>8</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>129</u>

MISSION: To destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon fire.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOST PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06037H000	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	70	59	129


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (155mmT), INF DIV
 SRC: 06125HO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>38</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>565</u>	<u>605</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	P1	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
06126H000 HHB (1/8n)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	26	196	222	
06127H000 FA Btry (3/8n)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	84	18	102	
06129H000 Svc Btry (1/8n)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	43	34	77	
Bn Total			321	284	605	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (105mm), Lt Inf Div

DATE: _____

SRC: 06125LO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WA	ENL	TOTAL
36	3	374	413

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	P1	PROPOSED	P1
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
06126L000 HH&S (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HH&S is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	27	185	212	
06127L000 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire	59	8	67	
Bn Total			204	209	413	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (105/155mm), GS
SRC: 06165T4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>35</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>380</u>	<u>416</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			CURRENT P1		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06166T400 HNB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HNB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	19	107	126
06167T400 FA Btry(105) (2/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	53	18	71
06127T400 FA Btry(155) (1/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	53	18	71
06129H400 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	43	34	77
Bn Total			221	195	416

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA BN (105mm T), Abn DIV
SRC: 06205H3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
37	2	424	463

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06206H300 HHS Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHS is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	41	224	265	
06207H300 FA Btry (105) (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	53	13	66	
Bn Total			200	263	463	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (155mm SP), HVY DIV
SRC: 06365HO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH


OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	2	538	578

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT P1	PROPOSED P1	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06366H000 HHR (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHR is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	27	198	225
06367H000 FA Rtry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	64	31	95
06369H000 Svc Rtry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Rtry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	13	55	68
Bn Total			232	346	578

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (155mm SP), Huy DIV
SRC: 06365J4

DATE: _____

**LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH**

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>50</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>668</u>	<u>720</u>

MISSION:

A. To provide Field Artillery fires, to include nuclear and chemical in direct support of a maneuver brigade (Armor or Mech) or in general support of the supported force. B. To reinforce the fires of other Field Artillery units.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P1

PROPOSED P1

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06366J410 HHB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	112	255	367	
06367J410 FA Btry (155) (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	64	31	95	
06369J410 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	13	55	68	
Bn Total			317	403	720	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FABn (155mm SP), Sep IN or AR Bde

DATE: _____

SRC: 06375HO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>37</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>542</u>	<u>584</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	P1	P2	TOT P1
PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS
06376HO000 HNB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HNB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	30	201	231	
06367HO000 FA Btry(155) (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	64	31	95	
06369HO000 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	13	55	68	
Bn Total			235	349	584	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (105mm T), GS
SRC: 06405H5

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
26	3	387	416

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	P1 MOS		
			P1	P2	MOS	TOT P1
06406H500 HHB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	15	116	131	
06407H500 FA Btry (105) (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	53	23	76	
06409H500 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	24	33	57	
Bn Total			198	218	416	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (155mm T) (3x6)

DATE: _____

SRC: 06425H3



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>29</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>451</u>	<u>482</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06426H300 HHB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.		17	116	133
06427H300 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.		75	23	98
06429H300 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.		15	40	55
Bn Total				257	225	482

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (8 in SA) (3x4)

DATE: _____

SRC: 06445H1



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
28	2	437	467

MISSION:

A. To provide Field Artillery fire support, including nuclear, to units of a division or corps.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT: P1

PROPOSED: P1

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06446H100 HHB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HBB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	20	106	126
06447H100 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	68	23	91
06449H100 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	13	55	68
Bn Total			237	230	467


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA BN (8IN SP) (3X6)
SRC: 06445J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>35</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>549</u>	<u>586</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	P1 MOS P2 MOS TOT P1 PSNS PSNS PSNS		
06446J100 HNB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HNB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.		22	103	125
06447J410 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.		88	40	128
06449J410 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.		17	60	77
Bn Total				303	283	586

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn (155mm SP) (3X6)

DATE: _____

SRC: 06455H3



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
28	2	450	480

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
06456H300 HHB (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HHB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	20	107	127	
06457H300 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	67	28	95	
06459H300 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The Service Btry is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	13	55	68	
Bn Total			234	246	480	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA BN (105mm T), AA S/4 DIV

DATE: _____

SRC: 06705LO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	3	388	429


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	MOS	P2	TOT P1
PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS			
06706L000 HHS Btry	P1	Cannon Bn's are doctrinally the basic fighting unit in the FA. The HBB is employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and therefore is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	30	189	8	219
06707L000 FA Btry (3/Bn)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	62	8	70	
Bn Total			216	213	429	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Btry (155mm T), LT Inf Div
SRC: 06107L0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	0	132	137

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	P1	PROPOSED	P1
06107J500 FA BTRY	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces. Unit has the capability to move shoot 6-50).	104	33	33	137
Btry Total			104	33	33	137

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: 105mm Btry Towed, L1D

DATE: _____

SRC: 06127L0



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
3	0	64	67

MISSION: To destroy, neutralize and suppress the enemy by cannon fire.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
CURRENT	P1	PROPOSED	P1		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06127L000 Btry 105	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire.	53	14	67


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Btry (105mm), FA Bn, IN DIV
SRC: 06157HO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
3	0	72	75


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To destroy, neutralize or suppress the enemy by cannon fire.			CURRENT PI			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06157HO Btry (105mm)	P1	Battery mission is to destroy, neutralize or suppress enemy forces by cannon fire. Battery functions as a single unit and has capability to be self sustaining for periods of time.	59	16	75	
BtryTotal			59	16	75	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MLRS Btry Hug Div
SRC: 06398J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>126</u>	<u>132</u>

MISSION: To destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by rocket fire.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS


CURRENT P-1

PROPOSED

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06398J400	P1	MLRS units are self sufficient organizations roughly equal to FA cannon battalion in ability to provide field artillery support. They are designed to compliment cannon artillery in SEAD and counterfire and provide interdiction fires against second echelon targets including troops, light equipment and air defense sites. They also augment the fires of cannon field artillery in attack of high density targets to neutralize the enemy with violent and destructive firepower during offensive operations. (FM 6-60)	61	71	132
Btry Total			61	71	132

UNIT: FA Bn, 8in/MLRS Hwy Bn
SRC: 06395J2

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
35	2	508	545

MISSION: To provide Field Artillery fires in general support of the supporting force.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P1
PROPOSED P1


SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06396J200 HHB	P1	Cannon battalions are doctrinally the basic fighting unit of the field artillery. Personnel of the headquarters and service battery are employed as integral elements of the firing batteries and thus are actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	4	103	107	
06397J200 Btry 8 in (x2)	P1	Cannon firing battery primary mission is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy forces.	89	28	117	
06398J200 MLRS	P1	MLRS units are self-sufficient organizations roughly equal to FA cannon battalions in ability to provide field artillery support. They are designed to complement cannon artillery in SEAD and counterfire and provide interdiction fires against second echelon targets including troops, light equipment and air defense sites. They also augment the fires of cannon field artillery in attack of high density targets to neutralize the enemy with violent and destructive firepower during offensive operations. (FM 6-60)	61	64	125	
06399J200 Svc Btry	P1		13	89	102	
BN TOTAL			167	284	451	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MLRS Bn, Non Div
SRC: 06525J3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
27	2	432	461

MISSION: To provide Field Artillery rocket fires in support of Corps Forces.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 PSNS	MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06526J300 HHS	P1	MLRS is used to kill or destroy enemy forces such as with cannon artillery although without the precision accuracy of delivery available with cannon fires	11	75	86	
06398J200 MLRS (x3)	P1	MLRS units are self sufficient organizations roughly equal to FA cannon battalion in ability to provide field artillery support. They are designed to compliment cannon artillery in SEAD and counterfire and provide interdiction fires against second echelon targets including troops, light equipment and air defense sites. They also augment the fires of cannon field artillery in attack of high density targets to neutralize the enemy with violent and destructive firepower during offensive operations. (FM 6-60)	61	64	125	
Bn Total			194	267	461	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: TGT Acq Btry, INF DIV
SRC: 06307H6

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
6	6	150	162

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	P2	MOS	TOT P1
06307H6 TAB	P2	Battery does not have a primary mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	6	156	PSNS	6
Btry Total			6	156	PSNS	6

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: 1st Acq Btry, HVY DIV

SRC: 06307J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>91</u>

MISSION: A. To acquire, identify, classify and locate enemy elements, units and forces to sufficient accuracy for attack.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT: <u>P1</u>			
			PROPOSED: <u>P2</u>			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
06307J4 TAB	P2	Battery does not have a primary mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	4	87	4	
Btry Total			4	87	4	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co., ID (MTZ)
SRC: 1941769

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WA	ENL	TOTAL
7	0	84	91

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	P1 PSNS
DIV PM OPS See (X1)	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	5	0
CO HQ (X1)	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	10	0
MP PLT (X 4)	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	76	76
Co. Total			0	91	76


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co., AIM Div

DATE: _____

SRC: 19017H7



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
9	0	197	206

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P2 CO/P1 PLT			
			PROPOSED P2 CO/P1 PLT			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
Div PM OPS Sec	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	9	0	0
CO HQ	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	32	0	0
MP PLT DS	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	99	99	99
MP PLT GS	P1		0	66	66	66
CO TOTAL			0	206	165	0


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA BN, LANCE
SRC: 06595H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>40</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>423</u>	<u>466</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06596H400 HMB (1/Bn)	P2	Unit provides direction and coordination of operations of the battalion. Does not have a primary mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	17	121	17	
06597H400 LANCE Btry (3/Bns)	P1	Unit delivers medium range fires, both nuclear and nonnuclear to neutralize or destroy second echelon targets including troops and light equipment as well as command center and logistics sites.	0	83	83	
06599H400 Svc Btry (1/Bn)	P2	Unit provides supply and maintenance support to the battalion; has no offensive role against enemy force.	0	79	0	
Bn Total			17	449	100	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, FA CMD (PERSHING)

SRC: 06602L0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>43</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>194</u>	<u>241</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
06602L000 HHB (1/Cmd)	P2	Battery is a command and control organization and does not engage in direct offensive actions to destroy enemy forces. Although a high priority target for enemy air attack, risk of personnel casualties is no greater than for any large headquarters.	13	228	13	
Btry Total			13	228	13	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: FA Bn, Pershing
SRC: 06625LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
59	14	815	888

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06626L000 HHS Btry (1/Bn)	P2	Unit provides command and control of a Pershing battalion and provides unit level administration for batteries organic to the battalion. Does not have primary mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	12	172	184	12
06627L000 PERSHING BTRY (4/Bns)	P2	Unit delivers coordinated neutralization and mass destruction nuclear fires on preplanned targets or targets of opportunity such as command and control centers, logistics installations and airfields.	9	167	176	9
Bn Total			48	840	888	48


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, FA Bde
SRC: 06401J3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>23</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>150</u>

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide command, control and administrative supervision of attached Field Artillery units.			CURRENT: <u>P2</u>			
			PROPOSED: <u>P2</u>			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 TOT PSNS
06401J320 HHB (1/FA Bde)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	4	146	4	
HHB TOTAL			4	146	4	
TOTAL HHB, FA Bde						


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, LT Inf Div Artg
SRC: 06102L0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>22</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>117</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 MOS	P2 MOS	TOT	P1 PSNS
06102L00 HHB DIVARTY (1/DIVARTY)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	2	115	2	
HHB TOTAL			2	115	2	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, Abn Div Arty
SRC: 06201H3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
41	5	170	216

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
06201H300 HHB (1/DIV ARTY)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	5	211	5
HHB TOTAL			5	211	5


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, DIV ARTY, Arms Div
SRC: 0630240

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

<u>OFF</u>	<u>W.O.</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>40</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>177</u>	<u>222</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide command and control for assigned and attached units.			CURRENT: <u>P2</u>		PROPOSED: <u>P2</u>	
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
06302HO HHB (1/0IV ARTY)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	4	218	4	
HHB TOTAL			4	218	4	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, DIVARTY, Air Asslt Div
SRC: 06702L0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
27	2	91	120


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
06702L000 HHB (1/AASLT DIV)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	3	117	3	
HHB TOTAL			3	117	3	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, Corps Artillery
SRC: 06502LO

DATE: _____



OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>41</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>184</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
06502L000 HHB (1/Corps Arty)	P2	Unit provides command and control of attached battalions and batteries; does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	3	181	3	
HHB TOTAL			3	181	3	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA BN, SHORAD, LID
SRC: 44115J8

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
26	3	293	322


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
44116J8000 HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a command, control and support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	12	50	62	BN
44117J800 Btry Gun/Stinger (X2)	P1	Although, the battery has essentially a defensive role as do all ADA normal deployment is so closely linked to the maneuver forces as to cause the mission to be offensive in nature much in the manner of Tube FA Btry's.	97	33	130	
Bn Total			206	116	272	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA BN, VULCAN/STINGER (ABN)
SRC: 44135L0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
32	4	416	452

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
44136L000 HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a command, control, and support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	11	78	89	11
44137L000 Rtry VUL/MPNS (X3)	P1	FM 44-1 identifies the towed Vulcan as unsuitable AD protection for maneuvering forces and therefore would not normally be employed in that manner; however, the Airborne unit appears to be a case where atypical deployment may be necessary for lack of anything better.	98	23	121	
Bn Total			305	147	374	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA VULCAN/STINGER Air Ass't Div
SRC: 44145LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
32	4	416	452


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
44146L000 HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a Command, Control and Support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	11	72	11
44147L000 Btry VUL/MPOS (X3)	P1	Although, FA 44-1 identifies the Towed Vulcan as a poor choice of weapon systems to protect maneuvering forces and therefore not normally employed in such a manner the Air Assault Div appears to be a case where atypical deployment maybe necessary for lack of anything better.	74	49	123
Bn Total			233	219	378

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA Bn, HTMD
SRC: 44155T3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENR	TOTAL
44	6	676	726

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P1 BN			
			PROPOSED P2 BN/P1 F-BTRY			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
44156T300 HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a Command, Control and Support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	16	83	16	
44157T300 Btry Gun/Stinger (X3)	P1	Although, the battery has essentially a defensive role, as do all ADA, normal deployment is so closely linked to the maneuver forces as to cause the mission to have an offensive flavor much in the manner of tube FA Btrys.	99	40	139	
44158T300 Btry Chap/Stinger (X3)	P1		159	51	210	
Bn Total			472	254	643	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA BN SHORAD Hvy Div
SRC: 44165LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
45	5	565	615


MISSION: To provide air defense against low-altitude hostile aircraft for the heavy division.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
HHB 44166L000	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a command, control and support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	52	119	52
Btry Gun/MAN- PADS 44167L000 (x3)	P1	Although the battery has essentially a defensive role as do all ADA, normal deployment is so closely linked to the maneuver forces as to cause the mission to be offensive in nature much in the manner of Tube FA Btry's	92	56	148
Bn Total			328	287	496

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA BN (CHAP), Corps
SRC: 44445LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
29	3	440	472

MISSION: To provide low to medium altitude air defense for the Corps.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a command, control and support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	17	119	136	17
Btry CHAP (x3)	P1	Although the battery has essentially a defensive role as do all ADA, normal deployment is so closely linked to the maneuver forces as to cause the mission to be offensive in nature much in the manner of Tuba FA Btry's.	76	36	112	76
Bn Total			245	227	472	245


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA BN, New Div CHAP SP/VULCAN Towed
SRC: 44725H1

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	7	650	695

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	
44726H100 HHB	P2	Normal deployment of ADA assets limits the HHB to a command, control, and support role. It is not actively involved in offensive combat.	12	133	12
44727H100 (X2) Vulcan Btry	P1	Although the firing batteries have essentially a defensive role, as with all ADA, normal employment is so closely linked to the maneuver forces that the mission is frequently offensive in nature in similar manner to cannon artillery units. This unit's primary role by doctrine is static defense of fixed installations, but it will be used as augmentation/replacement for divisional SHORAD battalions as required. Unit will therefore have an offensive combat mission.	68	33	101
44328H000 CHAP(SP)STINGER (X2)	P1		129	45	174
Bn Total				406	289
					562


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA Bn (HAWK)
SRC: 4426545

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>42</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>589</u>	<u>644</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
44266H500 HHB	P2	Provides Command, Control and Support to firing Btry's.	0	152	0	
44267H500 HAWK Btry (X3)	P2	Hawk is normally employed in the rear operations and tactical operations areas. When employed in support of a Div, Hawk firing elements are not normally employed within range of enemy medium field artillery. (source FM 44-1, Pg 4-24). Hawk's normal deployment and defensive mission remove it from the role of offensive killer.	0	164	0	
Bn Total			0	644	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA Bn (HAWK), Theater Army
SRC: 44485J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>51</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>706</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	P2	PROPOSED	P2
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
44486J400 HHB	P2	Provides command, control and support to firing Btry's.	4	190	4	
44487J400 Btry, Hawk (X4)	P2	Hawk is normally employed in the rear operations and tactical operations areas. When employed in support of a Div, Hawk firing elements are not normally employed within range of enemy medium field artillery. (source FM 44-1, Pg 4-24). Hawk's normal deployment and defensive mission remove it from the role of offensive killer.	1	127	1	
Bn Total			8	698	8	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA Bn(HAWK)(Corps)

DATE: _____

SRC: 44395J420



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>43</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>463</u>	<u>519</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	P2	PROPOSED	P2
44396J410 HHB	P2	Provides Command, Control and Support.	4	176	4	
44397J400 HAWK (x3)	P2	Hawk is normally employed in the rear operations and tactical operations areas. When employed in support of a Div, Hawk firing elements are not normally employed within range of enemy medium field artillery. (source FM 44-1, Pg 4-24). Hawks normal deployment and defensive mission remove it from the role of offensive killer.	8	105	8	
Bn Total			28	491	28	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: ADA Bn (Patriot)
SRC: 44635J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>37</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>352</u>	<u>398</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide high to medium altitude air defense of ground combat forces and high value assets.			CURRENT P2 PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
44636J400 HHB	P2	Provides command, control and support to firing Batteries.	0	161	0	
44637J400 Btry (Patriot) (X3)	P2	Patriot normally employed in defense of static high value assets or in area defense of deployed forces. This does not meet the concept of offensive killer. (Source FM 44-1, Pg 4-27).	0	79	0	
Bn Total			0	398	0	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, ADA Bde
SRC: 44002H6

DATE: _____



MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
44002H600	P2	To command and coordinate the operations of subordinate ADA Grps., Bn's and other assigned and attached units.	0	83	0	
Total			0	83	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHB, Theater Army, AD Cmd
SRC: 44001H8

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
44	2	92	138

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
44001H8	P2	To exercise command of Army Air Defense Forces.	0	138	0	
Total			0	138	0	

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AVIATION

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: RECON SQUAD, INF DIV, LT

DATE: _____

SRC: 17185L000



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
29	30	271	330

MISSION: To perform reconnaissance and surveillance, security, screening and rear battle operations, conduct intelligence and electronic warfare missions and facilitate command and control in support of Division operations.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P1

PROPOSED P2 / P1 Grd/Cav, LRS,
Fit Crews

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
17186L000 HHD	P 2	Provides Command, Control, and Support. Not actively engaged in offensive combat.	48	100	48
17187L000 Cav Trp	P 1	Unit will engage enemy forces by offensive actions in order to successfully disengage from contact	70	3	73
01167L000 Air Cav Trp (*2)	P 2 (P1 Fit crew)	Units are open EXCEPT for helicopter flight crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews will be involved in combat operations and will use organic aircraft weapons to kill enemy forces during reconnaissance and countermobility operations in support of the division.	14	20	14
07109L000 LRS Det	P 1	Although primary mission is intelligence gathering, the LRS Detachment must employ Infantry skills to ensure mission accomplishment and survival. Direct engagement with enemy forces, as an offensive action, although not desirable, may be essential to mission accomplishment.	22	19	41
Squad Total			168	162	190


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: AIR CAV Sqdn ID (LT)
SRC: 17305T3/D4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
36	87	458	581

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1	P1 MOS	P2 MOST	TOT P1 PSNS
17306T300 HHT	P2	Provides Command, Control, and Support. Not actively engaged in offensive combat.	25	248	25	
17307T300 Trp	P1	The ground cavalry will engage enemy forces by offensive actions in order to successfully disengage from contact.	126	20	146	
17308T300 X 3 Trp (P1 Ftr Cew)	P2	Units are open EXCEPT for helicopter flight crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews will be involved in combat operations and will use organic aircraft weapons to kill enemy forces during reconnaissance and countermobility operations in support of the division.	37	17	37	
Sqdn Total				262	319	282


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Cbt Avn Sqdn (ACR)
SRC: 17265J3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
38	103	402	507

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	P1 TOTAL PSNS
17266J310 HHT	P2	Provides command, control, and administrative and logistics support to the squadron. Unit does not have a mission to engage enemy forces in offensive combat.	26	252	26
17208J210 Air Cav Trp X 3	P2 (P1 Fir/Cav)	Units are open EXCEPT for helicopter flight crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews will be involved in combat operations and will use organic aircraft weapons to kill enemy forces during reconnaissance and countermobility operations in support of the division.	17	18	17
01257J430 Cbt Spt	P2 (P1 Fir/Cav)		26	24	26
17187J210 ATK HEL CO X 2	P1	Units primary mission is to destroy enemy forces using aerial fire support to maneuver forces. Unit performs mission as integrated teams of scout and attack helicopter to find, fix and destroy the enemy.	18	19	18
Squad Total			139	368	139

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Atk Hel Bu - L10

DATE: _____

SRC: 01185J8



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>22</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>242</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P2 BN / P1 ATK Co's			
			PROPOSED P2 BN / P1 ATK Co's			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
01186J800 Hq & Svc Co.	P2	Unit provides command, control, and supervision of battalion operations, and admin and logistics support to include aviation unit maintenance. Does not have a mission to engage in offensive combat.	15	116	116	15
01187J800 Atk Helo Co. (x3)	P1	Unit's primary mission is to destroy enemy forces by aerial fire support to maneuver forces. Unit performs mission as integrated teams of scout and attack helicopters to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.	18	19	19	37
Bn Total			69	173	173	126


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Atk Hel Bn, LID
SRC: 01385L100/200

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>25</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>282</u>

MISSION: To destroy enemy armor, mechanized and other forces, using fire and maneuver as an integrated member of the combined arms team.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P2 BN /P1 ATK Co's

PROPOSED P2BN/P1ATK CO


SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS	P2 MOS	TOT P1
			PSNS	PSNS	PSNS
01386L100 HHS	P2	Unit provides command, control, and supervision of battalion operations, and admin and logistics support to include aviation unit maintenance. Does not have a mission to engage in offensive combat.	17	154	17
01387L100 Atk Helo (x3)	P1	Unit's primary mission is to destroy enemy forces by aerial fire support to maneuver forces. Unit performs mission as integrated teams of scout and attack helicopters to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.	18	19	37
Bn Total			71	211	128

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Atk He/Bn.
SRC: 17385T300/D600

DATE: _____



OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>24</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>346</u>

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
17386T300 HQ & SVC Co.	P2	Unit provides command, control, and supervision of battalion operations, and admin and logistics support to include aviation unit maintenance. Does not have a mission to engage in offensive combat.	20	209	209	20
17387T300 Atk Co. X 3	P1	Unit's primary mission is to destroy enemy forces by aerial fire support to maneuver forces. Unit performs mission as integrated teams of scout and attack helicopters to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.	23	16	39	
Bn. Total			89	257	346	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: AsLt Hel Co. Huy Diu
SRC: 01257J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	26	102	135


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT:	P2		
			PROPOSED:	P2/P1 FLT Crews		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
01257J420 GS Co.	P2	Unit is open EXCEPT for helicopter flight crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews, while transporting maneuver force elements into battle, necessarily use organic aircraft weapons to kill enemy forces in clearing landing zones to deliver the maneuver forces. Remainder of unit personnel provide command, control, and logistics/admin support to the unit and so are not engaged in offensive combat operations.	0	135	135	0

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Avn Bn, Cmbt
SRC: 01405L100

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>29</u>	<u>132</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>450</u>

MISSION: To provide tactical mobility of troops, supplies, and equipment within the combat zone.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	P1	PROPOSED P2 BN/P1 FLT CREWS
01406L100 HHC	P2	Unit is open EXCEPT for helicopter flight crews. Pilots and enlisted members of flight crews, while transporting maneuver force elements into battle, necessarily use organic aircraft weapons to kill enemy forces in clearing landing zones to deliver the maneuver forces. Remainder of unit personnel provide command, control, and logistics/admin support to the unit and so are not engaged in offensive combat operations.	0	112	0
01317L000 Cbt Avn Co (x3)	P2		0	74	0
01409L100 AVUM Co.	P2		0	116	0
Bn Total			0	450	0


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHT, CAV BDE AIR ATTK
SRC: 17202J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
25	0	71	96

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
17202J400 HHT	P2	Provides command, control and support, is not engaged in offensive killing	2	94	96	2

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHD, Avn BN (Combat)
SRC: 01256H2

DATE: _____

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM NOT AVAILABLE

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
12	2	52	66

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide command, control, staff planning, supervision and coordination of all assigned and attached units, and to employ these units in support of ground operations incidental to combat.			CURRENT: <u>P2</u>			
PROPOSED: <u>P2</u>						
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
01256H200	P2	Provides Command and Control support. Not actively engaged in combat.	0	66	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Cmd Avn Co (GS), Hwy Div
SRC: 01287J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>8</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>147</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
01287J4 GS Co.	P2	Provides command and control and support.	0	147	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHD, ATC BN (CORPS)

DATE: _____

SRC: 95226J3



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>76</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1 PSNS
95226J300	P2	Mission does not include actual participation in combat.	0	76	0	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY


CHEMICAL

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: NBC Co., Hvy Av
SRC: 03387J400

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WA	ENL	TOTAL
12	1	146	159

MISSION: to provide Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) equipment decontamination and smoke support to a heavy Division.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P2 / P1 Recon, Decon, Smoke

PROPOSED P2

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS	P2 MOS	TOT	P1
			PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	
Div Cml Sec.	P2	This company does not have an offensive killing role. The Reconnaissance Platoon in this company does not have the dual role of NBC Recon and Cav Scout, like the Recon Platoon in the NBC Co., ACR; therefore it is open to women.	0	5	0	
NBC Elem.	P2		0	8	0	
Co. HQ	P2		0	8	0	
Maint Sec	P2		0	18	0	
Smoke Plt	P2		0	20	0	
Decon Plt	P2		0	80	0	
Recon Plt	P2		0	20	0	
Co. Tot			0	159	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: NBC Co. ACR
SRC: 03207J3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>80</u>

MISSION: To provide Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) equipment decontamination and reconnaissance support to an armored cavalry regiment.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
03207J300					
Rgmt Cml Sec	P2	No mission to kill/destroy enemy forces in an offensive role.	0	6	0
Co. HQ	P2	No mission to kill/destroy enemy forces in an offensive role.	0	7	0
Maint. Sec	P2	No mission to kill/destroy enemy forces in an offensive role.	0	10	0
Recon Plt	P1	Normal employment of this platoon in the ACR is in a dual role as NBC Recon and as a Cavalry Scout; therefore, this platoon is actively involved in the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	0	36	36
Decon Plt	P2	No mission to kill/destroy enemy forces in an offensive role.	0	21	0
Bn Total			0	80	36

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

CHEMICAL UNITS

With the exception of NBC Reconnaissance elements assigned to the Armored Cavalry (previous page), all other Chemical units will be coded P2 because they do not have an offensive killing mission.

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
MILITARY POLICE

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co., Huynh Duy
 SRC: 19217J4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
9	0	140	149


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P2 Co./P1 PLT			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT	P1 PSNS
Div PM OPNS Sco	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	6	6	0
CO HQ	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	18	18	0
CS PLT	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	63	63	63
DS Plt	P1		0	63	63	63
Co. Tot			0	149	149	126

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MPG, LID
SRC: 19323LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
6	0	71	77

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
DIV PM OPS Sec (X1)	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	5	0	
CO HQ (X1)	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	9	0	
MP PLT (X 3) (HQ + 3 MP SQDS)	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	63	63	
Co Total			0	77	63	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co., Air Aslt Div
SRC: 19037JO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>8</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>172</u>

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			CURRENT P2CO / P1PT		
			PROPOSED P2CO / P1 PT		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
PM OPS SEC	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	9	0
CO HQ	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	31	0
MP PLT DS	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	99	99
MP PLT GS	P1	-----	0	33	33
CO TOTAL		-----	0	172	132

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co., ABN Div

DATE: _____

SRC: 19313 LO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
7	0	91	98

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT		PROPOSED	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
Div PM OPNS	P2	Provost Marshall operations is a law enforcement function very similar to civilian law enforcement.	0	5	0	0
CO HQ	P2	Company headquarters provides command, control and administrative functions for the operational platoons.	0	9	0	0
MP PLT	P1	While divisional MP platoons perform traffic control, local area security, and law enforcement functions as do all Military Police, their rear area combat mission requires patrolling roads throughout the division area to locate and initiate offensive actions against enemy forces, if necessary.	0	84	84	84
Co Total			0	98	84	84

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co, Cbt Spt (Corps)

DATE: _____

SRC: 19077J2



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	0	171	176


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
			CURRENT P2		
			PROPOSED P2		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
CO HQ	P2	Rear area security operations (RACO), conducted primarily by teams or squads to locate and make initial contact with level I/level II threat forces, is similar in concept to patrols conducted by other combat support and by combat service support units outside base perimeter boundaries as an essential element of defense. The RACO mission of MP's, although differing in degree from that of CS and CSS units in the Corps area, is defensive in nature. Therefore this unit does not have a primary mission to kill or destroy enemy forces by offensive action	0	29	0
Ops Ctr	P2		0	15	0
MP Plt (4/Co)	P2		0	33	0
Co Total			0	176	0

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Hu Security Co.
 SRC: 19197J3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	0	205	210


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
Co HQs	P2	Headquarters provides command and control, and administrative and logistics support for the Company	0	38	0	
Platoon (4/Co)	P2	Mission and capabilities are defined as a guard/security function of a special weapons exclusion area. This and the added mission of convoy security are purely defensive in nature.	0	43	0	
Co Total			0	210	0	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Co (Escort Guard)
SRC: 19047H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
4	0	137	141

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
CO HQ	P2	HQ provides command, control and administrative and logistics support to the company; does not have a mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	15	0	
PLT HQ	P2	Platoon does not have a mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	6	0	
SQD	P2	Squad does not have a mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	120	0	
Co Total			0	141	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Det POW Info Center
SRC: 1910346

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
6	0	56	62

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT	PROPOSED	
MP Det	P2	Unit has no mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	62	0
Total				62	0


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP Phy Sec Co.
SRC: 19097H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
4	0	137	141

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
CO HQ	P2	HQs provides command, control and administrative and logistics support to the company.	0	21	0	
Security PLT (3/Cs)	P2	Mission involves a guard/security function which is defensive in nature. Threat of attack is high due to nature of facilities being guarded, however risk of casualties is minimal due to dispersion of platoon personnel.	0	40	0	
Dog Patrol (Aug)	P2	Augments Co, as required to aid in conduct of functions described above. NOTE: Personnel authorizations not included in Company total.	-	-	-	
Co Total			0	141	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, MP Bde (CORPS)

DATE: _____

SRC: 19262H420



*Not req'd when org'd as SRC 19262H420

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>22</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>68</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P2			
			PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
HHC	P2	Unit is a command and control organization with no mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	68	0	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MP GUARD CO.

DATE: _____

SRC: 19247H4



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>125</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT P2			
			PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
Co HQs	P2	HQs provides command, control and administrative and logistics support for the company; does not have a mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	14	0	
MP Guard Co (3/Co)	P2	Performs security guard duties; not offensive combat functions.	0	111	0	
Co Total				125	0	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHD, MP BN
SRC: 19076H400

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
12	1	45	58

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
HHD	P2	Unit is a command, control and administrative organization with no mission to destroy enemy forces by offensive action.	0	58	0

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, SF GROUP

DATE: _____

SRC: 31102HO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>29</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>89</u>

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide command and control and provide staff planning for the Special Forces Group and attached elements.			CURRENT P1 PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT	P1 PSNS
HHC	P2	Group headquarters is a command and control element for operations of attached units and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces as an offensive action.	30	59	30	
Co Total		The Group Commander and key staff personnel who direct operations of attached units are designated "male only" by specialty. Therefore, the expertise needed to direct combat operations, to conduct special operations combat planning, or to establish and operate a Special Forces Operational Base are available on the staff. Interchangeable positions are administrative and require technical expertise in appropriate admin functions.	30	59	30	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: SF Bn, SF Grp
SRC: 31105H0

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WA	ENL	TOTAL
33	19	209	261

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide command, control, and staff elements to the SF Group, for employment in unconventional warfare, special operations and Foreign Internal Defense.			CURRENT P/ PROPOSED P/			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
HQ, SFOW 31106H000 (X1)	P1	SF units are involved in operations of an overt, covert, clandestine or low visibility nature primarily in hostile or denied areas. Missions of this type will necessarily require the killing/destruction of enemy forces.	12	15	27	
SF Co 31107H000 (X3)	P1		77	1	234	
Bn Total			243	18	261	


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Sig Co, SF Group
SRC: 11257H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OEE	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	1	150	156

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
Signal Co	P2	The Signal Company supports Special Forces elements for intelligence, OPSEC, and electronic warfare, but has no offensive killing role in destroying enemy forces.	32	124	32
Co. Total			32	124	32


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: MI Co, SF GRP.
SRC: 34137H8

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
5	1	115	121

MISSION: To provide integrated intelligence and operations security (OPSEC) and electronic warfare support to the Special Forces Group. To provide intel, OPSEC and EW training TMs in support of unconventional warfare or Foreign Internal Defense.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS CURRENT <u>P1</u> PROPOSED <u>P2</u>		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
Co (x1)	P2	The MI Company supports Special Forces elements for intelligence, OPSEC, and electronic warfare, but has no offensive killing role in destroying enemy forces.	0	121	0
Co. Total			0	121	0


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Svc Co, SF Grp
SRC: 31127H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
14	20	201	235

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
To provide admin, logistical and limited aviation support for the Special Forces Group.			CURRENT P1 PROPOSED P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
Svc Co	P2	The Service Company provides administrative and logistical support. It is not directly involved in direct action missions nor does it have an offensive killing role.	5	230	235	
Co. Tot.			5	230	235	

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: PSYOPS (CFC BN & Gp)

DATE: _____

SRC: 33500HO



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
21	3	79	103

MISSION:

To plan and conduct psychological operations. To provide command and control, admin and logistical support and operational supervision over organic and attached units.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT P2

PROPOSED P2

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
TM AB Cmd&Ctrl (x4)	P2	Psychological Operations Units do not have a mission of killing/destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	0	46	0
TM AC Cmd&Ctrl (x1)	P2		0	57	0
TOTAL			0	103	0

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: Civil Affairs TMAC
SRC: 41500H2

DATE: _____

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
NOT AVAILABLE

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>32</u>

MISSION: SEE Below			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
TMAC HHD	P2	Unit does not have a mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive combat action.	0	32	32	0
TOTAL		MISSION: To perform civil affairs functions in support of military operations and assist in the discharge of the Commander's political military responsibilities to the civilian population, government and economy in the area. Also to perform civil affairs functions in support of US commitments and national policy in cold war operations. To operate as a civil affairs or a civil military operations staff element of a HQ's within the capabilities of the various civil affairs teams. To provide command and control and operation supervisor over organic and attached units. As a secondary mission, within the United States, to provide military support to local civil government within the area affected by enemy attack, national disaster or other emergency.	0	32	32	0

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BRIGADE/DIVISION


HEADQUARTERS COMPANIES

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, RANGER REGIMENT
SRC: 07302L000

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>27</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>97</u>	<u>128</u>

MISSIONS:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT P1	PROPOSED P2 (Recon Plt P1)	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
REGT HQS STAFF	P2	Regimental headquarters and staff is a command and control element for operations of attached units. It does not have a mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	25	42	25
RECON PLT	P1	Provides reconnaissance support for the regiment. Unit personnel employ tactical Infantry skills to ensure mission accomplishment and survival. Direct engagement with enemy as an offensive action may be essential to mission accomplishment.	14	2	16
COMM PLT	P2	Communications platoon and company headquarters provide administrative and logistics support to the Regimental Headquarters and do not have a mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	0	30	0
CO HQS	P2		3	12	3
Co Total		The Regimental Commander and key staff personnel who direct operations of attached units are designated "male only" by specialty. Therefore, the expertise needed to direct combat operations is available on the staff. Interchangeable positions are administrative and require technical expertise in appropriate admin functions.	42	86	44


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Abn BDE
SRC: 57042H3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>20</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>101</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	P1 MOS P2 MOST TOT P1 PSNS PSNS		
57042H3 HHC (1/80E)	P2	Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.	P1	16	85	16
HHC TOTAL		The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MOS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to reconstitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units. Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.	P2	16	85	16

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Air Aslt Bde
 SRC: 67042LO

DATE: _____




MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
67042L000 HHC (1/80E)	P2	Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.	20	58	20	
HHC TOTAL		The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MDS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to reconstitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units. Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.	20	58	20	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, LID BDE
SRC: 77042L00

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>17</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>100</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
77042L000 HHC (1/LID BDE)	P2	Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.	19	81	19
HHC TOTAL		The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MOS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to re-constitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units. Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.	19	81	19

WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, BDE AR DIV

DATE: _____

SRC: 87042J410



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
24	1	66	91

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
A. The HQ provides command, control and supervision of the tactical operations of the brigade and attached units.			CURRENT P1		
B. The HHC provides logistics and operating personnel support for the HQ staff sections.			PROPOSED P2		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS
87042J410 HHC	P2	<p>Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.</p> <p>The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MOS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to reconstitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units.</p> <p>Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.</p>	20	71	20


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Bde, Mech Inf Div

DATE: _____

SRC: 87042J420



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
24	1	66	91

MISSION: A. The HQ provides command, control and supervision of the tactical operations of the Bdes and attached units. B. The HHC provides logistics and personnel support for the Brigade HQ staff sections.			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOST PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1
87024J420 HHC	P2	<p>Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.</p> <p>The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MOS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to reconstitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units.</p> <p>Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.</p>	23	68	23	P1 P2

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
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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Hvy Sep Bde, Mech IN/AR

DATE: _____

SRC: 87102J4



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
46	4	291	341

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
			CURRENT		PROPOSED	
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	P1
87102J410 HHC, AR	P2	Brigade HHC is a command and control element for maneuver battalions and other attached units and supporting units. This unit does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive actions.	79	262	341	
87102J420 HHC, Mech	P2	The Brigade Commander and selected staff positions (notably the operations staff) direct the battle — these positions are designated "male only" by virtue of MOS/FA. The great majority of duty positions are administrative or logistical support, either as command and control of subordinate units or internal to the HHC and do not have a role in directing the battle. Neither will these personnel be used to reconstitute functions of subordinate units as to do so may render the Brigade incapable of accomplishing its missions. Some technical skills, e.g. signal communications, do not transfer to lower echelon units. Opening the Bde HHC to women is completely consistent with the WCTF rationale for utilization of women soldiers. It also reflects current practice.	*80	262	80	*Mech Bde auth. one more P1 position than AR Bde

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, HTLD
SRC: 07004D600

DATE: _____

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
NOT AVAILABLE

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
—	—	—	—

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS	
07004D600 HHC	P2	<p>Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.</p> <p>The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise.</p> <p>Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.</p>				


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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, ABN DIV
SRC: 57004H3

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>80</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>183</u>

MISSION:

A. The HQ provides command, control and supervision of the operations of the Division and attached units. B. The HHC provides logistics and personnel support for the Division and staff sections.

COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS

CURRENT: P2


PROPOSED: P2

SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
57004H300 HHC (1/ABN DIV)	P2	Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	24	159	24
HHC TOTAL		The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise. Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.	24	159	24

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, A1B As/4 Div
SRC: 67004LO

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
83	7	186	276

MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:		
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
67004L000 HHC (1/DIV)	P2	Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	33	243	33	
HHC TOTAL		The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise. Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.	33	243	33	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, LIGHT Inf DIV
 SRC: 77004L000

DATE: _____

ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM
NOT AVAILABLE

LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>72</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>232</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS		
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	CURRENT:	PROPOSED:	
			P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT P1 PSNS
77004L000 HHC	P2	<p>Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.</p> <p>The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise.</p> <p>Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.</p>			

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Hvy Div AR
SRC: 87004J410

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
<u>81</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>198</u>	<u>287</u>


MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1 MOS PSNS	P2 MOS PSNS	TOT PSNS	P1 PSNS
87004J410 HHC	P2	Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	17	270	17	
HHC Total		The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise. Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.	17	270	17	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Hwy Div MECH
SRC: 87004J420




MISSION:			COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS				
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE	P1	MOS	P2	MOS	TOT P1
			PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	PSNS	
87004J420 Inf Div(Mech) (1/Div)	P2	Division Headquarters staff is a command and control element for operation of the division and attached units. The headquarters company provides internal support for the division staff and does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces by offensive action.	37		250		37
HHC Total		The Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander and selected staff positions involved in planning and directing maneuver units in combat are designated "male only" positions by MOS/FA. The majority of duty positions, whether staff or HHC internal support, are administrative/logistical functions and do not have a role in directing the battle. The skills employed by these latter personnel are primarily technical and experience in maneuver units does not materially contribute to expertise.	37		250		37
		Opening the entire HHC to women will have no impact on command post elements as the key positions are male only by MOS and sufficient clerical and support personnel are available to insure only male soldiers are included in the CP, if desired.					

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

UNIT: HHC, Corps or Abn Corps
SRC: 52002H4

DATE: _____



LVL 1 STRENGTH AUTH

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>152</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>377</u>

MISSION:				COMBAT EXCLUSION STATUS			
				CURRENT: P2			
				PROPOSED: P2			
SUBUNIT	P CODE	RATIONALE		P1 PSNS	P2 PSNS	TOT P PSNS	
52002H420/410 HHC (1/CORPS)	P2	This unit provides command and control of Divisions, Separate Brigades and other Corps assets. Does not have a primary mission of destroying enemy forces nor are personnel assets used to reconstitute combat capability of subordinate units.		28	349	28	
HHC TOTAL				28	349	28	

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

UNITS

The MI Company, Special Forces is P1. All other MI Battalions are P2 because they do not have an offensive killing role.

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SIGNAL UNITS

The Signal Company, Special Forces Group and all other communications elements organic to P1 units will be closed. All other signal units, because they do not conduct offensive killing missions, will be coded P2. This includes the following units that were previously coded P1 because of their battle field location.

- a. Tactical Command Post Platoon of Command Operations (TAC CP at FLOT)
- b. Forward Signal Center Platoon of the Forward Communications Company, (BDE Trains, DISCOM FAST)

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

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WCTF COMBAT EXCLUSION POLICY

MEDICAL UNITS

All medical units would be P2, except those elements organic to P1 units (i.e. the medical platoon of an infantry battalion would be P1). Medical units do not perform offensive killing missions. Medical elements which are closed because they are organic to P1 units are closed because of the P1 units overall mission and not the sub-elements mission.

Units closed under DCPC but opened under WCTF include:

- a. Medical Support Company, Main Support Battalion
- b. Medical Company, Forward Support Battalion
- c. Medical Company, Medical Battalion, Division
- d. Medical Company, Separate Brigades
- e. Air Ambulance Platoon, Medical Co., (Air Ambulance)
Med Bn, Air Asslt Division
- f. Support Company, Ambulance Platoon, HQ & Spt, Med Bn,
Abn. Div.
- g. Air Ambulance Section, Med Det (Helicopter Ambulance).

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

All combat service support units and all types of units not previously addressed will be coded P2. No offensive killing role was identified for those units. Concurrence was received from the proponents.

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APPENDIX F

ALTERNATIVES TO PHYSICAL STRENGTH STANDARDS

F-1. General. This study group strongly recommends, on the basis of evidence both from the laboratory and from troop units, that the Army adopt physical strength standards by MOS as a mandatory criteria for award of MOS to all soldiers. However, given the Army leadership's past reluctance to accept such a recommendation, we realize the possibility that it may continue to be unacceptable. Therefore, in view of the critical need to preserve the operational capability of the combat, combat support and combat service support forces on the battlefield in terms of individual and collective soldier physical strength, WCTF developed some alternative approaches to retaining a minimum level of strength in units.

F-2. Alternatives. Each of the alternatives involves establishing a maximum level of female assigned strength or a minimum level of male assigned strength by unit and/or by MOS. These processes focus only on the unit positions for which the authorized MOS is classified in AR 611-201 as "Heavy" or "Very Heavy." The difference in physical strength capability between the average female and the average male has a substantial operational impact only in these strength classifications. Although the WCTF dealt with divisions, which are the primary fighting forces and the force elements wherein the risk accruing to a reduced operational capability is greatest, these strategies could apply to any or all units in the Army.

a. MOS classified as "Heavy." Two mathematical based approaches and a commander's concensus assessment are provided.

(1) Both mathematical formulas rely on a similar set of facts and assumptions and show that between 70 and 88 percent of the personnel in any heavy category MOS within the division must be males. The facts upon which both approaches are based are that the heavy physical strength category requires a lifting capability of between 81 and 100 pounds and that the average dynamic strength of a female is about 68 percent that of a male. The key assumption is that a TOE unit's operational readiness should not be reduced below a "combat ready" (C1) unit mission capability by this one factor. Additionally, the mid-point of the weight lifting standard--90 pounds--was used to avoid biasing the result toward either the low end (81 pounds) or the high end (100 pounds) of the "Heavy" strength requirement range.

Table F-1.

Average Strength Capability of Female

Facts:

- o Female average dynamic strength equals 68% of a male's average dynamic strength
- o Heavy MOS lift requirement: 81-100 lbs

Assumptions:

- o That a heavy cluster MOS has 100 positions in the unit
- o Ninety percent (90%) of personnel must lift 90 lbs

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} M + F &= 100 \text{ persons} \\ 90M + (.68) 90F &= .90 (90) 100 \text{ person - pounds} \\ M + .68F &= 90 \\ M + .68(100-M) &= 90 \\ .32M &= 22 \\ M &= 68.75 \quad 69 \quad 70\% \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

70% of the personnel in any heavy cluster MOS within the division must be males

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Table F-2.

Method II - Percentage of Females Qualified

Facts:

- o 100% of males in the heavy cluster MOS can lift 81-100 lbs
- o 12% of females in the heavy cluster MOS can lift 81-100 lbs

Assumptions:

- o That a heavy cluster MOS has 100 positions in the unit
- o 90% of personnel must lift 90 lbs

Then:

$$\begin{aligned}M + F &= 100 \text{ people in unit} \\M + .12F &= 90 \text{ people capable of lifting 90 lbs} \\(100-F) + .12F &= 90 \\.88F &= 10 \\F &= 10/.88 = 11.4\end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

The unit mix is 88 males (minimum) and 12 females

(2) Table F-1 is based upon the average strength capability of the female soldier. Two equations with two unknowns (number of males and number of females) are derived. First equation is simply the sum of the number of males and females for a 100 person unit. Second equation assumes that 90 percent of personnel in a 100 person unit must be able to lift 90 pounds. In other words, a 100-person unit should be able to lift .90 (90) 100-person pounds. Solving for the unknowns the two equations gives the answer that at least 70 males must be assigned to the 100-person unit.

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(3) Table F-2 is based upon the percentage of females qualified in a 100 person unit. Since only 12 percent of females can lift 90 pounds, the number of personnel capable of lifting 90 pounds would be M (# of males) + .12 F (# females) = 90 people capable of lifting 90 pounds. Bottomline: employing this methodology each unit must have a minimum of 88 males.

(4) A third approach was to obtain the assessments of commanders of various sized units within several divisions. Commanders consistently reported observing that combat effectiveness begins to drop significantly when the ratio of males declines to about 70 percent in units of any size. Combat effectiveness was viewed in terms of the amount of work in the heavier physical tasks that could be done in a specified period of time or, conversely, the amount of time taken to do a specified set of tasks. The essential reason given for reduced productivity in these units was that many of the female soldiers lacked the strength to do the heavier tasks and so either waited for male soldiers to do those tasks or recruited additional males and/or females to assist in those tasks. Meanwhile, the work those additional soldiers would have been doing was postponed. The delays were reported to be remarkable when unit density of female soldiers exceeded 40 percent.

b. MOS classified as "Very Heavy." It is in the very heavy group of MOS where the lesser physical strength of the average female has the greatest impact. The majority of positions available to both women and men are in this MOS group, yet very few of the women the Army is currently recruiting have the physical strength to qualify for these positions. Depending on which of the various studies one refers to, between 1% and 5.5% of the enlisted female soldiers recruited under present criteria possess the actual physical upper

body strength required of the very heavy MOS classification. Given the small number, efforts to develop a mathematical approach were fruitless because they effectively closed this group of MOS to women. Rather, we concluded these MOS should remain open to women but with a limitation of 10 percent female content in each MOS and in the distribution to divisional units. A divisional unit would thus be assured of retaining the collective physical strength to perform its mission in a combat environment. If the Army continues to recruit non-strength qualified soldiers at current rates, the additional risks to combat effectiveness would be accepted in nondivisional TOE units.

c. Female assignment density in divisions. This alternative differs from the above approaches to determining the male/female content of an Army division or other large organizational element, e.g., separate brigade. It uses a minimum male soldier fill of 70 percent for heavy category MOS and 90 percent for very heavy category MOS, in enlisted positions, based on the limits developed in paragraph F.2.a and b, above. It further accounts for the impact of pregnancy among both officer and enlisted personnel. The analysis was accomplished by laying out, in a spreadsheet format, the number of authorized positions in a division by MOS and by battalion or separate company sized unit. The specific organization used to develop the results in table F-3 and F-4 was the J-series Heavy Division, modernized equipment. SRC:87000J440. This TOE authorizes a total of 16,507 positions in the division. Following outlines the computational process and summarizes the results.

(1) Enlisted personnel authorizations.

o Spreadsheet all MOS in the divisional battalions and separate companies and identify the physical demands rating of each MOS from AR 611-201.

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o Identify the number of positions in each MOS that are closed to women, using whatever policy is appropriate, e.g., current DCPC or the WCTF recommended revision of DCPC which opens more divisional positions to females.

o Identify the number of open positions by MOS within each battalion or separate company within the Division.

o Strength decrement:

- Decrement the number of positions available to female soldiers in open units to 30 percent of available open spaces for heavy category MOS and to 10 percent of available open spaces for very heavy category MOS. Do not take any decrement to light, medium or moderately heavy MOS for physical strength. These decrements are in accordance with paragraph F-2a and b, above.

o Pregnancy decrement. Utilizing the results of the physical strength decrement, reduce the number of positions available to females after taking the strength decrement as follows:

- Within each unit having a density of one position in a given MOS, that position would be closed to females.

- Within each unit having a density of two, three, or four positions in a given MOS, one of the positions would be closed to females.

- Within units having a density of five or greater positions, reduce the total positions available to females by 10 percent based on the fact that an average of 10 percent of the female force are pregnant at any given time.

o Express these limitations in terms of minimum required male fill by MOS in order to avoid the propensity to turn strength caps into quotas.

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- Compute the number of positions closed to females (male only) IAW the combat exclusion policy.
- Add the number of males required to fill open positions as a result of the male set asides to maintain physical strength capability and minimize impact of pregnancy.
- Sum to determine total required male fill by MOS in division.
 - o Computational rules for enlisted personnel.
 - For Light, Medium, and Moderately Heavy MOS: Decrement all units with open positions as described above for pregnancy. The number of closed positions (combat exclusion) plus 10 percent of open positions (or the number of males required in units with low density of MOS) to offset the impact of pregnancy yields the required male fill in those MOS.
 - Heavy MOS: Decrement the total open positions in each unit by 73 percent (reciprocal of 30 percent max female fill on the basis of physical strength plus 10 percent of the 30 percent for pregnancy yields 27 percent of available female positions). Number of male only positions (combat exclusion) plus 73 percent of the open positions due to physical strength plus pregnancy (or the number of males required to offset the impact of pregnancy in low density MOS) yields the required male fill in the division.
 - Very Heavy MOS: Decrement the total open positions in each unit by 91 percent (reciprocal of 10 percent female max fill on the basis of physical strength plus 10 percent of the 10 percent for pregnancy yields 9% of the total strength that may be female). Number of male only positions plus 91 percent of the open positions due to physical strength and pregnancy (or the number of males required to offset the impact of pregnancy in low density MOS) yields the required male fill in the division.

Table F-3.
Male/Female Enlisted Mix in Division

PHYS STR CATEGORY	QTY OF MOS	MOS PSNS (% OF TOTAL)	TOTAL PSNS IN DIVISION	TOTAL PSNS CLOSED UNITS	TOTAL PSNS OPEN UNITS
LIGHT	15	7.3	50	2	48
MEDIUM	28	13.6	591	255	336
MOD HEAVY	24	11.7	1,203	755	448
HEAVY	16	7.8	1,506	698	808
VERY HEAVY	79	38.3	11,219	8,900	2,319
N/A	28	13.6	296	153	146
UNDETERMINED	16	7.8	288	173	105
	206	100.0	15,153	10,935	4,218

TOTAL RECOMMENDED MALE FILL OF OPEN UNITS = 2,895

TOTAL FEMALE FILL (MAXIMUM) IN OPEN UNITS = 1,323 OR 31% OF ALL OPEN POSITIONS OR 9% OF ALL POSITIONS IN DIVISION

(2) Officer and warrant officer personnel.

- o Display all warrant officer MOS and officer areas of concentration (AOC) in divisional battalions and separate companies and identify the number of positions in each MOS/AOC that are closed to women, using appropriate combat exclusion policy as the basis, e.g., WCTF combat exclusion recommendation.

- Identify the number of positions, by MOS/AOC, that are open to women in each battalion/separate company.

- o There are no physical strength standards for officers, therefore female officer assignment will not be limited on the basis of physical strength.

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o Pregnancy decrement. Reduce the positions available to female officers by the same procedures as outlined above for enlisted personnel.

o Express limitations in terms of minimum required male fill of MOS/AOC.

(5) Table F-4 summarizes the results of a total division computation for all officer, warrant officer and enlisted positions.

Table F-4.

Total Male/Female Personnel Mix in Division

	ENLISTED	WO	OFFICER
TOTAL POSITIONS-DIVISION	15,153	302	1,195
NUMBER OF MOS/AOC	206	37	69
POSITIONS IN CLOSED UNITS (MALE ONLY)	10,935	203	847
POSITIONS IN OPEN UNITS (M/F)	4,218	99	348
REQUIRED MALE FILL IN OPEN UNITS	2,895	41	96
MINIMUM MALE FILL (CLOSED & OPEN UNITS)	13,830	244	943
MAXIMUM FEMALE FILL (OPEN UNITS)	1,323	58	252
PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN DIVISION			9.8%

(6) Considerations. Some considerations should be observed in applying the pregnancy decrement. As a minimum:

(a) A policy decision must be made regarding whether the pregnancy decrement should be applied equally (across the board) to all enlisted grades...Or should there be some exemptions because self motivating career considerations by the service member and routine command qualitative management procedures preclude the necessity of closing women out of certain

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key and unique positions. Exemptions should be considered for CSM, SGM, 1SG, and maybe for E-7 and above. These exemptions were not included in the WCTF computations.

(b) Should there be exemptions to the pregnancy decrement for officers as well?...e.g., command positions and other key, high visibility positions? Should all officers be exempted because of the "professionalism" and "special trust and confidence" aspects of officership? Does this same consideration apply to warrant officers?

(c) As a caution on the physical strength decrement, should the physical strength caps on heavy and very heavy category MOS be applied en masse to the enlisted population?...Or should there be exemptions for CSM, SGM, 1SG? For many of the "canner" MOS a physical strength rating is "not applicable." Should E-7 and above be exempted from physical strength limits on the theory that their duties are supervisory and not "hands on?"

APPENDIX G

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PREVIOUS MAJOR STUDIES

This appendix summarizes the three previous Women in the Army (WITA) studies as a convenience to the reader and to demonstrate the consistency of study findings during the past 10 years. Although the first two studies covered a wide range of topics, only those that relate to the subjects addressed by WCTF are spelled out here. Details of the remaining topics are available in the published study reports.

WOMEN IN THE ARMY STUDY GROUP (1976)

1. Study Purpose: DCSPER, HQDA tasked the group to "revalidate the program for the expanded role of women in the Army to assure that it provides for full and effective employment and is consistent with the current and future needs of the Army."
2. Scope. Study was done primarily from existing research and other written material. Consists of eleven subject areas:
 - a. Utilization of women in armies, past and present
 - b. Review of WEEM Model
 - c. Review of MOS open/closed to women
 - d. Methodology for a parametric approach to determining non-prior service accessions for enlisted women
 - e. Review of women officer policies and programs
 - f. Review of pregnancy/sole parent dependency policies
 - g. Review of basic training and special training
 - h. Review of MOS training

APPENDIX D USE ONLY

- i. Attitude surveys
 - j. Survey of major commands
 - k. Review of physiological, psychological and sociological factors
3. Applicable Study Conclusions.
- a. The U.S. Army has a greater female strength and a wider range of job opportunities for women than any other country studied.
 - b. The will of Congress has been interpreted as restricting women from combat although the term "combat" has been ill defined. All MOS should be reviewed to determine if they should be closed due to national policy or for management considerations, and this list of closed MOS should be reviewed on a regular basis. Reasons for closure of MOS to females must be clearly stated for each MOS and list of closed MOS be published.
 - c. The current (DOD, 1976) pregnancy separation policy has significant impact on readiness, deployability and mission accomplishment and therefore, the option to determine retention of pregnant women should be returned to the Army.
 - d. Based on reports from the field, the GAO and the DAIG, a review of MOS training, and its relationship to the field environment are essential to establishing MOS related physical and operational standards. The scope of establishing these standards was beyond the scope of the study and a TRADOC proposed approach to the problem should be pursued. MACOM commanders were concerned about the need to set minimum physical standards for all personnel in each MOS.
 - e. Concerning the physiological, psychological, and sociological factors which impact on the utilization of women, there are more unknowns than knowns regarding the effect of women in units, and many of the questions must be

answered before any significant changes are made to current policies and programs. A clear differential currently exists between the militarily relevant physical capabilities of males and females, strongly in favor of males. The full potential of women has not been established and considerable improvement can be made in physical fitness programs for women. Observational studies should be made on the effects of combat stress in mixed sex groups.

4. Applicable Study Recommendations.

a. That the Army publicize its rationale for continued exclusion of women from a direct combat role, i.e., it is a national policy as evidenced by the views of Congress. That a precise definition of the term "combat" be developed. That 67 MOS, as determined with MILPERCEN, should be closed for reasons of both combat/close combat support and personnel management considerations. That criteria for closure of MOS to women be based on:

1. Skills directly involved in combat or directly contributing to inflicting casualties or equipment damage on the enemy.

2. Skills utilized primarily in areas where close combat operations would occur.

3. On a temporary basis, skills in which women would not have a manageable and viable career.

b. Army continue efforts to reverse the current DOD pregnancy separation policy (and return to involuntary separation of pregnant soldiers), develop parameters to review individual retention requests in event pregnancy separation policy is reversed, and establish better data collection for both pregnancy and sole parent cases to determine need for future policy changes.

c. The TRADOC concept for developing physical and operational standards be approved and monitored to completion.

d. Establish a policy that qualified females may be utilized by commanders to accomplish unit mission regardless of battlefield geographical location as long as combat exclusion policies are not violated.

e. Research on performance capabilities/limitations of women soldiers and on psychological/sociological factors receive continued emphasis.

EVALUATION OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY (1978)

1. Study Purpose. Determine the maximum number of women by MOS/specialty and grade that can be assigned without reducing the capability of units to accomplish their mission. This assessment is essential as a prelude to decisions to substantially increase the number of women in the Army.

2. Scope. Evaluation was designed to comprehensively review the entire subject of Women in the Army, examining all past and ongoing policies, procedures and issues; MOS, mission statements and unit functions in light of combat exclusion; and observing job performance worldwide. Subject areas addressed were:

a. Analyze all MOS/specialties currently closed to women (excluding infantry, armor, cavalry) to determine if they should be opened to women.

b. Analyze Category I units to identify those which should be open to women.

c. Determine the total number of interchangeable positions that could be filled by women; calculate maximum female content of each MOS.

d. Analyze other factors impacting on utilization of women, including pregnancy, physical capabilities, overseas housing, field uniforms and equipment, leadership, sole parents, fraternization, intra-service marriage, utilization of women, adequate job descriptions, stress/self image/emotionality/aggressiveness, and hygiene/menses.

3. Applicable Study Conclusions.

a. Need a combat exclusion definition which is free of ambiguity. Combat exclusion and career progression considerations should be overriding factors in determining MOS/specialties closed to women.

b. The combat exclusion definition applied against the normal battlefield deployment of TOE units provides a valid basis for closing units to women. As doctrine changes, new judgements must be made. The Category I, II, and III designations for TOE units have no consistent, supportable foundations as a basis for assignment criteria.

c. There is clear evidence that certain physical capabilities of men are greater than those of women.

(1) The current lack of established performance standards, unvalidated critical tasks, and the absence of a system for measuring potential against the standards, precludes reliable determination of the physical capabilities soldiers of either sex must possess to do the job. Based on experience and documented evidence, female incumbents in certain MOS cannot perform all of the physically demanding tasks. The Army cannot be assured of accomplishing the ground combat mission if women are randomly accessed into positions with physically demanding tasks that exceed their capabilities.

(2) Physical strength capabilities of women can, however, be improved through conditioning.

(3) It appears that when tests of physical strength have been standardized and physical requirements by MOS firmly established, a gender free system can be implemented. If this is achieved, complaints regarding the MOS qualifications of women will be reduced significantly.

d. The issue of pregnancy is perceived by the Army in the field as the greatest impediment to full integration of women.

(1) Commanders face problems associated with operational readiness, deployability of unit members, field training and morale. They must decide on an individual basis how to meet commitments with pregnant women assigned.

(2) In general, unit leaders do not cope well with the entire pregnancy issue. In many cases the women do not pull their share of extra duty, are exempted from field duty, draw full pay and allowances without earning them, and are not required to maintain minimum dress standards. Morale of other soldiers is lowered by the real or perceived inequitable treatment.

(3) Based on available information, the current policy of the Army concerning pregnancy cases is not cost effective.

e. Although there are more men than women sole parents in the Army, a higher percentage of the female soldier population is sole parents. The inability of sole parents (male or female) to pull shift work because of unreliable child care facilities, their questionable dependability in the event of mobilization and status with regards to deployability are areas of concern to the field. Due to unique problems associated with their particular circumstances, sole parents are perceived as receiving preferential treatment within their units.

f. The areas of stress, self image, emotionality and aggressiveness were perceived as problems by the field based on questionnaire responses. Subject was not further pursued in the study.

4. Applicable Study Recommendations.

a. That the criteria for closure of MOS/specialties to women be based on combat exclusion, career progression, physical capabilities and (to a lesser extent) attitudes and perceptions. Based on combat exclusion, 25 MOS/specialties were designated closed to women. Based on career progression, 22 additional MOS/specialties were designated closed. Using physical capabilities, supported by attitudes and perceptions, 14 more MOS designated closed pending validation of physical job requirements and development of physical testing capability.

b. That 15 Category I units (HHC and service batteries of FA cannon battalions) that were continued closed by the 1977 combat exclusion decision be opened. Analysis disclosed no conflict between the mission of these units and the combat exclusion definition, battlefield deployment considerations, nor established doctrine. That nine Category I units (Engineer bridge, assault helicopter, and other company level units) that were opened to women by the 1977 combat exclusion decision be closed for the reasons indicated. That the Army discontinue the use of Category I, II and III designations as a basis for assignment considerations.

c. That when a gender-free system for measuring strength potential is developed and implemented, MOS/specialties closed to women due to physical capability considerations be opened to personnel who qualify under the new system. That a coordinated effort be initiated to establish and validate performance standards for all MOS/specialties. That DA establish specific strength requirements by MOS. That tests be developed and administered at the military entrance stations to determine the strength potential of enlistees

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prior to actual enlistment. That the Army include in MOS training and skill qualification tests (SQT), tests of physical capabilities to perform the critical tasks of MOS and skill level.

d. That a pregnancy policy with two options be implemented: involuntary separation upon determination by medical authority that soldier is no longer deployable, or absence without pay (except medical care) when no longer deployable and when accrued leave is exhausted. In event pregnancy terminates prior to birth of child, the service woman is relieved of these provisions. If the absence without pay option is selected, before the service member can return to duty she must show evidence that she is physically fit, and that formal child care arrangements have been made to permit her assignment or deployment to an area where dependents are not authorized.

e. That any service member who becomes a sole parent and retains physical custody of a dependent under 18 years of age be offered the following options:

(1) If sole parent status is attained by death, separation or divorce, the service member:

(a) Be required to provide evidence that formal child care arrangements (notarized statement by the natural and substitute parent(s)) have been made or be given one year in which to make these arrangements, in accordance with Section I or II, AR 614-200.

(b) Be separated from the service at the end of the year if satisfactory arrangements have not been made.

(2) If sole parent status is attained through adoption, the service member:

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(a) Be required at the time of adoption to provide evidence of formal child care arrangements (notarized statement by the natural and substitute parent(s)) to prevent delay or deferral in the event of assignment or deployment to an area where dependents are not authorized.

(b) Be separated from the service if satisfactory arrangements have not been made.

WOMEN IN THE ARMY POLICY REVIEW GROUP (1982)

1. Study Purpose. Assess how current Army policies concerning women impact on Army mission and readiness, to include mobility and deployment, and how these policies affect retention and quality of life for women. Develop long range policies which will ensure a combat ready, cost effective force.
2. Scope. Study group initially developed 19 issues. Combat exclusion policy/direct combat and MOS physical requirements were addressed by the study as the major issues affecting combat readiness. Pregnancy was referred to DOD as a policy matter requiring joint study. The following issues were referred to other Army staff activities for resolution.

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| a. Fraternization | i. Career development |
| b. In-service married couples | j. Lost time |
| c. Sole parents | k. Attrition |
| d. Sexual harassment | l. Migration |
| e. Female clothing | m. Retention |
| f. Nutrition | n. Malutilization |
| g. Extreme temperatures | o. Field hygiene |
| h. Child care | |

3. Applicable Study Conclusions.

- a. Based on physical demands analysis:

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(1) The average female recruit has 50 to 75 percent of strength, stamina and muscle mass of the average male recruit, with greatest disparity in upper body strength. Upper body strength appears to be the limiting factor in military job performance.

(2) The major physical capacity requirements for most military jobs are lifting and carrying.

(3) Majority of Army jobs have heavy or very heavy (as defined by Dept of Labor classification system) work requirements.

(4) Performance can be predicted with respect to criterion tasks by measuring predictors associated with soldier strength and stamina.

(5) Entry level assessment of physical work capacity during induction will be useful for selection and assignment of all enlisted personnel.

(6) Soldier's strength and stamina can be substantially improved with an appropriate training program.

b. Women should be excluded from serving in positions requiring routine engagement in direct combat. These positions are primarily located forward of the brigade rear boundary. 302,000 of the 572,000 enlisted duty positions have the highest probability of routinely engaging in direct combat.

4. Applicable Study Recommendations.

a. The Physical Demands Analysis system as the basis for a gender-free physical strength capacity test should be adopted.

b. All soldiers should be matched to their job through demonstrated physical capacity at least equivalent to that required by the job.

c. The Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) should be validated expeditiously by the Army.

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d. The Army adopt the WITAPRG definition of "direct combat" and women be restricted from positions that have a high probability of routinely engaging in direct combat.

e. Based on the concept of direct combat probability coding, formulated by WITAPRG, an additional 23 MOS's be closed to women.

f. Implement a transition plan which halts enlistments of women into closed MOS, provides for voluntary reclassification of female soldiers into another MOS for which qualified and honors existing enlistment contracts.

APPENDIX H

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